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Foreword
VERY LONGRUN FORECASTING IS a hazardous activity because the uncer-tainties and imponderables of life have 
plenty of time to intrude, and bend and buck the 
charted path. At the same time, to craft policy 
that is rooted in reason and reality, we need to 
peer into the future with the best information, sta-
tistics, and models that we have. Th at is what we 
have tried to do in Global Development Horizons. 
We have marshaled some of our best analysts and 
researchers to undertake this task. Let me thank 
them for taking on this hazardous and somewhat 
thankless job, but also remind them that one 
advantage they have is that, by the time the accu-
racy of their forecasts becomes known, most of 
them will have moved on to other pursuits.   
Th e aim of this edition of Global Development 
Horizons is to build scenarios for the global econ-
omy over, roughly, the next two decades, with 
special focus given to saving and investment. 
Developing countries’ share in global investment 
has grown from less than 20 percent to almost 
one-half in the past 15 years. A similar pattern is 
observed for saving. Only a minor part of these 
trends in saving and investment is due to the 
consequences of the 2008 global ﬁ nancial crisis. 
Most of the changes have emerged as a result of 
entrenched economic and demographic forces. 
Productivity catch-up, together with increasing 
integration into global markets, sound macro-
economic policies, and improved education and 
health, have contributed to an acceleration of 
growth and large increases in investment and 
saving rates in many developing countries. A fur-
ther boost has been provided by the demographic 
dividend, which has reached peak levels in many 
countries. The rising investment and saving 
rates within developing countries, together with 
the expanding share of developing countries in 
global GDP, have led to a spectacular dominance 
by developing countries in global investment 
dynamics. Two-thirds of the growth in global 
investment over the last ten years has originated 
in developing countries.
To varying degrees, these forces will remain 
in play in the medium to long run. Current pro-
jections indicate that the world population will 
grow from around 7 billion in 2010 to more 
than 8.5 billion in 2030. Th e addition of more 
than 1.4 billion people will occur almost exclu-
sively in developing countries. More crucially, 
there will be a signiﬁ cant shift in the age struc-
ture of both developing and advanced countries. 
Aging in high-income countries, emerging East 
Asia, and the transition economies of Europe 
and Central Asia will affect both saving and 
investment behavior. In Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, on the other hand, the population 
will remain relatively young. Concurrent with 
these demographic trends, developing coun-
tries will continue to catch up with the higher 
productivity levels that exist in more advanced 
economies. 
These trends raise some pressing questions 
about the ﬁ nancing of future global patterns of 
investment, and the answers to these are not at all 
obvious. For example, will aging societies starve 
the global economy of capital as the elderly draw 
down their stock of savings? Or will robust eco-
nomic growth boost younger workers’ incomes 
and saving? Will investment opportunities 
decline rapidly as the growth of the labor force 
slows across the world? To address these ques-
tions this edition of Global Development Horizons 
develops two scenarios of investment, saving, and 
capital ﬂ ows through 2030, based on alternative 
paths of productivity and fundamental drivers of 
structural change.
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markets. As a result, the global financial crisis 
illustrated that developing countries are vulner-
able to what happens in dominant ﬁ nancial cen-
ters in high-income countries. Th is is unlikely to 
persist in scenarios in which developing coun-
tries’ share of global saving and investment con-
tinues to rise.
The printed copy of this edition of Global 
Development Horizons will be just one part of 
a broader multimedia ensemble. The accom-
panying website, http://www.worldbank.org/
CapitalForTh eFuture, includes access to a host 
of related electronic resources, including data 
sets behind the two main scenarios presented in 
this report, background papers, technical appen-
dixes, interactive widgets that allow the inter-
ested reader to explore variations to some of the 
assumptions used in the projections, and related 
audio and video resources.
By setting out the implications of emerg-
ing trends as they will play out over the next 
two decades, this edition of Global Development 
Horizons should help policy makers become bet-
ter armed with knowledge both in terms of posi-
tioning their respective countries in a new, multi-
polar, global economy, and in terms of adapting 
to potential challenges they will inevitably face, 
at home and beyond, in the near and more dis-
tant future. 
Kaushik Basu
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist
Th e World Bank
Th e forward-looking scenarios explored in this 
report come at a critical juncture in the global 
economy. In the field of saving, developing-
country governments are pondering strategies for 
expanding social services amid fiscal pressures 
emanating from their aging populations. In the 
investment arena, policy makers in developing 
countries are looking to spur domestic economic 
activity as they seek to reorient away from export-
led growth while decoupling from the malaise 
still hindering the developed world. And in terms 
of capital markets, the global ﬁ nancial crisis has 
promoted a rethinking of the beneﬁ ts and costs 
of unbridled capital f lows, coupled with the 
widespread view that there is a pressing need for 
reform of the international ﬁ nancial system.
One key prognosis discussed at some length 
in the report is that, in spite of pressures from 
population aging, the world will not face a short-
age of saving in the future, and yields on capi-
tal are expected to remain fairly stable through 
2030. Th is stability of saving at the global level, 
however, belies a significant shift in composi-
tion. By 2030, developing countries will account 
for around two-thirds of every dollar saved and 
invested (compared with about half today), and 
around half of the stock of global capital will 
reside in the developing world, compared to less 
than one-third today. Th is implies a huge chal-
lenge for financial intermediation in develop-
ing countries. Currently, many countries with a 
dominant position in trade and production play 
a relatively minor role in international ﬁ nancial 
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Overview
 MAJOR STRUCTUR AL TR ANSformations under way in the global economy will shape the economic 
fortunes of nations for decades to come. The 
gradual acceleration of trend growth in develop-
ing countries, which started during the 1990s, 
has increased their contribution not only to 
global investment but also to global saving. Th is 
is a signiﬁ cant change from a few decades ago, 
when many considered low national saving rates 
and diﬃ  culty in attracting foreign capital to be 
constraints to investment and growth in devel-
oping countries. Collectively, developing coun-
tries’ domestic saving stood at 34 percent of 
their gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, up 
from 21 percent in 1970, and their investment 
was around 33 percent of their GDP in 2012, 
up from 22 percent. As a result of the upward 
trends in these rates and an accelerated economic 
expansion, developing countries’ share of global 
saving now stands at 46 percent, nearly double 
the level of the mid-1960s. 
What is behind these trends, and will they 
continue in the future or are they a short-term 
phenomenon? What do they mean for devel-
opment and poverty reduction? This report 
addresses these questions, identifying key eco-
nomic and structural drivers that, together with 
demographic shifts, will aﬀ ect saving and invest-
ment decisions over the next two decades—and 
thus the global distribution of capital in the 
future. Th e report builds two distinct scenarios 
that serve as “economic laboratories” to study the 
potential consequences of changes in these driv-
ers. Th e main diﬀ erences between the two sce-
narios are (a) the speed of convergence between 
the developed and developing worlds in per capita 
income levels (due to productivity catch-up), and 
(b) the pace of structural transformations in the 
two groups (such as ﬁ nancial development and 
improvements in institutional quality). In the 
ﬁ rst scenario, this convergence is gradual, while in 
the second, convergence is more rapid. 
Convergence between the developed and 
developing worlds was elusive for much of the 
20th century. But upgrading of education and 
health, improvements in governance, continued 
economic and financial globalization, and the 
rapid diffusion of information and communi-
cations technologies increasingly point toward 
such convergence as reality (Spence 2011). Th e 
two convergence scenarios do not account for 
every trend or shock that may have an important 
economic impact over the time horizon consid-
ered, such as climate change, commodity shocks, 
or financial crises. Indeed, these scenarios are 
not intended to be forecasts and should not be 
judged by their likelihood of materializing. Th eir 
usefulness is in illustrating as clearly as possible 
how upcoming changes in the global patterns 
of growth, demographic change, and structural 
variables will affect—in a way fundamentally 
diﬀ erent from the past—saving, investment, and 
capital ﬂ ows. 
In the gradual convergence scenario, the aver-
age per capita income of the developing world 
will rise from about 8 percent of that in high-
income countries in 2010 to about 16 percent by 
2030. In the rapid convergence scenario, the gap 
between the two country groups is smaller: an 
average citizen of what is now a developing coun-
try will, by 2030, earn 19 percent of the income 
of an average citizen of a high-income country. 
Th e gradual and rapid scenarios predict average 
world economic growth of 2.6 percent and 3 per-
cent per year, respectively, during the next two 
decades; the developing world’s growth will aver-
age an annual rate of 4.8 percent in the gradual 
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convergence scenario and 5.5 percent in the rapid 
one. With gradual convergence, the contribution 
of developing countries to global growth will rise 
from 73 percent around 2015 to 87 percent by 
2030; with rapid convergence, developing coun-
tries’ contribution will reach 93 percent by the 
end of the period. In both scenarios, developing 
countries’ employment in services will account 
for more than 60 percent of their total employ-
ment by 2030, their share of total expenditure on 
food items will be halved, and they will account 
for more than 50 percent of global trade.
The increasing global weight of investment 
activity in developing countries under these sce-
narios will not mechanically materialize but will 
require two conditions to be fulﬁ lled: ﬁ rst, pro-
ductivity growth and sectoral shifts will have to 
create enough investment opportunities. Second, 
both domestic and international investors will 
have to be willing to ﬁ nance these investments 
and allocate two-thirds of global savings to devel-
oping countries. Fulﬁ llment of these conditions 
depends on major structural changes and contin-
ued improvements in governance over the next 
two decades.
Thus, the scenario analysis considers how 
structural and institutional factors may change in 
the future. In the gradual convergence scenario, 
these structural factors are assumed to evolve in 
a fashion consistent with their historical patterns. 
In the rapid convergence scenario, however, struc-
tural transformations are assumed to break away 
from historical trends and proceed more quickly. 
This would occur if, for instance, the techno-
logical wave from the third industrial revolution 
becomes entrenched globally and fundamentally 
changes the economic and institutional struc-
tures of developing countries. In such a scenario, 
ﬁ nancial markets in economies like Brazil, India, 
and those of the Middle East will develop consid-
erably, with these countries attaining, by 2030, 
a level of ﬁ nancial development comparable to 
the United States in the early 1980s. Similarly, 
the quality of institutions in developing countries 
will tend to improve signiﬁ cantly. Importantly, 
the rate of progress in these variables will diﬀ er 
among countries: for economies starting further 
away from the frontier, the rate of growth will be 
relatively faster.
Outlooks under the 
two scenarios
Th e two scenarios presented in this report oﬀ er 
a picture of the future of global capital that does 
not parallel recent trends, providing a template for 
thinking strategically about a number of global 
ﬁ nancial and economic challenges looming ahead 
and their implications for policy today. Th e main 
ﬁ ndings of the report are summarized below.
Th e world will not run out of saving in the 
future, and global investment rates, saving 
rates, and yields on capital will remain fairly 
stable through 2030
Aging will tend to be less pronounced in develop-
ing economies than in advanced economies over 
the forthcoming two decades. In addition, eco-
nomic growth and the speed of ﬁ nancial market 
development will be greater in developing coun-
tries. Under the gradual convergence scenario, 
the saving rate of the developing world will inch 
down from a peak of 34 percent in 2014 to 32 
percent in 2030, while the saving rate for high-
income economies will fall from 20 percent to 16 
percent over the same period (ﬁ gure O.1, panel 
b). However, the world will not run out of saving 
because the global saving rate depends not only 
on country-level saving rates but also on econo-
mies’ relative sizes. Th e shift of global economic 
weight toward high-saving developing economies 
means that, by 2030, developing countries will 
account for 62–64 percent of total world saving, 
depending on which scenario is considered, up 
from 45 percent in 2010. Th is shift in economic 
weight will compensate for the reduction in sav-
ing rates at the country level, so that the global 
saving rate will remain more or less unchanged.
 With robust economic growth moderating 
the negative impacts of aging and ﬁ nancial mar-
ket development on developing countries’ saving 
rates, and with no signiﬁ cant increase in invest-
ment demand as growth slows moderately after 
2020 in most countries, it is unlikely that there 
will be increased tension between global saving 
supply and capital demand. Accordingly, there 
will not be signiﬁ cant upward pressure on yields, 
even in the rapid convergence scenario, under 
which the average global yield is expected to rise 
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by roughly half a percentage point between 2014 
and 2030. 
Global investment will expand at a rate in line 
with overall output, amounting to $26.7 trillion 
(in 2010 dollars, or more than a quarter of the 
global output of $105 trillion) by 2030 under the 
gradual convergence scenario (ﬁ gure O.1, panel a).
Th e distribution of the global stock of capital 
will shift toward the developing world, but 
wealth may remain concentrated among high-
income households in developing economies
Th e increased signiﬁ cance of developing coun-
tries as suppliers and demanders of global saving 
will lead to a redistribution of the world stock of 
capital and wealth. In the gradual convergence 
scenario, by 2030, half of the global stock of capi-
tal—$158 trillion (in 2010 dollars)—will reside 
in the developing world (ﬁ gure O.2). Th is will 
mean an acceleration of the shift in the global 
distribution of national wealth. The bimodal 
distribution of national wealth per capita, which 
currently displays a large “hump” of middle-
income countries and a smaller peak of a number 
of high-income countries, may well become more 
balanced as more middle-income countries build 
their per capita national wealth.
 The more-equal distribution of capital and 
wealth between countries does not imply, however, 
that such redistributive shifts will be replicated 
within countries. Indeed, saving (and wealth) 
in developing countries is highly concentrated 
among upper-income households. Data at the 
household level show that the least educated 
groups tend to have the lowest lifetime income 
and low or no savings, suggesting an inability to 
improve their earning capacity and, for the poor-
est, to escape poverty traps. If the distribution of 
education among workers of future generations 
were to remain as unequal as it is today, this would 
perpetuate inequality of earning capacity, saving, 
and wealth in the future. Leveling the playing 
ﬁ eld in terms of educational opportunities could 
thus be supported not just in terms of fairness but 
also—given the positive eﬀ ect on private saving—
in terms of efficiency. In Mexico, for instance, 
augmenting demographic projections with educa-
tional attainment yields a household saving rate 
in 2050 that is almost 5 percentage points above 
a scenario that does not take into account the 
impact of changes in education (ﬁ gure O.3).
 Sub-Saharan Africa will be the only region 
not experiencing a decline in its saving rate, 
while East Asia and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia will record the largest reductions
Diﬀ erences in the timing of demographic transi-
tions imply that saving, factor prices, and income 
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older than the average person, while those ben-
eﬁ ting from higher wages will tend to be younger.
Set against these heterogeneous demographic 
pressures is the role of economic growth. Increases 
in productivity, resulting from technological 
advancement as well as institutional improve-
ments, can raise the amount of output produced 
with a given amount of input. For some countries 
and regions, accelerated growth associated with 
productivity advancements will increase national 
saving, with younger cohorts of the population 
receiving larger lifetime per capita incomes such 
that they increase their saving more than older 
cohorts reduce theirs.
For these reasons, the stability of investment 
and saving rates at the global level masks sub-
stantial heterogeneity in country experiences. 
Indonesia, Japan, and the Russian Federation, 
for example, will experience sharp reductions in 
the working-age share of their populations and 
thus will see their saving rates fall signiﬁ cantly 
through 2030. In contrast, economies such as 
Brazil and Mexico will experience a more gradual 
decline. Sub-Saharan Africa,  with its relatively 
young and rapidly growing population and robust 
distribution will all be aﬀ ected diﬀ erently across 
countries. In aging economies, labor becomes 
scarcer with respect to capital, thus raising real 
wages relative to the return to capital. Th is diver-
gence in the path of factor prices has intergenera-
tional distribution eﬀ ects: asset holders adversely 
aﬀ ected by lower capital returns will tend to be 
FIGURE O.2 Developing countries will represent more than half of global capital stocks by 
2030 in the gradual convergence scenario, compared with about a third in 2010
Source: World Bank projections.
Note: Capital stocks are calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a constant depreciation rate of 5 percent.
a. Panel b projections assume a gradual convergence scenario of annual world economic growth of 2.6 percent over the next two decades, of 
which developing (high-income) growth will average 5.0 (1.0) percent annually.
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driver of saving by Mexican households
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account for almost half of all global manufactur-
ing investment.
The heterogeneity in investment patterns 
across countries will be more pronounced in the 
rapid convergence scenario. With ﬁ nancial devel-
opment and institutional quality advancing at a 
faster pace under this scenario, developing econo-
mies in general will attract an even greater share 
of global saving. Some economies, such as China 
and India, will have investment rates of around 1 
percent higher in the rapid convergence scenario 
than in the gradual convergence scenario by 
2030. Economies such as Brazil and Indonesia, 
on the other hand, will see slightly lower rates 
of investment in the rapid convergence scenario 
(although their investment levels will be unam-
biguously higher) because their output will grow 
even faster than investment.
Th e future patterns of investment will entail 
not only geographic shifts but also sectoral ones. 
As countries become richer, demand shifts toward 
services. However, whether investment in the ser-
vices sector rises concomitantly depends on the 
capital intensities of services relative to the other 
sectors. In the gradual convergence scenario, ser-
vices as a share of total investment in developing 
countries will grow from 57 percent to 61 per-
cent. Th is shift will likely be realized alongside 
demographic changes that will increase demand 
for educational, health, and infrastructural ser-
vices, as well as a global move toward greater 
trade in services and a larger share of services 
being embedded in tradable goods.
A strong ﬂ ow of investment into services will 
be evident in infrastructure. Measured in terms 
of value, infrastructural needs will be largest in 
developing East and South Asia (ﬁ gure O.4) in 
light of population growth pressures and rapid 
increases in per capita income. Even exempting 
maintenance costs and replacement investments, 
fully meeting anticipated population coverage 
targets will result in a global infrastructure bill for 
developing countries that amounts to about $866 
billion annually in 2030 (in 2010 dollars), consti-
tuting about 10 percent of all services investment 
in developing countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where infrastructure needs are especially acute, 
it will amount to as much as 23 percent of total 
investment.
rate of growth due to productivity catch-up, will 
be the only region not experiencing a signiﬁ cant 
decline in its saving rate over the time horizon 
considered here. In absolute terms, however, sav-
ing will continue to be dominated by Asia and the 
Middle East: in the gradual convergence scenario, 
China will save far more, in absolute terms, than 
any other country in 2030—$9 trillion in 2010 
dollars—with India a distant second with $1.7 
trillion, having surpassed the levels of Japan and 
the United States in the 2020s.
The aging of the population will bring 
increases in age-related expenditures such as pen-
sions and health services, putting pressure on 
public ﬁ nances. In China, for example, total age-
related public expenditures would increase by 5.4 
percent of GDP between 2010 and 2030 if the 
generosity and coverage of the pension, health-
care, and education systems were to remain con-
stant; if China were to converge with U.S. gen-
erosity and coverage levels, age-related public 
expenditures would rise by 18.6 percent of GDP. 
China and India will account for the majority 
of global investment, and investment will 
shift toward the services sector, especially in 
infrastructure 
Strong economic growth will underpin China’s 
leadership in global gross capital formation over 
the next two decades. In the gradual conver-
gence scenario, China will account for 30 per-
cent of global investment by 2030. Elsewhere 
in the developing world, robust growth will be 
associated with high investment rates as well. 
Brazil, India, and Russia, together, will account 
for more than 13 percent of global investment 
in 2030, more than the United States. Among 
high-income countries, relatively strong institu-
tions and continued technological advantage will 
mean that investment rates remain fairly stable, at 
around 17 percent of output. In terms of volumes, 
investment in the developing world will reach 
$15 trillion (in 2010 dollars) versus $10 trillion 
in high-income economies. As is the case for sav-
ing, China and India will be the largest investors 
among developing countries—the two countries 
combined will represent 38 percent of the global 
gross investment in 2030, versus 40 percent in 
all high-income countries combined—and will 
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because faster financial development attracts 
capital and at the same time moderates private 
saving. Th ese net capital inﬂ ows will not come 
primarily from the North but from newly indus-
trialized East Asian countries, most notably 
China.
The relevance of capital f lows, however, 
extends well beyond the balance of a coun-
try’s borrowing or lending as captured by net 
inﬂ ows or outﬂ ows. From a policy perspective, it 
is equally important to also examine the future 
path of gross ﬂ ows. As developing countries’ vol-
umes of gross inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows expand in the 
future, the potential beneﬁ ts to these countries 
are significant: diversification of idiosyncratic 
national risks, the imposition of greater market 
discipline on policy making, and the opportunity 
to supplement domestic saving in ramping up 
ﬁ xed investment and growth. Gross inﬂ ows and 
outﬂ ows can be thought of as trade in ﬁ nancial 
assets. In this sense, the future path of a country’s 
gross capital inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows depends on (a) 
the strength of demand for foreign assets; (b) the 
country’s capacity to supply assets with return 
and risk characteristics appealing to interna-
tional investors and creditors; and (c) the degree 
of frictions—for example, problems of asym-
metric information—that potentially inhibit this 
exchange. 
Institutional improvement and f inancial 
market development in the developing world, 
combined with an environment of rising per-
ceived risk in high-income economies, appear 
set to remove advanced countries’ monopoly 
on supplying high-quality assets. Encouraged 
by improvements in the business environment, 
solid economic growth, and demographic trends 
supportive of growing consumer demand, inves-
tors have shown greater interest in developing 
countries far beyond large emerging markets, 
as demonstrated perhaps most clearly in recent 
years by the growing level of capital inﬂ ows to 
Sub-Saharan African countries. In the future, 
improvements in institutional factors will co-
evolve with ongoing regional and global integra-
tion of developing countries’ ﬁ nancial markets, 
rendering developing countries much more sig-
nificant sources, destinations, and potentially 
also intermediaries of global capital ﬂ ows.
Developing countries will account for a 
greater share of gross capital inﬂ ows and 
outﬂ ows in the future
Th e shifting geographic patterns of saving and 
investment activity will also manifest in pat-
terns of global capital f lows. In the gradual 
convergence scenario, much of the developing 
world will run moderate, gradually attenuat-
ing def icits. This pattern will predominate 
among countries that are relatively early in their 
demographic transitions and have significant 
scope for ﬁ nancial market development, which 
tends to moderate saving and at the same time 
boost investment. For example, India and, on 
aggregate, Sub-Saharan Africa ﬁ t this descrip-
tion well; they will run current account defi-
cits averaging 2.4 percent and 3.2 percent of 
GDP, respectively, over 2010–30 in the gradual 
convergence scenario. Under the rapid conver-
gence scenario, this pattern will be even starker 
F IGURE O.4 Annual infrastructure needs over the next 20 
years are likely to be greatest in East and South Asia
Source: World Bank projections.
Note: Details of the methodology underlying the projections are given in the Global 
Development Horizons online annex 1.5.
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grow to become significant at the global level. 
Developing countries’ financial markets will 
play a much greater role in intermediating capi-
tal ﬂ ows than they do today, both in their role 
as intermediaries of South-South f lows and in 
their intermediation of capital ﬂ ows to and from 
the North. Reserve accumulation will likely 
decline as a share of developing countries’ out-
ﬂ ows, displaced by private ﬂ ows as ﬁ nancial mar-
kets develop and as exchange rate regimes move 
toward greater ﬂ exibility.
Complex policy challenges will arise from 
changing patterns of saving, investment, and 
capital ﬂ ows
Th e patterns of saving, investment, and capital 
f lows through 2030 will affect economic con-
ditions from the household level to the global 
macroeconomic level, with implications not only 
for national policy makers but also for interna-
tional institutions and policy coordination. Th e 
rapid growth in cross-border capital ﬂ ows in the 
decades ahead will make the world’s economies 
more integrated than at any time in history. Eight 
main policy messages stem from the three chap-
ters in this report: 
Th e scenario analysis estimates that develop-
ing countries will account for 47–60 percent of 
global capital inﬂ ows in 2030, up from 23 per-
cent in 2010 (figure O.5). Relative to develop-
ing countries’ GDP, however, the increase is 
less dramatic: inﬂ ows are foreseen to represent 
6–11 percent of their GDP in 2030, versus 7 
percent in 2010. Th ere will also be clear changes 
in the regional distribution of capital f lows. 
Disaggregating the projected increase in capi-
tal inﬂ ows to the developing world by country 
shows that China will be an important part of the 
story, but by no means will it be a China story—
nor a BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
story—alone. By 2030, no single country will 
attract as great a share of global inﬂ ows as the 
United States or the Euro Area does today. 
Moreover, small and medium-size developing 
countries will collectively matter much more in 
the global economy than they do today, particu-
larly in terms of their role in global ﬁ nancial mar-
kets and in driving capital ﬂ ows.
With developing countries accounting for 
nearly half or more of both global gross inﬂ ows 
and outﬂ ows under both scenarios, the South-
South component of gross capital f lows will 
F IGURE O.5 By 2030, nearly half or more of gross capital inﬂ ows will likely go to 
developing countries
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the IMF International Financial Statistics database. 
Note: Inﬂ ows are depicted in nominal dollars, assuming a constant 3.5 percent world inﬂ ation rate, where inﬂ ation is based on the 2003–07 ﬁ ve-
year average from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database. Gradual and rapid convergence refer to projected scenarios concerning the 
relative pace of convergence between developed and developing economies in terms of income and structural changes.
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pose a major challenge. Infrastructure needs will 
have to be ﬁ nanced in a challenging environment 
in which demographic pressures will exacerbate 
public sector funding diﬃ  culties. Infrastructure 
financing is particularly challenging given the 
long-term nature (and associated risks) of these 
investments. Moreover, as developing countries 
constitute a larger and larger share of the world 
economy, they may outgrow traditional sources 
of infrastructure ﬁ nancing, such as lending by 
international ﬁ nancial institutions. To meet their 
future infrastructure financing needs, policy 
makers in developing countries will need to lever-
age private sector ﬁ nancing through public-pri-
vate partnerships as well as tap structured ﬁ nanc-
ing from global capital markets.
Government will have to sustainably manage 
public ﬁ nances with an eye toward the forthcoming 
demographic changes. A large increase in the share 
of population past working age, in combination 
with increased demand for health-care services 
in the later years of life that will come with ris-
ing incomes, will strain budgets. Th e shift in the 
composition of public expenditure toward health 
care and pensions will be offset only margin-
ally by the expected impact of aging on educa-
tion spending. Furthermore, in most developing 
countries, the scope for decreases in non-age-
related expenditures is quite limited. Complex 
policy challenges will arise from eﬀ orts to keep 
the public burden of health care and pensions 
under control while limiting the decline in ben-
eﬁ ts and services. In the face of unprecedented 
aging, for many developing countries, the public 
pension and health-care models pursued in the 
past will no longer be viable options. Looking 
forward, part of the policy challenge will be to 
transition to systems with greater participation by 
private markets.
Demographic shifts due to changes in household 
structure will increase the importance of ﬁ nancial 
markets in providing for income support during old 
age. As incomes rise, household size tends to fall 
as workers are more geographically mobile and 
older individuals are more able to live indepen-
dently on their accumulated savings. Alongside 
this reduction in household size tends to come a 
profound transformation of the old-age support 
structure away from an informal, multigenera-
tional household system to more formal private 
National policy makers seeking to support invest-
ment activity in their economies should concentrate 
their eﬀ orts on establishing a favorable investment 
climate. Th e importance of ﬁ nancial development 
and institutional quality in attracting investment 
from the global pool of saving, amply demon-
strated by the diﬀ erence in investment patterns 
in the rapid versus gradual convergence scenarios, 
underscores the importance of structural and 
institutional change for countries to eﬀ ectively 
compete in the future world economy. Taking 
steps to improve the development of the ﬁ nancial 
sector and adjusting policies to raise the overall 
quality of governance can be eﬀ ective for coun-
tries seeking to sustain high rates of private sector 
investment. Th is is not to say that public invest-
ment is irrelevant, since there may be a role for 
intervention where market failures are clear and 
where social returns are especially large. If policy 
makers do decide to pursue the interventionist 
route with regard to investment policy, attention 
should be paid to the institutional design. High 
levels of accountability should be maintained, 
and interventions should have clear sunset clauses 
to better align private sector incentives in an envi-
ronment of active private sector competition.
Policy makers will have to recognize the forth-
coming increasing demand for services and facili-
tate the needed accompanying investment. In many 
developing countries, governments currently 
engage in policies that, directly or indirectly, 
favor investment in agriculture and manufactur-
ing while maintaining a protectionist stance in 
the services sector. Many economies, for exam-
ple, explicitly prohibit foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in certain “sensitive” or “strategic” services. 
Such policies will become an increasing burden 
on eﬃ  ciency in a global economy where services 
account for a larger share of output. Furthermore, 
if targeted interventions in investment are 
deemed desirable, the services sector is likely to 
oﬀ er the most social returns in areas such as edu-
cation, health care, and infrastructure. Even in 
manufacturing and agriculture, there are subin-
dustries where positive externalities may poten-
tially be large; these include areas such as the 
production of “green” technology components or 
tropically adapted seeds.
For developing countries over the next 20 years, 
the issue of ﬁ nancing for infrastructural projects will 
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amounts of capital are transferred among devel-
oping countries, South-South monetary policy 
coordination will become more critical in pro-
moting stable ﬁ nancial and macroeconomic con-
ditions in these countries. In particular, there 
is capacity for greater regional monetary policy 
spillover from large emerging economies such as 
Brazil and Russia. At the global level, greater use 
of the renminbi could considerably strengthen 
the impact of China’s monetary policy on the rest 
of the world, partially eroding the dominance of 
U.S. and Euro Area monetary policy. For small 
and medium-size developing countries, a world 
with a multipolar currency hierarchy would 
mean that developing countries will become less 
aﬀ ected by monetary policy spillovers from any 
one country. Th is could be stabilizing on a global 
level because liquidity shocks will be more diver-
siﬁ ed, but it could also become more diﬃ  cult to 
assess the timing and extent of monetary policy 
spillovers, requiring greater monetary policy 
coordination. Regardless of the currency compo-
sition of capital ﬂ ows in the future, the increasing 
share of global f lows going to and from devel-
oping countries indicates that these countries 
should have a larger role in management of capi-
tal ﬂ ows at the international level, within both 
bilateral and multilateral organizations. 
Policy makers will need to prepare for a greater 
role of capital markets in international ﬁ nancial 
intermediation and promote the development of 
domestic capital markets. Looking forward, as 
gross capital inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows grow in scale, 
their composition in terms of portfolio, bank 
lending, and FDI will also grow in importance. 
Th is is because these diﬀ erent types of ﬂ ows have 
different implications for macro stability. It is 
likely that, globally, capital markets will inter-
mediate a growing share of ﬂ ows in the future 
and that banks will account for less. Bank lend-
ing tends to be highly procyclical and gener-
ally less supportive of risk sharing than FDI or 
equity portfolio investment. However, total (debt 
and equity) portfolio investment has historically 
been even more volatile, in relative terms (that is, 
adjusting for the smaller magnitude of this com-
ponent of developing countries’ inf lows), than 
bank lending. Moreover, as households and ﬁ rms 
in developing countries increasingly demand 
not only greater access to credit but also greater 
pension or public social protection systems. 
Greater reliance on privately ﬁ nanced pensions 
rather than household savings and transfers dur-
ing old age has the potential to improve welfare, 
assuming that the elderly and their children all 
prefer to live separately. Another beneﬁ t is that 
using private ﬁ nancial markets to intermediate 
pension savings can increase ﬁ nancial depth and 
contribute to development. However, shifting 
from dependence on the income of family mem-
bers to dependence on ﬁ nancial institutions also 
underlines the importance of strong regulation 
to limit fraud and excessive risk taking among 
ﬁ nancial intermediaries.
Policy makers in developing countries have a cen-
tral role to play in boosting private saving through 
policies to raise educational attainment, especially 
for the poor. This is likely to reduce the saving 
concentration observed across household groups 
within countries. Indeed, such concentration also 
has negative implications for economic mobil-
ity and thus for the political and social cohesion 
essential for growth. Not only do high-income 
households tend to save a greater proportion 
of their incomes than low-income households, 
but they also account for the bulk of saving in 
countries at various stages of development and 
demographic transition, although to different 
degrees. In countries with high economic mobil-
ity, the relationship between low savings and 
low income could reﬂ ect eﬀ orts to smooth con-
sumption by households experiencing temporary 
income losses. Unfortunately, a similar correla-
tion is observed across households grouped by 
educational attainment, a proxy for permanent 
income and thus a more stable condition than the 
position in the income distribution at a point in 
time. Consistently, the least educated group in a 
country has low or no savings, suggesting that 
those individuals have an inability to improve 
their earning capacity and, among the poorest, to 
escape a poverty trap.
Th e course of global monetary and ﬁ nancial pol-
icy making will need to be adjusted as developing 
countries become responsible for an expected half or 
more of the world’s capital outﬂ ows. Both the grad-
ual and rapid convergence scenarios envisage that 
developing countries will account for a substan-
tially increasing share of the world’s gross capital 
inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows through 2030. As growing 
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of investment and saving—and the fact that 
income, saving, and investment affect each 
other—a structural model is needed. This is 
why, in this report, a global computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) dynamic model is adopted 
as the main analytical tool applied across all the 
chapters. In addition, other tools—such as panel 
data econometrics—are used (a) to estimate key 
parameters for the global CGE model, and (b) to 
complement the results obtained from it.
Given the focus of the methodologica l 
approach on capturing the impact of the main 
determinants, the potential eﬀ ects of some other 
long-term trends and persistent economic shocks 
are omitted from the analysis. For example, as dis-
cussed in chapter 1, crises (whether commodity-
based, ﬁ nancial, or environmental in nature) may 
engender increased uncertainty that results in lon-
ger-term eﬀ ects on investment. Other elements—
for example, changes in habits arising from shifts 
in cultural factors behind saving behavior, or 
changes in the global pattern of migration and 
remittances—also remain unmodeled.
It should also be noted that there are numer-
ous potential outcomes of future changes in pro-
ductivity, ensuing growth patterns, and accom-
panying policy changes. Although there is broad 
agreement on demographic projections, there is 
no consensus on the exogenous values governing 
productivity changes or on the correct param-
eterization of saving functions or equations of 
demand and supply of capital goods. Th us, even 
with sophisticated models, growth, investment, 
and saving rates for any speciﬁ c country or region 
are subject to a large margin of error. With this in 
mind, the main advantage of a model-based sce-
nario analysis is that it provides an opportunity 
to explore the interaction among broad trends 
rather than providing exact forecasts.
A global dynamic general equilibrium 
framework
The global CGE model—which is a modified 
version of the World Bank’s Linkage model, a 
dynamic model—comprises 17 country-regions, 
7 sectors (encompassing agriculture, manufac-
turing, and services), and 3 factors of production 
(capital, and skilled and unskilled labor). The 
version of the model used here relies on the most 
choice and variety in ﬁ nancial assets and services, 
domestic ﬁ nancial markets will have to compete 
globally in terms of both their structure and their 
depth. Although the many eﬀ orts under way to 
improve regulation of the international bank-
ing sector will remain highly relevant, policies 
should also be designed to accommodate—and 
in some cases actively promote—the development 
of domestic capital markets. At the same time, 
authorities should monitor the composition of 
capital ﬂ ows; more broadly, they should develop 
regulatory institutions to be forward-looking 
and ready to adapt to potentially destabilizing 
changes in the composition of capital ﬂ ows.
Modeling the global dynamics 
of investment, saving, and 
capital ﬂ ows
The main objective of this report is to identify 
emerging trends of investment and saving. This 
is achieved not in terms of a set of forecasts but 
rather by asking a series of “what if ” questions 
and by building scenarios. For example, the report 
addresses the question of what are the conse-
quences for global saving if aging will hasten and 
will continue to exert negative pressure. Or what 
will happen to the demand for capital if produc-
tivity catch-up accelerates in developing countries. 
A simple approach would just rely on corre-
lations and, by extrapolating the trends of key 
determinants such as aging and productivity 
growth, infer their impact on saving and invest-
ment. Th us, in the ﬁ rst “what if” question above, 
this simple approach would suggest that global 
saving will decline. However, aging does not hap-
pen in isolation, and other factors counterbal-
ance its negative impact. Likewise, faster rates 
of productivity growth will—for a given popula-
tion growth rate—translate into faster economic 
growth and higher per capita incomes; higher 
incomes, in turn, will aﬀ ect the pace of ﬁ nan-
cial development and institutional improvement. 
Th ese outcomes reinforce the positive impact that 
faster economic growth alone has on attracting 
investment ﬁ nancing.
To account for the direct and indirect eﬀ ects 
of multiple factors on the emerging trends 
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countries is somewhat wider: 0.7–3.5 percent 
until 2015 and constant thereafter. Th ere is sig-
niﬁ cant variation in TFP growth across develop-
ing countries, ranging from above 3.5 percent in 
China (in line with Bosworth and Collins [2008] 
estimates) to around 1.5 percent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Th e growth in the labor force is derived from 
the United Nations age-speciﬁ c population pro-
jections assuming no changes in participation 
rates. According to these population projections, 
the demographic transition is asynchronous 
across countries in several respects: the timing 
of its start, the speed with which the transition 
unfolds, and the relative sizes of bulge cohorts. 
In the current version of the model, there is no 
diﬀ erentiation between the growth of skilled and 
unskilled workers. 
Th e other crucial dynamics of the model deal 
with the accumulation of physical capital, which 
results from the interaction of global saving sup-
ply, domestic investment demand, and interna-
tional capital allocation (ﬁ gure O.6), as follows: 
• In each country, saving behavior, in accor-
dance with a standard life-cycle approach, 
depends on demography and per capita 
income growth; additional determinants 
include ﬁ nancial development and social 
protection systems.
• Investment demand is obtained from capi-
tal demand, which, in turn, is derived from 
sector-specific production functions in a 
setting of perfectly competitive proﬁ t-max-
imizing firms. Investment demand thus 
relates positively to output and negatively 
to rental rates. 
• Th e global pool of saving is allocated across 
countries following a function represent-
ing the global ﬁ nancing of investment. Th is 
responds to relative rental rates but also 
to country-speciﬁ c economic growth and 
structural factors such as ﬁ nancial develop-
ment and the quality of institutions. Th e 
global financing of investment also cap-
tures home bias by including a lagged term. 
For each country, net capital ﬂ ows make up 
the diﬀ erence between the level of ﬁ nancing and 
recent Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
dataset, whose base year is 2007. Scenarios are 
developed by solving for a new equilibrium in 
each subsequent year through 2030. 
At its core, Linkage is a neoclassical model 
with aggregate growth, saving, and investment 
endogenously determined and predicated on 
assumptions regarding key exogenous determi-
nants such as productivity changes, demographic 
shifts, ﬁ nancial market development, and insti-
tutional improvement. Unlike simpler growth 
models, however, Linkage has considerably more 
structure: First, it is multisectoral. Th is allows for 
more complex productivity dynamics, including 
diﬀ erentiating productivity growth between agri-
culture, manufacturing, and services and picking 
up the changing structure of demand (and there-
fore output) as growth in incomes leads to a rela-
tive shift into manufactures and services. Second, 
it is linked multiregionally, allowing for the inﬂ u-
ence of openness—via trade and finance—on 
domestic variables such as output and wages. 
Third, Linkage includes a set of equations for 
capturing saving and investment behavior. 
A full description of the Linkage model is 
available in Van der Mensbrugghe (2011), and 
this overview brieﬂ y describes the equations gov-
erning the dynamics of investment and saving as 
well as the main assumptions concerning the pro-
jected paths of exogenous determinants.
Starting with the latter, the key exogenous 
determinants are productivity and demograph-
ics. Productivity change is derived from a com-
bination of estimates and is also subjectively 
ﬁ ne-tuned. Agricultural productivity is assumed 
to be factor-neutral and exogenous and is set to 
estimates from empirical studies (for example, 
Martin and Mitra 1999). Productivity in man-
ufacturing and services is labor-augmenting 
(Harrod-neutral technical change); it is skill-neu-
tral but sector-biased, with productivity growth 
higher in manufacturing than in services. Th is 
gives rise to a long-term rate of total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth in the range of 0.1–0.2 
percent for the high-income countries in the 
gradual convergence scenario, which lies toward 
the low end of the Bosworth and Collins (2003) 
estimates but is consistent with the trends in the 
early and mid-2000s. Th e range for developing 
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will be bid up. Th is will attract capital ﬂ ows to 
the country, mitigating the upward pressure on 
rental rates but not eliminating it fully.
Summing up, in the Linkage model, sav-
ing, investment, output, and income as well as 
relative factor and good prices are simultaneously 
determined. However, for any speciﬁ c country or 
region, income growth rates, investment and sav-
ing rates, and net capital ﬂ ows generated by the 
model are subject to a margin of error because the 
resulting trends in these variables depend on:
domestic saving. Th us the model allows for global 
capital mobility, but only imperfectly because the 
ﬁ nancing of investment responds to rental rate 
diﬀ erentials with a ﬁ nite elasticity and depends 
on other factors as well. In this setup, net capi-
tal ﬂ ows between countries remain within limits 
that are reasonable given their historical range, 
and there is no guarantee that rental rates will 
equalize across countries. For example, a country 
beneﬁ ting from productivity catch-up will expe-
rience stronger capital demand, and rental rates 
F IGURE O.6 Schematic diagram describing interactions between saving, investment demand, and 
investment ﬁ nancing
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accounting for the possible endogeneity of eco-
nomic growth, faster growth is positively related 
with both saving and investment ﬁ nancing. 
The coefficients on the structural variables 
also accord with a body of empirical and theo-
retical work. For instance, ﬁ nancial development 
is positively associated with the investment rate 
(more sophisticated ﬁ nancial markets are able to 
lend more readily to firms for investment pur-
poses) (Benhabib and Spiegel 2000) but nega-
tively related to the saving rate (households with 
easier access to consumer credit need to save less 
for consumption smoothing) (Loayza, Schmidt-
Hebbel, and Servén 2000).
Complementary analytical approaches: 
enriching the CGE results
Th e CGE analysis requires a number of simpli-
fying assumptions and cannot generate some of 
the results that are of interest to policy makers 
and development practitioners. For example, the 
population age structure of a country (or groups 
of countries) is approximated by a simple old-age 
dependency ratio; and, given the fact that the 
model works with a representative household, it 
cannot provide any insights on diﬀ erent saving 
behavior for diﬀ erent categories of households. 
Therefore, complementary analytical tools are 
used to address these issues. 
In the case of saving, a complementary 
approach studies the future of saving by consid-
ering how demography and income growth will 
aﬀ ect saving at the household level. Examining 
the issue from a microeconomic perspective pro-
vides a more realistic and nuanced view of the 
likely evolution of saving, although at the price of 
considering a limited set of countries because of 
data availability. While the household-level anal-
ysis conﬁ rms the broad conclusions of the CGE 
analysis, the micro-level data also expose the 
complexities of the interaction among aging, sav-
ing, and growth. Th e microanalytical approach 
is described in more technical detail in online 
annex 2.1.
In the case of capital ﬂ ows, the CGE model-
generated saving and investment scenarios have 
direct implications for net capital ﬂ ows (essen-
tially countries’ saving-investment diﬀ erentials), 
but a separate model is required to complement 
(a) Assumptions on the path of exogenous vari-
ables, speciﬁ cally on productivity, demogra-
phy, ﬁ nancial sector development, and qual-
ity of institutions
(b) Parameterization of the equations and, more 
explicitly, the elasticity of the saving and 
investment rates with respect to aged depen-
dency (only for saving), income growth, 
ﬁ nancial sector development, and quality of 
institutions
Some of the key assumptions concerning 
point (a) have already been described above. By 
considering two scenarios, the report takes into 
account uncertainty in the future trends. In the 
rapid convergence scenario, productivity is exog-
enously raised by a factor of 50 percent for all 
developing countries, and the rate of growth of 
structural variables is boosted so that they reduce 
by 25 percent the distance between their cur-
rent levels and that of the United States in 2030 
(assumed to be the frontier). With regard to point 
(b), a key assumption made is that the coeﬃ  cients 
for the economic and structural variables in the 
saving and investment financing equations are 
indeed stable.
Complementary analytical approaches: 
estimating parameters
Th e parameterization of the investment demand 
function draws on the large, and by now stan-
dard, empirical literature that estimates the 
parameters of the production function. Th e lit-
erature is, however, somewhat more circumspect 
with regard to parameter estimates of the saving 
and investment ﬁ nancing functions. Accordingly, 
this report performs estimates for the elastici-
ties corresponding to the described determinants 
using econometric techniques designed to limit 
the impact of endogeneity in the regressors as 
well as measurement error (details are given in 
online annex 1.5).1
The signs of these estimated coefficients are 
consistent with underlying theory. For example, 
the coeﬃ  cient on demography in the saving equa-
tion—measured by the aged dependency ratio—
is negative and statistically significant, which 
implies that economies with older populations 
tend to save less. As another example, even after 
14 Overview Global Development Horizons
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these ﬁ ndings with scenarios for countries’ gross 
volumes of capital inf lows and outf lows. An 
econometric model is speciﬁ ed to estimate gross 
inﬂ ows (outﬂ ows can be backed out from these 
and net ﬂ ows), drawing on the literature to iden-
tify key determinants, and also controlling for 
any country-level effects that do not vary over 
time and for global shocks across time. Two sce-
narios for gross ﬂ ows are generated by ﬁ tting pro-
jected paths of the independent variables to the 
estimated equation, which correspond to the two 
CGE model-generated scenarios (details are given 
in online annexes 3.3 and 3.4).
Note
1. Th e online annexes are available at http://www.world
bank.org/CapitalForTh eFuture.
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1
The Emerging Pattern of 
Global Investment
A SNAPSHOT IN 2030 WILL REVEAL a world in which more than two-thirds of all global investment and half of the 
global accumulated capital stock will be in devel-
oping economies. Th is is in sharp contrast with 
recent history. Currently, almost 70 percent of 
the world’s capital stock resides in the developed 
world, and in 2000 developing countries’ share 
in global investments was only about 20 percent. 
Projections presented in this chapter indicate 
that, by 2030, global aggregate investment activ-
ity will far and away reside in China—with 30 
percent—while India and Brazil (7 percent and 3 
percent, respectively) will account for shares com-
parable to the United States and Japan (11 per-
cent and 5 percent, respectively). Developing Asia 
will collectively hold capital stocks exceeding 55 
percent of the entire developed world’s.
Th is shift in investment activity toward the 
Global South coincides with rapid catch-up 
growth that began during the 1990s as devel-
oping countries integrated into global markets, 
underwent structural transformations, and 
improved their institutions. Assuming a continu-
ation of needed reforms, this catch-up process is 
expected to carry on over the course of the next 
two decades. In fact, the shift in allocation of 
the global capital stock corresponds closely to 
a similar rise in developing countries’ share of 
global gross domestic product (GDP). Currently, 
roughly 70 percent of global GDP is produced 
in high-income countries, and that share will 
decline to around 50 percent by 2030. Indeed, 
the capital-to-GDP ratios of developing coun-
tries as a group and high-income countries as a 
group diﬀ er very little, even as the ratio can vary 
substantially across individual countries: in both 
groups, the size of the capital stock is about 2.5 
times the size of annual GDP, and this ratio is 
expected to increase gradually over time. As labor 
productivity in developing countries catches up 
with the higher levels that exist in high-income 
countries, the global distribution of capital per 
capita will become more equal.  
With much higher productivity growth in 
developing countries, their investment rate has 
to be substantially higher than in high-income 
countries for the capital stock to keep pace with 
potential output. Today, developing countries 
collectively invest slightly above 30 percent of 
GDP, a rate almost twice that of high-income 
countries, which currently stands at about 17 per-
cent. Th e high investment rates—together with 
the rising share of developing countries in global 
GDP—will increase developing countries’ share 
in global investment to two-thirds before 2030. 
However, this outcome will not mechanically 
materialize, but will require two conditions to be 
fulﬁ lled: First, productivity growth and sectoral 
shifts must create enough investment opportu-
nities. Second, both domestic and international 
investors must be willing to ﬁ nance these invest-
ments, allocating two-thirds of every dollar of 
global savings to developing countries. These 
two conditions are analyzed in this chapter. Th e 
analysis of the ﬁ rst one relies heavily on standard 
factor demand equations in a global general equi-
librium model. Th e analysis of the second con-
dition brings in econometric analysis regarding 
the historical behavior of investors, who react not 
only to growth opportunities and yields, but also 
to institutions and other factors, often encapsu-
lated by the term “investment climate.” 
Th at the discussion has shifted to how much 
developing countries will contribute to, and 
reshape, global investment trends is a testimony 
to the great strides that the developing world has 
made over the past half century. Estimates by a 
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group of experts convened by the United Nations 
placed the total capital requirements of develop-
ing countries in 1950–60 at $19 billion, of which 
they believed only a fraction would be met by 
domestic savings, leaving an “investment gap” of 
$14 billion (UN 1951). Pioneers in development 
economics argued over whether structural rigidi-
ties in developing countries could ever be over-
come such that investment could be productively 
translated into output, engendering an industrial 
takeoﬀ  (Meier and Seers 1984). 
The main messages of this chapter are the 
following:
• Since 2000, there have been three notable 
changes in the pattern of global invest-
ment activity: a shift in global investment 
toward the developing world, a shift toward 
greater manufacturing investment glob-
ally, and a slow, but deﬁ nitive, redistribu-
tion of capital stocks toward the develop-
ing world. Although a nontrivial share 
of these phenomena can be attributed to 
large economies such as China and India, 
significant increases in investment rates 
have occurred elsewhere in the developing 
world as well. 
• Th e future structure of production will imply 
also a global shift toward investment in ser-
vices. Th is shift is the natural consequence 
of (a) increased shares of services in econo-
mies with higher per capita incomes, (b) 
demographic changes that will increase 
demand for educational and health services, 
and (c) a larger share of services embedded 
in tradable goods. Between 2010 and 2030, 
services investment will rise from 57 per-
cent to 61 percent of the total investment 
proﬁ le in developing countries, and from 
75 percent to 78 percent in high-income 
economies. Th is rise is expected to occur 
despite ongoing rapid growth in manu-
facturing investment, especially in several 
lower-middle-income countries and regions 
(such as India and the lower-income econo-
mies of Southeast Asia). 
• The overall relationship between economic 
growth and investment is strong and signiﬁ -
cant, and developing countries’ growing share 
of global investment since 2000 has been due 
in large part to robust growth in those coun-
tries. This observation is consistent with 
optimal factor demand calculations in a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model. It is also conﬁ rmed by econometric 
analysis of how investors allocate resources 
over countries. However, the historical cor-
relation between growth and investment 
ratios found in the latter analysis indicates 
that growth alone will be insufficient to 
fully satisfy optimal factor demand. Th at 
means improvements in other driving 
forces are needed to attract suﬃ  cient capi-
tal. One of those forces is ﬁ nancial devel-
opment, or the maturity of the financial 
sector. A 10 percent increase in a standard 
measure of ﬁ nancial intermediation—the 
ratio of private credit to GDP—is associ-
ated with a 1–5 percent increase in invest-
ment. If such improvements are insuffi-
cient, yields relative to those abroad will 
have to rise in fast-growing economies to 
attract suﬃ  cient capital.  
• One major area of concern in developing 
countries regards infrastructure needs. Even 
exempting maintenance costs and replace-
ment investments, fully meeting antici-
pated population coverage targets will 
result in a global infrastructure investment 
bill for developing countries that amounts 
to about $866 billion annually in 2030 
(measured in 2010 dollars). Although this 
amounts to only around 3 percent of all 
developing-world investment in 2030, its 
ﬁ nancing is particularly challenging given 
the long-term nature (and associated risks) 
of these investments.
• Despite many common changes in investment 
patterns, the patterns themselves can signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ er across countries. Th ere are pre-
dictable patterns; for example, low-income 
countries invest primarily in agriculture, 
and middle-income countries invest heavily 
in manufacturing and increasingly in ser-
vices. But there are notable exceptions. For 
example, Vietnam (which until recently 
was a low-income country) invested a dis-
proportionately large share of all f ixed 
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investment in manufacturing. Countries 
have also varied in their overall capital-
to-GDP ratio, with the natural resource-
rich economies of Brazil and the Russian 
Federation requiring less capital per unit 
of output than China and India. Finally, 
although the private sector has tended to 
account for a larger proportion of invest-
ment than the public sector in most upper-
middle-income economies, the economies 
of China and the Middle East have been 
notable exceptions. 
• Despite the rising share of developing coun-
tries, the global investment rate is expected 
to remain relatively stable. If investment 
rates in individual countries would remain 
constant, the global investment rate would 
rise because of the growing share of the 
developing world. However, investment 
rates in virtually all individual countries 
are expected to fall. That drop is largely 
associated with slowing growth in produc-
tion potential, reﬂ ecting demographics and 
the shift toward services (where productiv-
ity growth is lower). The slowdown will 
not be uniform across the world. China’s 
investment will fall more sharply than else-
where in the developing world, while Sub-
Saharan Africa will actually experience a 
rise relative to its recent historical average. 
Th is fall of the investment rate in individ-
ual countries compensates for the composi-
tion eﬀ ect of a larger share of developing 
countries in the world, leading to a stable 
global investment rate.
• In a scenario where convergence between 
developing and high-income economies occurs 
more rapidly, total investment at the global 
level will be 7 percent higher than in a sce-
nario where convergence follows recent his-
torical trends and is far more gradual. In 
this rapid convergence scenario, aggregate 
investment in developing countries will 
also rise by $2.7 trillion (in 2010 dollars) 
compared with the gradual convergence 
scenario, while investment in high-income 
countries will fall by about $1 trillion rela-
tive to the gradual convergence outcome. 
Whether investment rates rise or fall in 
any given country will depend, however, 
on the increase in its investment relative to 
its output; in China and India, for exam-
ple, investment rates will rise on the order 
of about 1 percent, while economies such 
as Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia will see 
small declines in their investment rates, of 
0.4–1.1 percent.
• Policy makers seeking to support investment 
activity in their economies should concentrate 
their eﬀ orts on establishing a favorable invest-
ment climate that supports private sector 
investment activity, including policies aimed 
at improving ﬁ nancial sector development 
and policies to raise the overall quality of 
governance, especially concerning the rule 
of law. To the extent that direct interven-
tion is warranted, it should be in areas 
where market or government failures are 
clear and where social returns are especially 
large. If policy makers do decide to pursue 
the interventionist route with regard to 
investment policy, their eﬀ orts may be best 
placed supporting the upcoming expansion 
in service sector investment, especially in 
areas such as education, health care, and 
infrastructure, where spillovers from posi-
tive externalities can be especially high. 
Insofar as infrastructure is concerned, the 
trend toward public-private partnerships 
can oﬀ er both additional sources of capi-
tal and a disciplinary mechanism to limit 
potential public sector ineﬃ  ciencies.
Changing patterns of investment 
worldwide
There has been a global shift 
toward greater investment in the 
developing world
Since the turn of the 20th century, the pat-
tern of global investment—measured as gross 
capital formation1—has changed significantly. 
Between 1965 and 1999, investment in devel-
oping countries held a relatively constant global 
share—averaging 18.5 percent—but this share 
increased dramatically in the ﬁ rst decade of the 
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Further, although the investment share of output 
in developing countries has remained strong after 
the crisis, it contracted sharply in the developed 
world. Consequently, there is reason to believe 
that future saving and investment f lows—and 
the associated costs of capital—may in fact sta-
bilize at levels demonstrably diﬀ erent from those 
observed today.
By virtue of sheer size, much of the sharp rise 
in developing countries’ share of global invest-
ment can be attributed to China and, to a lesser 
extent, India. Moreover, with so much of the 
change in developing-country investment occur-
ring in China and India, neglecting to examine 
their experiences risks obscuring the important 
dynamics that are taking place there. But even 
in the absence of these two developing-country 
giants, the share of global investment accounted 
for by developing countries has risen steadily 
since 2000, and currently stands at the high-
est level since the mid-1960s (ﬁ gure 1.3). Across 
developing countries, investment rates have risen 
signiﬁ cantly from lows in the 1990s—including 
countries as diverse as Ghana (20 percent in the 
1990s to 24 percent in the 2000s), Guatemala (16 
percent to 19 percent), and Mongolia (31 percent 
to 35 percent). Looking at the world as a whole, 
an unmistakable message emerges: the conver-
gence of investment performance between the 
21st century, reaching about 40 percent by 2009 
(ﬁ gure 1.1, panel b); the change is even starker 
when one adjusts for diﬀ erences in purchasing 
power (as further discussed in box 1.1). Moreover, 
this convergence in global investment shares 
has been hastened by the global ﬁ nancial crisis. 
Since 2007, investment has fallen more sharply 
in high-income countries than in the developing 
world (figure 1.1, panel a). The growing inf lu-
ence of developing countries in the global invest-
ment picture has clearly paralleled the emergence 
of developing countries on the world economic 
stage.
This convergence in investment shares 
between developing and high-income countries 
owes as much to increases in the developing 
world’s investment rates (ﬁ gure 1.2, panel a) as 
it does to their larger size in the global economy 
(ﬁ gure 1.2, panel b). Although these trends are 
unlikely to persist indefinitely—the process of 
deleveraging in Europe and the United States fol-
lowing the 2007–09 crisis will eventually end, 
and saving and investment rates will ultimately 
reach upper limits in the developing world—
investment in developing countries appears likely 
to play a greater global role in the future. Indeed, 
the gap between developing and high-income 
countries’ investment shares of output has never 
been greater for any period since the mid-1960s. 
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 FIGURE 1.1 Gross investment in developing countries has increased in absolute terms (panel a) and as a 
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 So urce: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database.
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oping countries is I = –0.011t + 21.360, where I is total gross investment and t is the year, while that for the 2000–10 period is I = 0.024t – 49.312; the Chow test F = 52.06 
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In this report, investment ratios are expressed in mar-
ket prices, as are the underlying optimal capital-output 
ratios. Investment rates do not depend on the choice of 
a speciﬁ c unit of measurement of the output or invest-
ment volumes because market prices will reﬂ ect the 
chosen volume units. Nevertheless, it might also be 
interesting to express investment rates in speciﬁ c vol-
ume units—units expressed in purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms that are the same across countries. 
That PPP-adjusted investment rates tend to be lower 
in developing countries than rates measured in national 
market prices has been known for some time (Summers 
and Heston 1991) (figure B1.1.1, panel a). Recent 
research conﬁ rms that the difference is primarily attrib-
utable to differences in output prices across countries 
(Hsieh and Klenow 2007), a reﬂ ection of the Balassa-
Samuelson observation that at low levels of develop-
ment, lower productivity levels in the tradable sectors 
relative to nontradables translates into lower price levels 
overall. In contrast, because investment goods are, by 
and large, internationally traded, their price differences 
also tend to be small across countries. Consequently, 
within developing countries, investment goods are 
relatively expensive, and investment rates (along with 
capital-output ratios) turn out to be signiﬁ cantly smaller 
when expressed in international PPP units, even if these 
ratios calculated in market prices are similar. 
As developing countries catch up, the difference 
between market prices and PPP units will disappear, 
and capital-output ratios in PPP measures will con-
verge toward those in high-income countries. In other 
words, over time the volume of the capital in develop-
ing countries will rise not only as overall productivity 
increases but also because the relative price of output 
will rise. This important trend can be explained only if 
the analysis is conducted in market prices, and using 
PPP measures of investment may introduce potentially 
signiﬁ cant distortions to the data (Knowles 2001). For 
example, the small capital-output differential between 
high-income and developing countries becomes more 
pronounced after PPP corrections (ﬁ gure B1.1.1, panel 
b), even though this differential has no bearing on the 
investment decisions faced by economic agents within 
any given country.
BOX 1.1  Different terms, different rates: Purchasing-power adjusted investment 
vs. investment expressed in national currency
FIGURE B1.1.1 Differentials in investment rates (panel a) and capital-output ratios (panel b) 
are greater when measured in PPP terms
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and Penn World Tables (https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/).
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity. The investment rate differential is calculated as the difference between (unweighted) average investment rates for 
high-income and developing countries, measured in either national currency (NC) or PPP-adjusted international dollars. Capital stocks were calculated 
using a perpetual inventory method with an assumed constant depreciation rate of 5 percent. Calculations with weighted averages yield similar results.
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developing countries continue to struggle with 
sustaining high levels of investment over time. 
The upper-middle-income economies of Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, saw an investment 
takeoff between 1965 and 1980—peaking at 
30 percent of GDP in 1978—before falling to 
annual averages of 15–20 percent (figure 1.4). 
Similarly, investment growth in major emerging 
economies such as Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey 
has been more modest and gradual.
Globally, investment booms—character-
ized by a fairly sharp increase in an economy’s 
investment rate over just several years—have 
been somewhat rare phenomena, although some 
historical episodes did persist over an extended 
period. An examination of countries that have 
experienced such booms suggests that such spurts 
of investment have not, in general, been associ-
ated with sustained subsequent economic growth 
(box 1.2).
Some have questioned China’s heavy reliance 
on investment as an engine of growth, espe-
cially when examined in terms of the relatively 
low-value-added nature of Chinese manufactur-
ing (Bardhan 2010). Consequently, if China—
along with other high-investment economies—is 
to sustain a “soft landing” for its current high 
investment rate, observers have argued that its 
FIGURE 1.2 Developing countries’ rising investment rates (panel a) and growing share of global output 
(panel b) have contributed to their increased share of investment in global output
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database.
Note: The gap between developing and high-income investment is computed as the difference between the two groups’ investment shares of gross domestic product.
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FIGURE 1.3 The rising share of developing countries’ 
investment in global output is due to more than just 
changes in China and India
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database.
Note: Shaded area corresponds to the period from 2000 onward, where a break in the series 
occurred (a simple linear regression on time in the 1965–99 period for the full developing 
country subsample is I = –0.011t + 21.360, where I is total gross investment and t is the year, 
while that for the 2000–10 period is I = 0.024 – 49.312; the Chow test F = 52.06 is signiﬁ cant 
at the 1 percent level.
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developed and developing worlds has deﬁ nitively 
begun and is likely to consolidate in the future.
Th e clear upswing in investment in develop-
ing countries as a whole is not to deny that many 
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investment-centric economic growth model must 
be ultimately accompanied by structural changes 
to the economy (World Bank 2012a). Such struc-
tural changes include not only sectoral shifts in 
investment and production but also more fun-
damental changes in terms of ﬁ nancial market 
development, its economic and sociopolitical 
institutions, and its ﬁ nancial integration into the 
global economy.
In sum, it is clear that, since 2000, there has 
been an unmistakable shift in the pattern of 
gross capital formation at the worldwide level, 
with developing countries becoming increasingly 
important in the global investment picture. Th is 
shift appears to have been led by robust economic 
growth in the developing world relative to the 
developed world and by greater convergence in 
investment rates between the two.
FIGURE 1.4 Investment rates among Sub-Saharan 
African countries of different income levels have followed 
distinct paths
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database.
Note: Investment rates are the unweighted shares for each income group. GDP-weighted 
results are qualitatively similar. 
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Investment booms have historically occurred in a 
broad range of developing and high-income coun-
tries (table B1.2.1). However, such booms have not 
necessarily been accompanied by sustained eco-
nomic growth in the aftermath of the boom. Indeed, 
many economies that have experienced investment 
booms—defined as any period of steady growth in 
investment rates lasting for at least three consecutive 
years—have experienced subsequent weak growth 
even after the initial postboom period (ﬁ gure B1.2.1). 
Investment-boom economies also include many 
economies that have remained low- or lower-middle-
income. Interestingly, China—which has maintained 
very high levels of investment since reforms in the 
1980s—has not sustained the sorts of investment 
surges that would justify the label “boom”: rather, the 
Chinese experience has been one of steady and con-
sistent ratcheting up of investment, with occasional 
pauses. Altogether, there have been at least 38 invest-
ment booms over the past half century. 
BOX 1.2 Investment booms are not always associated with sustained growth
TABLE B1.2.1 Investment booms have occurred in a broad range of developing and high-
income countries
Number of booms Economies
1 Albania; Algeria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas, The; Belarus; Botswana; Chad; Côte d’Ivoire; 
Cameroon; Eritrea; Iceland; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Kazakhstan; Lebanon; Macao SAR, China; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Malta; Morocco; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Saudi 
Arabia; Serbia; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Zambia
2 Jordan; Malaysia; Venezuela, RB
4 Lesotho
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database.
Note: Investment booms are deﬁ ned as any three-year episode where the investment share of gross domestic product increased by at least a total of 
two percentage points, conditional on an initial investment share of at least 10 percent.
(continued)
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shift can be expected to occur in investment pat-
terns. Indeed, since 2000, capital formation has 
gradually moved away from agriculture, and man-
ufacturing investment—as a share of global ﬁ xed 
investment—has doubled, rising from 11 percent 
in 2000 to 22 percent in 2007, even as global 
investment in agriculture has remained relatively 
stagnant (of about 9 percent of global ﬁ xed invest-
ment, roughly half its share in the 1980s).
A shift in sec toral distribution 
toward manufacturing and 
services is under way
As an economy’s income level rises, its production 
structure tends to move away from the predomi-
nance of agriculture, toward a larger manufactur-
ing base, and eventually to a service-oriented econ-
omy. As average income levels rise, an analogous 
 
Some of these investment booms have lasted for 
fairly long periods. The longest episode was the recent 
Belarussian boom of 2003–10. As is to be expected, 
several fast-growing economies have also experienced 
investment booms: these include República Bolivariana 
de Venezuela in the 1970s and Malaysia and Thailand 
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the conditions underlying 
investment booms differ across economies: Kazakhstan 
and Saudi Arabia, for example, experienced booms in 
large part due to natural resources, while some booms 
coincided with significant appreciation in real estate 
(Belarus and Lebanon) or ﬁ nancial asset markets (Macao 
SAR, China). Other economies have had booms led by 
the public sector, such as that of Côte d’Ivoire in the 
mid-1970s. Finally, some booms were driven by foreign 
capital inﬂ ows, which may give rise to the boom-bust 
cycles commonly observed in middle-income countries 
(Tornell and Westermann 2002).
BOX 1.2 (continued)
FIGURE B1.2.1 Many countries experience weak growth following an investment boom
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database.
Note: Data are for 1960–2010 preboom (postboom) periods, deﬁ ned as the GDP growth rate in the four-year period just prior to the boom (the four-
year period after the end of the boom). For countries experiencing more than one boom, the reported numbers average the rates across all booms. 
Investment booms are deﬁ ned as any three-year episode of at least two percentage points’ growth in investment share of GDP, conditional on an initial 
investment share of at least 10 percent 
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Th ese changes in the sectoral distribution of 
investment activity will likely be accompanied by 
gradual improvements in the eﬃ  ciency of invest-
ment. Aggregate and sectoral investment ﬁ gures 
often obscure the extent to which investment is 
actually translated into productive capital, and 
as economies develop, such allocative eﬃ  ciency 
will probably rise. Estimates of the eﬃ  ciency of 
capital use indicate wide variations, both between 
and within countries (table 1.1).2 In China, the 
economywide ratio of changes in output for each 
additional unit of capital deployed (the marginal 
product of capital, or MPK) averaged 22 percent 
annually. This is comparable to the MPKs in 
India, Indonesia, and Mexico but is signiﬁ cantly 
lower than Turkey’s MPK (and higher than 
Russia’s)—suggesting that, at the economywide 
level, investment is more eﬃ  ciently deployed in 
Turkey (and less eﬃ  ciently in Russia).
Taking these estimates at face value, the 
fairly low MPK of around 10 percent observed 
for China’s and Indonesia’s manufacturing sec-
tors (both relative to other economies and within 
these respective economies) indicates that invest-
ment is less eﬃ  ciently deployed in manufactur-
ing than in the agriculture and services sec-
tors in these countries. For China, one possible 
This increase in the overall importance of 
manufacturing investment notwithstanding, the 
global distribution of manufacturing investment 
has remained concentrated in lower-middle-
income countries, a feature that has been rela-
tively stable over the past two decades (ﬁ gure 1.5, 
panel a). Th us, although China has accounted for 
the vast majority of lower-middle-income invest-
ment in the sector, its share is likely to decline in 
the future as lower-middle-income countries—
such as India and Vietnam (ﬁ gure 1.5, panel b)—
gradually ramp up their manufacturing bases 
with added investment. To the extent that future 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa remains robust, 
low-income countries in the continent may also 
see increases in their manufacturing investment 
shares.
As income levels rise in the developing world, 
global investment activity is on the cusp of yet 
another major shift in sectoral investment pat-
terns. This transition will likely see services 
investment rise in both the developed and devel-
oping worlds, completing the global move away 
from the primary and secondary sectors and 
toward a postindustrial investment landscape 
with the services sector dominating global invest-
ment activity.
FIGURE 1.5 Global manufacturing investment tends to be concentrated in lower-middle-income countries 
(panel a), with China currently accounting for the vast majority of investment in those countries (panel b)
Sources: World Bank calculations, using data in the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database; FAO FAOSTAT database; GTAP database; and World Bank World Development 
Indicators database.
Note: HIC = high-income countries, UMC = upper-middle-income countries, LMC = lower-middle-income countries, LIC = low-income countries. 
a. Shares are the unweighted averages of annual data indicated for each income group. Investment-weighted results are qualitatively similar but overstate the 2000–07 
shares for the LMC category because of the large weight of China. Global manufacturing data for 2000–07 averages for LMC include Indian data for only 2005 (the only 
year data were available). Global agricultural data for 1990–99 averages for LIC include Tajikistan data for only 1995 because of anomalous shares for the later years.
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among developing-country firms. The upshot 
of this ﬁ nding is that many potential eﬃ  ciency 
gains remain for developing countries to exploit 
as they grow.
One potential reason for the historical ineﬃ  -
ciency of investment in many developing coun-
tries may be the preponderance of public sources 
as the origin of investment activity. Public sector 
investment rates—averaging about 9 percent of 
total output—are often significantly higher in 
developing economies relative to high-income 
countries (figure 1.6, panel a). In low-income 
countries, in part because of greater infrastruc-
ture needs, this share may be even larger; public 
investment rates in low-income countries aver-
age about 2 percentage points higher than in 
middle-income ones. Moreover, for low-income 
economies that are commodity exporters, the 
government often invests directly in the extrac-
tive resource industry.
Yet public investment often fails to produce 
economically valuable capital, and even in cases 
where public capital can be economically beneﬁ -
cial, public investment spending often suﬀ ers from 
severe misallocation problems (Pritchett 2000). 
However, the role of the state in investment has 
diminished in most developing countries since 
the 1970s (especially among low-income African 
countries exiting a “Big Push” model)3 (ﬁ gure 1.6, 
panel b). Moreover, future trends may support 
explanation for this ﬁ nding is that the high levels 
of capital formation required for the construction 
of its world-class assembly plants are ultimat ely 
rewarded with relatively less by way of value-
added output (Koopman, Wang, and Wei 2012). 
In Indonesia, governance problems have under-
mined the eﬃ  ciency of investment, especially in 
projects tied to the public sector (Fisman 2001; 
Olken 2007). India—in spite of its reputation in 
globally tradable services (Kapur and Ramamurti 
2001)—possesses an overall service-sector MPK 
that is not higher than that of its other sectors. 
In contrast, Brazil’s high MPK in agriculture 
appears consistent with the overall evidence in 
favor of the sector’s global competitiveness (Rada 
and Buccola 2012).
To the extent that cross-country variations 
in MPKs are indicative of the eﬃ  ciency of capi-
tal deployment—with the resulting resource 
misallocation ref lected in aggregate total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) differentials—the mes-
sage of low overall efficiency of investment in 
developing countries is a theme that has found 
resonance in recent academic research (Caselli 
and Feyrer 2007). Additional estimates for 
Africa (Kalemi-Ozcan and Sørensen 2012), 
Eastern Europe (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and 
Scarpetta 2009), and China and India (Hsieh 
and Klenow 2009) all point to the presence of 
significant inefficiencies in capital allocation 
TABLE 1.1 There is signiﬁ cant heterogeneity in marginal products of capital, at both 
 economywide and sectoral levels, across developing countries
Brazil China India Indonesia Mexico
Russian 
Federation Turkey
Economywide 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.03 0.48
 Agriculture 0.28 0.29 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.34
 Manufacturing — 0.08 0.35 0.11 0.27 — 1.17
 Services — 8.78a 0.19 — 0.24 — 0.19
Sources: World Bank calculations, using data in the UNIDO Industrial Statistics dabatase; FAO FAOSTAT database; GTAP database; and World Bank 
World Development Indicators database.
Note: MPK = marginal product of capital, — = not available. Unless otherwise indicated, data are for 1991–2007. MPKs are computed as the capital 
output elasticity-weighted ratio of output to capital stock, computed for a sector j (or economywide) in year t from the formula MPKjt = αjYjt /Kjt , 
where Y and K are gross domestic product (GDP) and the capital stock formation, respectively, and α is computed from the share of compensation 
to physical capital in that sector (or economywide), excluding natural capital. Sectoral GDPs are computed from sectoral value-added shares of 
total GDP. Capital stocks are calculated from sectoral investment using a perpetual inventory method with an assumed constant depreciation rate 
of 5 percent. In most cases, annual data for manufacturing and services are not available for the full period, and reported MPKs are computed from 
available data. The computation excludes the years 1998–99 (ﬁ nancial crisis) for Brazil; years prior to 1996 (transition) and 1999–2000 (ﬁ nancial 
crisis) for Russia; 1997–98 (ﬁ nancial crisis) for Indonesia; 1994 (ﬁ nancial crisis) for Mexico; and 1999–2000 (ﬁ nancial crisis) for Turkey. 
a. Because no data are directly available for investment in services, the ﬁ gures for service sector investment were recovered as the residual of total 
investment and investment in the other two sectors. Consequently, very large service MPKs (as for China) may be the result of underestimating 
service sector investment rather than actual high levels of efﬁ ciency in the sector.
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of public capital to output in low-income coun-
tries (Gupta et al. 2011). More generally, the 
gains to output growth from increases in infra-
structure investment could potentially be large: 
improving infrastructure quality from that of a 
median economy to the top quartile translates 
into as much as a 7.7 percent increase in output 
per worker (Caldéron, Moral-Benito, and Servén 
2011). Since the 1990s, PPP infrastructure proj-
ects have become increasingly common among 
developing countries (ﬁ gure 1.7, panel a).
In addition to the long-term increase in pri-
vate sector involvement in infrastructure, aid 
ﬂ ows have become more important as the public 
sector retrenched in the wake of the global ﬁ nan-
cial crisis. In 2008, for example, more than one-
third of infrastructure spending in low-income 
countries was aid-ﬁ nanced (compared with only 
4 percent in middle-income countries). With 
government budgets increasingly strained in the 
developed world, however, and ﬁ scal outlooks rel-
atively grim for the next decade or two, support 
for infrastructure from traditional donor sources 
is likely to slow signiﬁ cantly. Th is leaves nontra-
ditional bilateral donors—such as Brazil, China, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries,5 
and India—to pick up the slack as major ﬁ nan-
ciers of infrastructure projects in Africa. 
even greater rollback: the increased openness of 
economies to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in funding large infrastructure projects, and the 
movement of more countries from low-income to 
lower-middle-income status. On this ﬁ nal point, 
the development of economies worldwide would 
exert further downward pressure on overall pub-
lic sector investment. Working against these fac-
tors is the growing perception that, in a multi-
polar world economy with inﬂ uential sovereign 
wealth funds, the state can play a more major role 
in economic activity overall (Mostrous, Gue, and 
Dittman 2010), which could signal more active 
involvement of governments in future investment 
activities.
Another factor that may support lower levels 
of public investment in the future is the increased 
involvement of the private sector in the provision 
of infrastructure—namely, through public-pri-
vate partnerships (PPPs).4 Th ese partnerships can 
be a crucial step toward improving discipline in 
the allocation of public funds for infrastructure 
and enhancing the efficiency of infrastructure 
services. (Such discipline has typically been lack-
ing in the public sector, eroding the contribution 
of public investment to capital accumulation and 
growth.) Enhancing public investment eﬃ  ciency 
is especially important given the contribution 
FIGURE 1.6 The public sector share of output is lower in high-income countries than in other country 
groups (panel a), but the public sector share of investment has converged among country groups (panel b)
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database .
Note: HIC = high-income countries, UMC = upper-middle-income countries, LMC = lower-middle-income countries, LIC = low-income countries. 
a. (Unweighted) shares of total output are computed as a ﬁ ve-year moving average, given the volatility of annual investment relative output. 
b. (Unweighted) shares of public investment are computed from public ﬁ xed capital formation as a share of gross ﬁ xed capital formation, with statistically implausible outli-
ers (shares greater than unity) dropped.
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American economies, infrastructure investment 
as a share of GDP collapsed in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and has remained subdued in the 
years since, the exception being Chile (ﬁ gure 1.8).
This could suggest that private and public 
investments in infrastructure are complements 
rather than substitutes (Calderón and Servén 
2010). Th e limited global success of private pro-
vision of important public goods is a cautionary 
tale against a rush into PPPs in other areas where 
the state has historically played a central investing 
role, such as human capital (box 1.3).
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing PPP-
based infrastructure ﬁ nancing is how, historically, 
such ﬁ nancing has been an enormously complex 
process. Financing large-scale infrastructure proj-
ects typically involves multiple ﬁ nancing sources, 
numerous public and private contracting parties, 
intricate legal documentation governed by both 
national and international laws, and diﬃ  cult con-
tracting and institutional design problems.
Th e complexity of the multiparty, multimodal 
approach to infrastructure f inancing is evi-
dent, for example, in the largest energy projects 
recently undertaken in the Middle East (box 1.4). 
The contours of infrastructure financing have 
For all their beneﬁ ts, PPP projects remain, at 
this time, limited in their ability to meet com-
prehensive infrastructure needs, with most 
projects limited to the telecommunications and 
energy sectors. One reason for this is that private 
investment commitments have been heavily con-
centrated; the energy and telecommunications 
sectors have clearly beneﬁ ted the most from the 
increase in private investment (ﬁ gure 1.7, panel 
b). In low-income countries, three-quarters of 
PPP commitments have been in telecommuni-
cations, as opposed to a shade less than half for 
middle-income countries. Th is concentration can 
also be seen geographically, with the major devel-
oping countries often accounting for more than 
half of all PPP projects in a typical year. India 
has been the top recipient of private sector ﬂ ows 
in infrastructure since 2006, followed by Brazil, 
China, Russia, and Turkey.6
Moreover, on net, private investment in infra-
structure often has not oﬀ set declines in public 
sector investment, leading to cases, such as in 
Pakistan and South Africa, where infrastructure 
investment in terms of GDP plummeted as pub-
lic sector investment declined (Commission on 
Growth and Development 2008). In major Latin 
FIGURE 1.7 Private sector commitments to infrastructure have risen over time, both in major developing 
countries (panel a) and across most infrastructure subsectors (panel b)
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database.
Note: PPP = public-private partnership.
a. Data for total global distribution for 2000–10 (panel b) have been adjusted for U.S. Consumer Price Index inﬂ ation and are given in real 2005 dollars.
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capital (measured using the perpetual inventory 
method),8 was largely concentrated in the devel-
oped world, especially in the United States and 
Western Europe (map 1.1). By 1995, this situation 
had begun to change, with several large develop-
ing economies, such as Brazil and China, accumu-
lating stocks comparable to those of high-income 
countries. Th e latest data suggest that this shift has 
further consolidated. Today, Brazil, China, India, 
and Russia together account for about 18 percent 
of the global share of capital, more than twice the 
share of Germany and near that of the United 
States.
Th e process is far from complete: a normalized 
Herﬁ ndahl index of capital stocks has fallen only 
modestly—from a high of 0.08 in the late 1980s 
to a low of 0.07 of 2010—compared with a larger 
fall in the analogous normalized Herﬁ ndahl of 
production (a decline from 0.13 to 0.10). This 
slow evolution of the Herfindahl points to the 
high concentration of capital and wealth that 
continues to reside in the industrialized high-
income countries, a ref lection of the legacy of 
capital accumulation that occurred over the 19th 
and 20th centuries. Nevertheless, the process of a 
gradually less unequal global distribution of capi-
tal should continue in the future as developing 
economies grow in size and absolute investment 
ﬂ ows into their domestic capital stocks rise.
also changed gradually over the past decade, with 
bond issuance replacing traditional bank loans, 
and banks based in emerging economies now 
becoming major intermediaries in the infrastruc-
ture sector. Th e challenges facing infrastructure 
ﬁ nancing in the future will be revisited later in 
this chapter.
In sum, sectoral investment patterns also 
imply changing patterns since 2000, with a 
shift in global investment away from agriculture 
toward manufacturing, and a gradual reduction 
of the role of public sector investment in devel-
oping countries. Th e world appears to be on the 
cusp of yet another shift in investment patterns, 
this time toward an increased emphasis on the 
services sector. Th e expanded role of the services 
sector will likely be manifested in a host of invest-
ment activities, ranging from services related to 
greater human capital production to an expan-
sion of infrastructure in the developing world.
A gradual redistribution of 
global capital stocks has occurred 
in recent decades
The ongoing shift in the distribution of global 
investment shares has meant that the exist-
ing stock of productive physical capital has 
also been changing over time.7 In 1980, global 
FIGURE 1.8 Infrastructure investment shares of GDP declined rapidly in major Latin 
American economies in the late 1980s and have remained subdued in subsequent years
Source: World Bank calculations, using data from Calderón and Servén 2010.
Note: The six Latin American economies covered in the ﬁ gure are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
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diminished, the greater abundance of capital in 
high-income countries need not signify that capi-
tal has been ineﬃ  ciently distributed. Capital must, 
ultimately, be paired with labor (and other inputs) 
Although the distribution of stocks of capital 
provides an important sense of the cumulative 
investment that would be required before the 
global inequality in the distribution of capital is 
Although the focus of this report is on investment in 
physical capital, it is important to recognize that accu-
mulation of human capital may stimulate economic 
growth and development. Though it is possible that 
human capital may be subject to diminishing returns in 
the same way as physical capital (Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil 1992), some scholars have argued that endog-
enous growth via increasing returns could be real-
ized through spillovers from knowledge embedded in 
human capital (Romer 1990).
Over the past two decades, high-income coun-
tries have outspent developing countries in developing 
human capital, not only on an absolute basis but also in 
relative terms. Between 1990 and 2009, high-income 
countries invested, on average, about 35 percent of 
their total investment billa on human capital, whereas 
developing countries spent about half as much over 
the same period (ﬁ gure B1.3.1). In fact, the most recent 
decade saw only a slight increase in human capital 
investment by developing nations, to 19.6 percent 
(from 17.3 percent in the decade before). Given the 
growing importance of human capital in the deploy-
ment of technology, even in capital-intensive sectors 
such as manufacturing, developing countries will likely 
need to adjust their capital allocation decisions in the 
future. To the extent that they do, this increased invest-
ment in human capital will be yet another element giv-
ing rise to higher levels of investment in the services 
sector, since education and research and development 
(R&D) are typically classiﬁ ed as services.
BOX 1.3 Investment in human capital can be a source of economic growth
FIGURE B1.3.1 Investment in human capital relative to physical capital in high-
income and developing countries, 1990–99 to 2000–10 
Sources: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and World Bank 
EdStats database.
Note: Investment in private and public education and research and development (R&D) are measured as expenditures in each 
of these sectors.
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total investment bill is calculated to include these expenditures as forms of “investment.”
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message than a focus on stocks alone. Th e East 
Asia and Pacific region, for instance, has the 
largest stock of capital, mainly due to the size 
of China. Once the capital stock is adjusted for 
eﬃ  cient units of labor, however, the region falls 
into the lower half of the distribution in terms of 
for the purposes of production; a given country 
would only be “capital-starved” if there existed a 
signiﬁ cant imbalance between available capital and 
labor (adjusted for human capital diﬀ erentials). 
Thus, the distribution of such efficiency-
adjusted capital stocks may offer a different 
Infrastructure ﬁ nancing related to the highest-value 
energy projects undertaken in the Middle East illus-
trates the complexity of large-scale infrastructure 
ﬁ nancing operations. Projects typically involve multi-
ple local and regional investors and ﬁ nancing based on 
a capital structure that combines direct equity stakes, 
debt issuance, and syndicated lending, together with 
some elements of export credit (both direct and cov-
ered) and Islamic ﬁ nancing (table B1.4.1). Pricing struc-
tures are also often complex; most projects, for exam-
ple, peg pricing to the London interbank offered rate 
(LIBOR), with varying markups for tranches according 
to the stage of the project.
The general resilience of project financing in the 
Middle East in 2009 demonstrates that sound, credit-
worthy projects continue to be able to raise long-term 
ﬁ nancing in a global environment of credit-constrained 
markets, especially when projects employ innovative 
approaches to syndicate formation. The Shuweihat 2 
independent water and power project, for example, 
secured a key loan component of its ﬁ nancing from the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation after the par-
ticipation of Japan’s Marubeni among the deal’s equity 
sponsors. The RasGas project is the second time the 
project has sought ﬁ nancing, the ﬁ rst being a 70-30 debt-
equity offering in 1996 (Dailami and Hauswald 2007).
BOX 1.4  Energy project ﬁ nancing in the Middle East: A multiparty, multimodal 
approach
TABLE B1.4.1 Top ﬁ ve project ﬁ nance deals in the Middle East, 2009
Sector Country
Value 
($ billions)
Financing breakdown 
($ billions)
Sponsors
(country, stake)
Dolphin Gas Pipeline Oil and gas United Arab 
Emirates
4.1 Bond (1.3); syndicated 
loan (1.4); covered loan 
(0.2); shareholder loan 
(1.2)
Mubadala (United Arab 
Emirates, 51%); Total 
(France, 25%); Occidental 
Petrol (United States, 25%)
Shuweihat 2 IWPP Power United Arab 
Emirates
2.6 Syndicated loan (2.1, 
2 tranches); sponsor 
equity (0.5)
Abu Dhabi Water and Elec 
(United Arab Emirates, 
60%); Suez (France, 20%); 
Marubeni (Japan, 20%)
Rabigh IPP Oil and gas, 
power
Saudi Arabia 2.5 Syndicated loan (1.9); 
sponsor equity (0.5)
ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia, 
40%); Kepco (United 
States, 40%); Saudi 
Electricity (Saudi Arabia, 
20%)
Ras Laffan LNG 
Project
Oil and gas Qatar 2.2 Bond (0.5 3-yr, 1.1 5-yr, 
0.6 10-yr)
n.a.
Al Dur IWPP Power and 
desalination
Bahrain 2.2 Syndicated loan (1.3); 
senior public bond (0.1), 
sponsor equity (0.6)
Suez (France, 40%); GIC 
(Singapore 20%); SIO 
(Bahrain, 10%); Cap Mgmt 
Hse (Bahrain, 25%); 
Instrata (Bahrain, 5%)
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the  PFI database. 
Note: IPP = independent power project, IWPP = independent water and power project, LNG = liqueﬁ ed natural gas, n.a. = not applicable.
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MAP 1.1 The geographical distribution of capital stocks has gradually shifted to 
developing countries over the past three decades
Sources: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and World Bank Global Economic Monitor 
database.
Note: Capital stocks are calculated using a perpetual inventory method with assumed constant depreciation rate of 5 percent. Countries with insuf-
ﬁ cient data in the constant investment series are backcasted using a regression of the investment deﬂ ator on the GDP deﬂ ator and available invest-
ment data. Data for the 2010 chart are either for 2010 or the latest year since 2006.
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increases in capital stocks, thereby placing a 
natural brake on the convergence of per-worker 
stocks of capital.
Long-run drivers of investment 
around the world
With its central role as a signal of anticipated 
future prosperity, the study of investment has pre-
occupied macroeconomists since the discipline’s 
emergence. Keynes (1936, 161) termed the spon-
taneous and volatile forces behind investment 
“animal spirits.” But the driving forces behind 
economic actors’ long-run decisions to invest 
are not entirely a black box. Traditional models 
of investment activity appeal to macroeconomic 
determinants, such as the growth rate and the real 
cost of capital (Jorgenson 1963), the shadow cost 
of capital (Tobin 1969), uncertainty (Lucas and 
Prescott 1971), and nominal variables such as 
asset prices ( Dixit and Pindyck 1994)  and the 
money supply (Holmström and Tirole 1997).
capital per eﬀ ective worker (ﬁ gure 1.9). Th e oppo-
site phenomenon can be seen, most dramatically, 
in the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, the 
stock of capital in Sub-Saharan Africa, while sig-
niﬁ cantly less than that of other regions, is higher 
than that of South Asia in per-worker units.
Th ese diﬀ erences in capital stock per  eﬃ  ciency-
adjusted labor unit point to the importance of 
considering the evolution of complementary fac-
tors when assessing the future demand for capi-
tal. For example, Latin America may experience 
weaker demand for investment in the future, 
especially because impending population dynam-
ics (explored in greater detail in chapter 2) may 
mean a slower expansion of the complementary 
labor force. Conversely, capital demand may be 
greater in regions such as Africa and South Asia, 
given the anticipated expansion of the labor force 
in these countries. Th ere also appears to be room 
for more capital accumulation in a high-capital-
stock region like East Asia.
Historical increases in capital per worker also 
carry signiﬁ cant implications for overall worker 
welfare. Th e average worker in 1950 in the United 
States—then, as now, the technologically lead-
ing nation—was paired with the equivalent of 
$72,400 worth of capital (measured in 2005 
PPP-adjusted international dollars) in the form 
of machinery, plant, and equipment, a level that 
countries such as Chile and Mexico attained by 
2008. The catch-up in worker welfare is even 
more stark when compared to other high-income 
countries. Today, the average worker in Malaysia 
is paired with only 20 percent less capital than a 
French worker had in 1975, and that does not take 
into account the vast improvements in the over-
all quality of capital goods. Even in a low-income 
economy such as Bangladesh, the average worker 
works with one-tenth the capital an average British 
worker did in the 1980s.
Although absolute capital stocks will con-
tinue to (slowly) converge over the next two 
decades, diﬀ erentials in the per-worker stock of 
capital between developing and high-income 
countries—which is already substantially more 
equally distributed today than it has ever been 
(map 1.2)—may not necessarily fall further. 
Th is is because population growth in develop-
ing countries will likely oﬀ set their fairly mild 
FIGURE 1.9 Adjusting capital stocks by efﬁ ciency-
adjusted units of labor results in different distributions 
compared to comparing capital stocks alone 
Sources: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database and World Bank Global Economic Monitor database.
Note: Capital stocks are calculated for 2010 (or latest), using a perpetual inventory method, 
with assumed constant depreciation rate of 5 percent, for the region collectively. Efﬁ ciency 
units of labor are calculated as the share of the working-age population participating in the 
labor market, adjusted by returns to the existing stock of human capital (measured as the aver-
age years of schooling of the population above 15 years of age). Capital stocks per efﬁ ciency-
adjusted units of labor are calculated as simple averages for each region.
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more investment from abroad. Although increases 
in investment need not automatically trans-
late into economic growth (Easterly and Levine 
2001),9 greater investment is naturally associated 
with heightened economic activity because ﬁ rms 
respond to anticipated future proﬁ t opportunities 
by raising investment today. Productivity gains 
drive heightened growth and investment activ-
ity, inciting lasting structural transformations in 
the broader economy. Th e relationship between 
growth and investment can be substantial: econo-
metric estimates suggest that, all else equal, each 
additional percentage point of growth is associ-
ated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the 
investment rate.
Structural factors are important 
drivers of changes in the 
allocation of investment ﬁ nancing
However, given the heterogeneity of developing 
countries’ experience with investment, even for 
economies growing at similar rates, it is clear that 
economic growth alone does not fully explain 
all aggregate investment activity. Th e opportu-
nity cost of undertaking any given investment 
At the global level, investment is ultimately 
constrained by saving. This accounting fact 
implies that independent changes in global saving 
patterns will directly aﬀ ect the extent of global 
investment activity. Were there to be reductions 
in global saving in the years ahead, for instance, 
this would imply reductions in world investment 
as well. Nevertheless, a single-minded focus on 
the global saving supply would leave open the cru-
cial question of how, given this supply of saving, 
global investment is subsequently allocated across 
countries. Th is allocation into global portfolios 
of investments is subject to two countervailing 
forces that may suppress investment activity in 
any given economy: disincentives for additional 
domestic investment, arising from diminishing 
returns (Kraay et al. 2006); and frictions imped-
ing mobility of capital across national borders, 
both of which give rise to diﬀ erences in expected 
returns across countries. Understanding what 
drives such cross-country diﬀ erences in expected 
returns is key to predicting the ability of econo-
mies to attract investment ﬁ nancing.
Diﬀ erences in macroeconomic growth, in par-
ticular, are a central part of the story. Economies 
that grow faster tend to invest more and attract 
MAP 1.2 Capital stocks per worker are now more equally distributed than ever before
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the Penn World Tables (https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/).
Note: Data are for 2009. Capital stocks are calculated using a perpetual inventory method with assumed constant depreciation rate of 5 percent, 
and presented in thousands of 2005 (Geary-Khamis) international dollars.
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percent increase in ﬁ nancial development, invest-
ment can rise as much as 3.3 percent.
Investment is also positively associated with 
the overall quality of the institutional environ-
ment (ﬁ gure 1.11). On this account, developing 
countries have made signiﬁ cant strides over the 
past decade: between 1996 and 2010, developing 
countries’ control of corruption and rule of law 
advanced by about 4 percent, while that in the 
developed world slid by about 1 percent, accord-
ing to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators.12 Although governance challenges 
remain an issue for developing countries, these 
improvements could well make a difference 
to their likely investment paths in the future. 
Econometric analyses indicate that real invest-
ment activity, even after controlling for a host 
of other intervening factors, remains statistically 
signiﬁ cant (ﬁ gure 1.11) and can rise by as much 
as 1.6 percent for each 10 percent increase in 
institutional quality.
Finally, the openness of a country’s borders to 
foreign capital inﬂ ows can also increase domes-
tic investment. As individual economies become 
more integrated into the global economy, future 
investment—especia lly in the smaller and 
poorer economies—may be increasingly led 
by such FDI. Cross-border capital movements 
(still) remain a small fraction of what would be 
implied in a world with more frictionless global 
capital markets (Lucas 1990), but if financial 
globalization were to proceed at the pace of 
the past two decades, patterns of capital ﬂ ows 
could be dramatically aﬀ ected, as discussed in 
chapter 3.
Investor sentiment is a key 
driver shaping future investment 
dynamics
One way of interpreting Keynes’s “animal spir-
its” behind investment is that such spirits may 
also embody expectations surrounding future 
investment dynamics. Such investor sentiment 
is ultimately based on expectations formed with 
regard to both future growth prospects and 
uncertainty surrounding those prospects. Th ese 
expectations are not easily captured in econo-
metric analyses of observable variables, but the 
activity lies, ultimately, in the attractiveness of 
other available investment opportunities world-
wide, and this attractiveness is embodied in these 
alternative investments’ expected returns to capi-
tal. Such expected return diﬀ erentials are attrib-
utable not just to diﬀ erences in countries’ eco-
nomic growth. Of central importance is also the 
yield on capital an economy oﬀ ers relative to oth-
ers.10 Finally, cross-country diﬀ erences in struc-
tural factors—in particular their levels of ﬁ nan-
cial development and the overall quality of their 
institutional environments—can also aﬀ ect the 
expected returns from investing in a given coun-
try because such structural factors can also dis-
tinguish the developmental fortunes of nations.11
Two structural factors are especially important 
in negatively inﬂ uencing investment ﬁ nancing: 
low levels of ﬁ nancial development and inadequa-
cies in institutional quality. Together, these fac-
tors give rise to (real or perceived) shortages of 
safe, investible assets (Caballero 2008). Th is is a 
chronic problem in emerging economies and can 
engender instabilities that go beyond the country’s 
borders: the pursuit of safe investment opportu-
nities can suppress long-term real interest rates, 
decrease the eﬃ  ciency of global saving allocation, 
ignite speculative bubbles in safe asset-generating 
countries, and contribute to unsustainable global 
imbalances (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 
2008). Overall, the empirical evidence supports 
the notion that structural factors are central to 
determining the amount of investment financ-
ing a country can attract, and it oﬀ ers a poten-
tial explanation of why cross-country patterns of 
investment diﬀ er as much as they do (box 1.5).
Th e importance of these two factors on actual 
investment activity is evident from the cross-
country data. As countries grow, they also tend 
to yield more mature and sophisticated finan-
cial systems; this increased level of financial 
development, in turn, appears to move together 
with changes in investment rates. Th is relation-
ship is especially striking for developing coun-
tries, although changes in credit provision have 
historically followed investment rates closely for 
high-income countries as well, with the excep-
tion of the period after 2000, when credit provi-
sion grew sharply in the developed world (ﬁ gure 
1.10). Econometric analyses suggest that, for a 10 
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investment.14 Values of Q significantly above 
unity are suggestive of optimism regarding future 
investment opportunities, and vice versa for values 
signiﬁ cantly below one. Computations of Tobin’s 
Q for developing countries suggest that investors 
anticipate continued positive growth prospects for 
many developing economies (box 1.6).
Another alternative way of attempting to cap-
ture the importance of investor sentiment is to 
examine the eﬀ ect that even temporary shocks 
to uncertainty can have on future investment. 
role of investor sentiment can be teased out in 
other ways. Consequently, although the Linkage 
model used in this report for scenario analyses 
does not explicitly model the eﬀ ect of investor 
sentiment, several other approaches offer hints 
about the role that sentiment can play in shaping 
future investment in developing countries.
One such approach is to examine the implicit 
(or shadow) cost of capital, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q.13 Estimates of Tobin’s Q point to financial 
market participants’ conditional forecasts of 
Traditional models of investment typically rely on stan-
dard macroeconomic determinants—such as output, 
economic growth, and the real cost of capital—to 
explain investment activity. However, macroeconomic 
variables are subject to cyclical shocks of a short-term 
nature, and such models may end up capturing fac-
tors whose effects may dissipate over the longer run. 
Just as important, these older models do not capture 
the potential effects of informational asymmetries 
and incomplete markets, a shortcoming that has been 
remedied by more recent models of investment.
The important role of uncertainty and market imper-
fections highlighted by these more recent studies 
hint at the need to consider how structural variables 
can affect aggregate investment at the cross-country 
level. After all, such frictions often ﬁ nd root in struc-
tural changes such as differences in the ability of the 
ﬁ nancial sector to intermediate saving (Dailami 1992), 
the legal frameworks that govern contract enforcement 
(Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini 2004), and property 
rights more generally (Besley 1995), along with the 
broader business climate and political-institutional envi-
ronment (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). 
Economic openness, so crucial to the medium-term 
current account, may also affect long-run investment 
activity (Chinn and Prasad 2003).
Differences in such structural factors can potentially 
alter the ﬂ ow of investment ﬁ nancing received by any 
given country. Three major considerations must be 
taken into account in any successful model that seeks 
to explain such cross-country investment patterns. 
First, the approach should incorporate, at its core, cross- 
country differentials in interest rates. Second, to account 
for additional factors affecting expected returns (but not 
fully reflected in interest rates), the model should be 
supplemented by economic and structural variables that 
may differ systematically between countries. Third, the 
approach should account for the signiﬁ cant heterogene-
ity that may occur in unobservable variables, along with 
the potential endogeneity in the explanatory variables. 
Although no single model can simultaneously address 
these distinct considerations, this report relies on sev-
eral econometric approaches to specify a range of plau-
sible coefﬁ cients for the main variables of interest.
The formal analyses (reported in the online Global 
Development Horizons [GDH ] annex 1.3) suggest that 
although not all structural variables exert a systematic 
impact on the cross-country allocation of investment 
ﬁ nancing, some clearly do. One important factor is the 
role of ﬁ nancial development: as the level of ﬁ nancial 
development increases, investment tends to rise as 
well. This is consistent with the literature (Benhabib and 
Spiegel 2000; Levine 2005; World Bank 2012b), which 
ﬁ nds that ﬁ nancial development has a causal inﬂ uence 
on, among other things, capital formation. The overall 
institutional environment appears to be important for 
driving investment as well. For example, Mauro (1995) 
has demonstrated that widespread corruption causes 
lower levels of investment at the cross-country level, 
while Besley (1995), using the case of Ghana, has 
shown that the same applies to the strength of the 
property rights regime. More generally, strong, posi-
tive relationships tend to exist between institutions and 
investment growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2005), especially those that are supportive of economic 
freedom (Dawson 1998).
BOX 1.5  Structural factors can affect the cross-country allocation of investment 
ﬁ nancing
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Th is is especially pertinent given how the global 
ﬁ nancial crisis of 2007–09 is often associated 
with decreased investor confidence. The logic 
behind this mechanism is well understood: capi-
tal investment is essentially a decision on when 
to exercise an option on an irreversible project, 
contingent on uncertainty about its future prof-
itability (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; McDonald 
and Siegel 1986).15 Th erefore, increased uncer-
tainty about future economic prospects may 
dampen aggregate investment as firms retain 
their option value by postponing capital forma-
tion decisions.16 Large variations in uncertainty 
alone may be sufficient to freeze investment 
activity and generate sharp recessions, indepen-
dent of productivity shocks (Bloom 2009), and 
may have an eﬀ ect even when realized real inter-
est rates themselves remain constant (Fernández-
Villaverde et al. 2011). By and large, empiri-
cal studies have found that uncertainty does 
have a corrosive eﬀ ect on investment (Carruth, 
Dickerson, and Henley 2000). For developing 
countries, the eﬀ ect of uncertainty is likely to be 
especially pronounced for macroeconomic vola-
tility (Aizenman and Marion 1999), uncertainty 
regarding the real exchange rate (Servén 2003), 
and commodity price f luctuations (Claessens 
and Duncan 1993).
FIGURE 1.10 Investment rates and ﬁ nancial sector development in developed and 
developing countries have evolved similarly
Sources: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and Financial Development and Structure 
database.
Note: Investment rate is deﬁ ned as the ﬁ xed investment share of GDP, while change in ﬁ nancial development is deﬁ ned as the three-year moving 
average of the annual change in the ratio of domestic credit provision to the private sector as a share of GDP; both ratios are unweighted averages 
for the two country groups.
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The deleterious effects of uncertainty are 
not limited to the short run. Simulations of 
the response of investment to a transient shock 
arising from economic uncertainty show that 
FIGURE 1.11 A positive relationship exists between 
investment and institutional quality
Sources: World Bank calculations, using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database and Financial Development and Structure database.
Note: Data are pooled for all countries over the period 1980–2010. The ﬁ gure is a bivariate plot 
of real ﬁ xed investment and institutional quality, with linear regression line. Investment rate is 
deﬁ ned as ﬁ xed investment in 2000 dollars, and institutional quality is the simple average of 
(subjective) measures of corruption and rule of law. Both variables are in logarithm form, are 
unweighted, and are signiﬁ cant in both bivariate and multivariate regressions at standard levels.
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To the extent that Tobin’s Q serves as a reasonable 
conditional (medium-term) forecast, cross-country 
measures of Tobin’s Q for developing economies reveal 
a mixed picture with regard to prospects for investment 
in the developing world. On one hand, it is evident that, 
on average, lower-income countries possess higher 
levels of average Qs (figure B1.6.1), a result consis-
tent with the notion that expectations of future invest-
ment are greater in lower-income countries. (Although 
not reported, Tobin’s Q calculations for developed 
countries typically yield values that ﬂ uctuate around 
the  equilibrium-consistent value of unity.) Moreover, 
measured Qs in several fast-growing developing coun-
tries—such as Bangladesh (3.55), Brazil (2.60), China 
(2.08), India (2.14), and Indonesia (1.87)—are higher 
than the developing-country average (of 1.53), which 
accords with the notion that anticipated investment 
prospects in these countries are generally favorable. 
On the other hand, Tobin’s Q values for several Eastern 
European countries indicate that market expectations 
for investment in the region remain more guarded, 
which could reflect long-lasting negative spillover 
effects of the European ﬁ nancial and debt crisis.
Some caution is warranted in placing too much 
weight on a single, raw measure of countries’ likely 
future investment. Developing countries—almost by 
deﬁ nition—will tend to possess ﬁ nancial markets that 
are less complete and more inefﬁ cient, which would 
reduce the predictive value of the market-based valu-
ations on which Tobin’s Q computations rely. Higher 
valuations for developing-country ﬁ rms may also reﬂ ect 
intangibles—such as political connections or monopoly 
rents—rather than bright growth prospects. Indeed, 
while the relationship between investment rates and 
Tobin’s Q is reasonably strong for high-income econo-
mies, it is far weaker for developing ones, which does 
limit the conﬁ dence one can place on the predictive 
ability of the measure. Nevertheless, with 90 percent 
of Qs measured at levels above unity, the overall mes-
sage of these calculations is that investors anticipate 
a continued positive growth path for many developing 
economies.
BOX 1.6  Tobin’s Q calculations for developing countries suggest positive growth 
prospects
FIGURE B1.6.1 Tobin’s average Q is higher on average in lower-income developing 
countries, reﬂ ecting market expectations of greater growth potential
Source: World Bank calculations, using data in the Bloomberg database. 
Note: Data are for 2010. Country-level Tobin’s average Qs are computed as the average of the ratio of aggregate market value to book value of 
assets held by public ﬁ rms domiciled in the country, with outliers greater than two standard deviations removed. Countries are sorted in order of 
descending per capita income, measured in 2010 dollars. Country coverage is limited by data availability. The developing-country average is com-
puted as a simple average of available data. The positive slope of the linear ﬁ t line indicates that Tobin’s Q is higher for economies with lower levels 
of per capita income.
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cross-country diﬀ erences in growth rates and rel-
ative returns to capital (when such relative returns 
are understood to embody not just observable 
diﬀ erences in countries’ relative yields but also 
structural factors), along with unobservable dif-
ferences arising from investor sentiment. On 
balance, therefore, the overall pattern of global 
and country-level investment through 2030 will 
depend on the global supply of saving, its alloca-
tion to investment across countries, and country-
speciﬁ c demands for capital. It is to this issue that 
the next section turns.
although such uncertainty seems to have a more 
pronounced eﬀ ect on investment in high-income 
countries, the negative effects of such shocks 
may also be acutely felt in developing countries 
(box 1.7).17
In sum, the existing literature on invest-
ment suggests that the cross-country variations 
in investment f inancing observed in recent 
times—especially in terms of the shift in invest-
ment activity toward developing countries and 
the move toward greater investment in second-
ary sectors—can be explained by examining 
The deleterious effects of uncertainty are not lim-
ited to the short run. Simulations of the response of 
investment to a transient shock arising from economic 
uncertainty show that although such uncertainty 
seems to have a more pronounced effect on invest-
ment in high-income countries (figure B1.7.1, panel 
a), developing countries are certainly not exempt; the 
negative effects of an uncertainty shock may appear 
after a lag of about eight years in developing countries 
(ﬁ gure B1.7.1, panel b). For both sets of countries, an 
uncertainty shock can be quite persistent, and the 
effect may not disappear completely long after the 
shock has ended. Moreover, the sharp results sug-
gest that shifts in uncertainty of a more fundamental 
nature may have even more negative and detrimental 
effects on investment.
BOX 1.7  How transient shocks to uncertainty can have a long-lasting impact on 
investment
FIGURE B1.7.1 Investment rate response to increased uncertainty in high-income and 
developing counties
Source: World Bank.
Note: Investment rate is deﬁ ned as the ﬁ xed investment share of output. The increase in uncertainty is a one standard-deviation shock to uncertainty, 
measured as the contribution-weighted principal components of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) (1,1) conditional 
variances of inﬂ ation; real exchange rate; and agricultural, metals, and energy commodity price indexes. The ﬁ gures show impulse response functions 
for a one standard-deviation innovation (solid blue) with +/– 2 standard error bands (dotted red), for 25 periods (years) into the future, generated from a 
level vector autoregressive (VAR) speciﬁ cation with two Akaike information criterion (AIC)–selected lags. Details of the estimation are provided in the 
Global Development Horizons online annex 1.4.
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Th e shift in distribution of investment as a 
share of global output between developing and 
high-income countries can be understood by 
considering the two components underlying 
this change: changes in each respective group’s 
investment rates and changes in their sizes rela-
tive to each other. Th e bulk of the increase in 
the share held by developing countries will actu-
ally be due to increases in their relative size. 
Collectively, investment in high-income coun-
tries as a proportion of their own output will 
decline slightly, by 0.7 percentage point (from 
17.5 percent to 16.8 percent), with an even larger 
corresponding decline in the developing world 
(a fall from 32.2 percent to 30.1 percent). Th us, 
developing countries’ increasing share of invest-
ment as a percentage of global output will be 
due to their catch-up economic growth, which 
results in their relative size rising from about 
one-third of the global economy in 2010 to 
almost half by 2030.
Just as China’s contribution led the surge in 
developing-world investment, the future decline 
in investment rates within developing countries 
will also be led by China, which will see its very 
high investment rate of 48 percent (as of 2010) 
edge down to about 45 percent in 2016 (as its 
shorter-term postcrisis stimulus fades) before 
The changing face of future 
investment opportunities
The gradual convergence 
scenario: A fairly stable path for 
the global investment rate, with 
heterogeneity at the country level
After the dip due to the global crisis of 2007–09, 
the scenario analyses performed for this chapter 
indicate that global investment will recover and 
trend steadily upward, growing at a rate in line 
with overall output (figure 1.12, panel a). By 
2030, global investment will amount to $25 tril-
lion, measured in 2010 dollars, with developing 
countries accounting for about two-thirds ($15 
trillion) of the total. In absolute terms, invest-
ment in developing countries will overtake that 
in high-income countries by the middle of the 
2010s. The global investment rate will remain 
more or less stable, consistent with the global sav-
ing rate of about 22 percent (ﬁ gure 1.12, panel 
b, and chapter 2). Th e share of global investment 
as a percentage of world output accounted for 
by high-income countries is expected to fall sig-
niﬁ cantly—from 12.0 percent to 9.1 percent of 
world output—with the rise in the investment 
share by developing countries more than making 
up the diﬀ erence.
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FIGURE 1.12 Total investment (panel a) and investment share of global output (panel b) will increase in 
developing relative to high-income economies in the gradual convergence scenario
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database and World Bank World Development 
Indicators database.
Note: Figure projections assume a gradual convergence scenario of annual world economic growth of 2.6 percent over the next two decades, of which developing (high-
income) growth will average 5.0 (1.0) percent annually.
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(ﬁ gure 1.13, panel b). At the same time, not all 
developing countries will see continuous declines 
in investment rates: Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
instance, will see its investment rate rise to aver-
age 24 percent between 2010 and 2030—a rate 
higher than its 2005–09 average of 21 percent—
and Russia’s investment rate will remain above 27 
percent over most of the projection period, signif-
icantly higher than its historical 2005–09 aver-
age. By way of contrast, the investment rate in the 
largest high-income countries will remain more 
or less stable, a testament to the fact that mild 
(but nevertheless positive) rates of productivity 
growth will mean that demand for investment 
in these capital-intensive economies will not dip 
precipitously. In the United States, for example, 
investment rates will close 2030 at around 13 per-
cent, which is its average rate over the course of 
the two decades.
In the gradual convergence scenario, future 
declines in investment rates will be largely driven 
by a slowing of either productivity growth or the 
labor supply because these factors determine the 
demand for investment. However, investment 
rates can also fall because of insuﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial 
resources available for any given country (the sup-
ply of investment ﬁ nancing). Changes in yields, 
relative to average yields in the world, would 
declining gradually to 37 percent by 2030 (ﬁ g-
ure 1.13, panel a). Already, there are signals in 
China—for example, underuse of office build-
ings in major cities and suspension or partial 
suspension of many high-speed rail projects—
that investment opportunities are being gradu-
ally exhausted. Th is declining investment trend 
in China will occur alongside a slowdown in 
the country’s rate of economic growth resulting 
from a rising old-age dependency ratio, which 
will reduce both capital supply (as saving falls) 
and labor supply (from a shrinking working-age 
population). Of course, the decline of China’s 
investment rate to a still-very-high 37 percent is 
not entirely surprising, given the general consen-
sus by academic, market, and policy economists 
that investment rates consistently exceeding 40 
percent are unlikely, even taking into account 
China’s relatively high rate of expected growth 
(Bardhan 2010; Dobbs et al. 2010; World Bank 
2012a).
Although the sharp drop in the investment 
rate in China will not be matched by any other 
developing country, several countries will expe-
rience signiﬁ cant declines relative to anticipated 
peaks in the medium term. Th ese include Brazil 
(from 23 percent in 2014 to 19 percent in 2030) 
and Indonesia (from 41 percent to 33 percent) 
FIGURE 1.13 Investment rates in many developing countries will trend downward in the gradual 
convergence scenario, but remain fairly stable in high-income countries
Source: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database.
Note: Investment rates for the short run (2011–13) follow estimates and projections from the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects, while medium- and long-run pro-
jections (2014–30) are from the Bank’s global LINKAGE model. Actual realizations for post-2014 are likely to be noisier. Figure projections assume a gradual convergence 
scenario of annual world economic growth of 2.6 percent over the next two decades, of which developing (high-income) growth will average 5.0 (1.0) percent annually.
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underlying mechanism inducing this change is 
the converse of Sub-Saharan Africa: shrinking 
labor forces and a deceleration from current fast 
productivity growth will mean that investment 
demand softens over the course of the next two 
decades. Th en—conditional on trends in domes-
tic saving—the drop in investment rates and the 
lower yields will also be accompanied by a slow-
ing of net capital inf lows (discussed in detail 
in chapter 3) as investors seek relatively higher-
return opportunities elsewhere.
High levels of investment by developing 
countries in their domestic economies over the 
next two decades will go some way toward cor-
recting the inequality in the global distribution 
of capital stocks between the developing world 
and high-income countries. By 2030, half of all 
capital stocks will reside in developing countries, 
with countries in East Asia and Latin America 
accounting for the largest shares of these stocks 
(56 percent and 15 percent of the developing 
world total, respectively) (f igure 1.15). Sub-
Saharan Africa will see the third-fastest growth in 
its capital stock among developing regions (after 
East and South Asia), albeit from a low base; by 
2030, its capital stock will more than double to 
$4.6 trillion (in 2010 dollars). As a group, devel-
oping countries’ capital stocks will grow by 212 
percent by 2030, compared with a 37 percent 
increase in high-income countries.
The rapid convergence scenario: 
A similarly stable path for the 
global investment rate, although 
with slightly higher investment 
rates among developing countries
As an alternative to the gradual convergence sce-
nario, it is interesting to consider a rapid con-
vergence scenario where convergence between 
developing economies and high-income ones pro-
ceeds more rapidly. Such a scenario could arise, 
for instance, if the tepid post-financial-crisis 
recovery in high-income countries plays out over 
an extended period and if more rapid catch-up 
growth in the developing world is accompanied 
by signiﬁ cant structural and institutional trans-
formation. For example, ﬁ nancial development 
in Brazil, India, and the Middle East would 
indicate whether forces of demand or supply are 
responsible for the decrease in investment rates. If 
(weak) demand is the driving force, relative yields 
will decline, and investors that are eager to supply 
their funds will mitigate the drop in the invest-
ment rate by encouraging more capital-intensive 
production. If, instead, (weak) supply is the driv-
ing force, the relative yield will increase, enticing 
still some additional ﬁ nancial capital while reduc-
ing demand by lowering the capital-intensity of 
production.
The relatively high yields in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, signal a diﬃ  culty in attract-
ing ample ﬁ nancing from global sources to meet 
their large investment demand and many new 
investment opportunities (figure 1.14). For a 
similar reason, yields are also expected to be rela-
tively high in Russia, Mexico, or high-income 
countries. Th e relative decline of yields in China, 
India, and Indonesia, in contrast, indicate a drop 
in investment demand from current levels. Th e 
FIGURE 1.14 The yield on loanable funds will rise more 
rapidly in high-income countries than in many developing 
countries
Source: World Bank projections.
Note: The leftmost (rightmost) bar for each country corresponds to 2010 (2030). Sub-Saharan 
Africa in these graphs excludes South Africa. Figure projections assume a gradual conver-
gence scenario of annual world economic growth of 2.6 percent over the next two decades, of 
which developing (high-income) growth will average 5.0 (1.0) percent annually. Yields are nor-
malized to unity for 2007, and so reported levels are not directly comparable across countries.
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Th us, as a group, the developing world will see 
its investment rate exceed that projected under 
the gradual convergence scenario by an average 
of about one percentage point throughout the 
20-year projection horizon.
For high-income countries, however, the 
investment rate under this rapid convergence 
scenario will be marginally lower—by about one 
percentage point—with a widening disparity 
between the two scenarios as 2030 approaches. 
Overall, the global investment rate rises slightly 
(because of the relatively larger size of develop-
ing economies), although it remains around 23 
percent. Th is uptick, nevertheless, will be smaller 
than the decline in global saving rates under this 
rapid convergence scenario (to be discussed in 
chapter 2), which results in some upward pressure 
on yields worldwide (discussed in chapter 3).
Even though the investment rate for develop-
ing countries collectively will rise slightly, there 
will be signiﬁ cant heterogeneity in their invest-
ment rates in the rapid convergence scenario rela-
tive to the gradual convergence scenario (ﬁ gure 
advance to attain, by 2030, a level of ﬁ nancial 
development comparable to the United States in 
the early 1980s. Similarly, the quality of insti-
tutions in China, Indonesia, and Russia would 
reach, by 2030, a level of the rule of law that is 
approximately two-thirds that of Scandinavian 
economies such as Norway or Sweden today. 
Importantly, the rate of progress in these variables 
is assumed to diﬀ er between countries: for econo-
mies starting further away from the frontier, the 
rate of growth will be relatively faster (the speciﬁ c 
assumptions for this scenario are documented in 
detail in the GDH online annex 1.6).
Th e results of this rapid convergence scenario 
indicate that global investment will be higher 
by 2030—led by substantially higher levels of 
investment in the developing world than under 
the gradual convergence scenario—to a total of 
$26.7 trillion (ﬁ gure 1.16, panel a). Th e increases 
in investment in developing countries are under-
pinned by higher productivity, with some rein-
forcing eﬀ ect from changes in the structural vari-
ables, especially from financial development.18 
FIGURE 1.15 Developing countries will account for more than half of global capital stocks 
by 2030 in the gradual convergence scenario (panel b), compared with about a third today 
(panel a)
Source: World Bank projections.
Note: Capital stocks are calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a constant depreciation rate of 5 percent.
a. Panel b projections assume a gradual convergence scenario of annual world economic growth of 2.6 percent over the next two decades, of 
which developing (high-income) growth will average 5.0 (1.0) percent annually.
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The opposite is true of Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Mexico.
Transformations in sectoral 
investment in developing 
countries
A shift toward investment 
in services can be expected
The transformations in the global picture of 
investment will not occur independently of dra-
matic shifts in the sectoral distribution of invest-
ment within developing countries. One major 
trend in sectoral shifts concerns the anticipated 
increase in the proportion of investment in the 
services sectors.19 In the gradual convergence 
scenario,20 by 2030, investment demand by the 
services sector as a proportion of total invest-
ment demand will rise by about four percentage 
points in high-income countries, reaching a high 
of 84 percent in Japan and the United States. In 
1.16, panel b). For example, China and India 
will experience slightly higher rates of invest-
ment, on the order of around one percentage 
point. At the other end of the spectrum, econo-
mies such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico will 
experience small declines in their investment 
rates, of 0.4–1.1 percent. Th is variation between 
countries is attributable to two mutually oﬀ set-
ting factors: (a) a positive contribution from high 
growth rates, rapidly growing ﬁ nancial maturity, 
and fast institutional advancement, all of which 
attract greater investment ﬁ nancing and hence 
raises investment; set against the fact that (b) 
output may grow even faster, so that as a share of 
this much higher GDP level, the investment rate 
falls (in terms of investment levels, of course, 
there are absolute increases in investment ﬂ ows). 
For China and India, therefore, the growth in all 
three of these drivers of investment ﬁ nancing—in 
conjunction with very little change in global sav-
ing—do not lead to output growth outstripping 
investment growth, and so investment rates are 
higher than in the gradual convergence scenario. 
FIGURE 1.16 Total global investment will be higher for developing countries in the rapid convergence 
scenario (panel a), but this belies substantial heterogeneity in individual developing-country experiences 
(panel b)
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database and World Bank World Development 
Indicators database.
Note: Figure projections assume two scenarios: a gradual convergence scenario of annual world economic growth of 2.6 percent over the next two decades, of which the 
developing (high-income) growth will average 5.0 (1.0) percent annually; and a rapid convergence scenario of annual world economic growth of 3.0 percent over the next 
two decades, of which the developing (high-income) growth will average 5.9 (1.0) percent annually.
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developing countries, the increase will be even 
larger: the services sector proportion of invest-
ment demand will increase by close to ﬁ ve per-
centage points (to 60 percent) overall, with the 
largest increases in India (from 60 percent to 70 
percent) and Russia (66 percent to 73 percent).21 
Th ere will also be signiﬁ cant upticks in certain 
countries that currently hold relatively small ser-
vices shares, such as Indonesia, where the share 
can be expected to rise by around six percentage 
points (table 1.2). Th e developing economies of 
East Asia (excluding China and Indonesia) and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) will 
also experience signiﬁ cant increases in their ser-
vice sector shares of roughly 6 percentage points.
Th e increase in the representation of services 
in total investment will be supported by four dis-
tinct trends: 
• Increasing per capita incomes in the largest 
developing countries 
• Demographic change 
• A rising share of services components along 
the supply chain 
• Infrastructure investment needs (infra-
structure being deﬁ ned in this report, as it 
is conventionally, as a service) 
The first effect is well known: economies 
tend to experience higher services value-added 
shares as their per capita incomes rise. India, for 
instance, had a services share of 38 percent of 
output in 1960, but as of 2010 this had risen to 
55 percent. Similar trends have occurred in devel-
oping economies as diverse as South Africa (from 
51 percent to 67 percent over the same period) 
and Argentina (from 39 percent to 59 percent 
between 1965 and 2010).
Th e second eﬀ ect will stem from rising health-
care needs faced by aging populations in many 
regions (this is discussed more thoroughly in 
chapter 2), alongside smaller youth populations 
in search of higher-quality educational services. 
These demographic pressures will result in a 
greater demand for investment in services. 
Th ird, with perhaps the notable exception of 
infrastructure—which is classiﬁ ed as a service in 
any case—agricultural and manufactured goods 
will embed a far greater services component in 
the future, and services in general will be more 
tradable. This increasing tradability is already 
evident in the information and communication 
technology (ICT) portion of the services export 
sector in some developing countries, such as vir-
tual medical diagnostics in India and Pakistan, 
human resource processing in the Gulf coun-
tries, and call centers in African countries such 
as Kenya and South Africa (Anand, Gable, and 
Mishra 2011). 
The final trend pertains to increased infra-
structure needs as economies develop (in emerg-
ing economies), coupled with the need to upgrade 
aging infrastructure (in advanced economies), 
both of which will channel more investment into 
the services sector.
Developing countries will continue to be the 
world’s manufacturing workshop. Collectively, 
developing countries will invest almost twice the 
amount that their high-income counterparts will 
in manufacturing by 2030 (compared with four-
ﬁ fths of that of high-income countries in 2010). 
In the currently lower-middle-income economies, 
manufacturing investment will grow steadily over 
the next two decades: Indonesia and India, for 
instance, will have average annual manufactur-
ing investment growth of around 7 percent and 5 
percent, respectively, and in Sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole investment will grow at an annual 
rate of somewhat less than 5 percent (table 1.2). 
Other smaller economies in East Asia, such as the 
Philippines and Vietnam, could also contribute 
to the global manufacturing picture, especially 
given their physical proximity to the East Asian 
production network. Manufacturing in the rest 
of developing Asia will grow by an average of 
about 4 percent per year.
In some high-income countries, there will be 
a signiﬁ cant falloﬀ  in manufacturing investment: 
Japan, for example, will see its manufacturing 
investment steadily shrink each year, to reach 15 
percent of its total investment in 2030. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, Europe and the United 
States will experience small, but nevertheless 
positive, annual growth rates in manufacturing 
investment, although the share of manufacturing 
in their investment bills will decline (by two per-
centage points each; it will decline by twice that 
in Japan).
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to lower the price of certain product lines, such as 
single-use medical devices, that would otherwise 
be unaﬀ ordable or inaccessible, especially in low-
income countries when they are produced by the 
traditional manufacturing industry. 3D-printing 
techniques could also defeat component obsoles-
cence (supporting poorer farmers and craftsmen 
who cannot aﬀ ord equipment and regular prod-
uct upgrade cycles) and potentially encourage 
the development of products for which the end 
users are predominantly located in low-income 
countries. 
For most countries, a larger share of investment 
activity within the services sector will be mirrored 
by a shrinking share held by the agriculture sec-
tor. In developing countries as a whole, the share 
of investment in agriculture will shrink from 
16 percent to 13 percent, although the variance 
across countries will be fairly large. Brazil and 
Sub-Saharan Africa will emerge as the (relative) 
leaders in this regard: their shares of agricultural 
In addition to the growing share of global man-
ufacturing investment represented by developing 
countries in the coming decades, the nature of 
manufactured goods will change. Manufactured 
goods are likely to embed greater services com-
ponents in the future and will be more techno-
logically sophisticated in ways beyond quality 
improvements, while also becoming increasingly 
transportable and transferable. Technological 
sophistication could be realized as enhanced 
interdevice interconnectivity (such as home appli-
ances that seamlessly interact with either a central 
computer or a mobile phone application) and as 
cost-competitive, environmentally friendly prod-
ucts (such as high-eﬃ  ciency vehicles and air con-
ditioners operating on solid-oxide fuel cells, bio-
fuels, or electrofuels). Other advances in additive 
manufacturing, such as three-dimensional (3D) 
printing, will allow more on-demand, physically 
complex, and highly customizable production. 
Such manufacturing processes have the potential 
TABLE 1.2 Both developing and high-income countries will see a rise in the share of investment devoted 
to the services sector in the future
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Share (%) Growth (%) Share (%) Growth (%) Share (%) Growth (%)
Developing countries
East Asia and Paciﬁ c 11 6.4 34 7.1 56 8.0
 China 10 7.4 35 7.7 56 8.6
 Indonesia 22 4.5 24 5.1 54 6.2
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 12 1.8 18 2.8 70 3.8
 Russian Federation 17 1.7 11 3.1 73 3.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 10 3.0 19 3.0 71 4.1
 Brazil 11 3.4 16 2.9 74 4.3
 Mexico 4 2.8 20 2.1 76 3.4
Middle East and North Africa 39 3.1 16 3.9 46 5.0
South Asia 14 5.1 17 6.5 69 8.1
 India 13 5.4 17 7.0 70 8.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 26 5.4 17 4.6 57 5.8
 South Africa 4 1.6 21 2.1 75 3.3
High-income countries
 Europe 3 −0.9 16 0.9 82 1.8
 Japan 1 −1.2 15 −0.1 84 1.1
 United States 3 −0.8 13 1.1 84 2.3
Source: World Bank projections.
Note: Investment share is computed as the sectoral share of total investment for each respective sector in 2030. Investment growth is computed as the compound annual 
percentage growth in sectoral investment for each respective sector between 2010 and 2030, measured in constant prices. Agriculture is deﬁ ned to include natural 
resources, manufacturing is deﬁ ned to include capital goods, and services are deﬁ ned to include infrastructure and construction. Table projections assume a gradual conver-
gence scenario of annual world economic growth of 2.6 percent over the next two decades, of which developing (high-income) growth will average 5.0 (1.0) percent annually.
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of the most pressing challenges for developing 
countries, especially when considered alongside 
rapid advances in per capita income and popula-
tion growth pressures in the poorest parts of the 
world. 
To better understand what such infrastructure 
investment needs are, it is necessary to go beyond 
likely investment paths and toward anticipating 
the investment expenditures that would result if 
desired targets for infrastructure were fully satis-
ﬁ ed. Indeed, even excluding maintenance costs, 
such needs will substantially exceed likely levels of 
actual infrastructure investment.22 Furthermore, 
given the central role that the public sector typi-
cally plays in infrastructural services, meeting 
such anticipated infrastructure needs is a ﬁ rst-
order concern for developing-country policy 
makers.23
Moreover, increased investment in sound 
infrastructure can serve a broader catalytic role 
in enabling sectoral shifts in investment as econo-
mies develop. Low-income countries seeking to 
break into global manufacturing markets will 
need reliable electricity generation, improved 
road and rail networks, and expanded port facili-
ties. Lower-middle-income economies will need 
higher-quality roads, more sophisticated water 
and drainage systems, and improved Internet and 
cellular phone coverage as their middle classes 
develop and as demand rises for these infrastruc-
tural services. And upper-middle-income nations 
will need modern, high-speed ICT networks and 
high-capacity power generation to effectively 
compete in high-tech manufacturing and glob-
ally tradable services while upgrading the overall 
quality of their service sectors.
A central question that developing-country 
policy makers will need to confront as they seek 
to scale up their infrastructure investments is how 
technological progress has changed, and will con-
tinue to change, the mechanisms and possibilities 
surrounding infrastructure service delivery and 
operation. Th e meaning of the term “infrastruc-
ture” is no longer self-evident: four decades ago, 
fixed-line telecommunications cables appeared 
to be a natural monopoly beneﬁ ting from pub-
lic sector provision; starting in the 1990s, a 
wave of privatizations around the world took 
hold, expanding penetration and coverage and 
investment, as a share of their total gross invest-
ment, will be mostly maintained through 2030, 
growing at annual rates of 3 percent and 5 per-
cent, respectively. This growth would ref lect 
Brazil’s comparative advantage in agricultural 
innovation, along with the adaptation of agricul-
tural technologies for the next frontier of mass 
agricultural cultivation in Africa, and is likely to 
be realized in the form of locally adapted tech-
nologies for tropical-weather farming and yield 
enhancement. Almost everywhere else in the 
world, however, agricultural investment will con-
tract more sharply: in high-income countries—
excluding investment in natural resources by the 
high-income countries of the GCC—agricultural 
investment will shrink, on average, to just 2 per-
cent of the investment bill, and even in the devel-
oping world, agriculture will amount to only 13 
percent of investment expenditures. In general, 
declines in pure agriculture (excluding natural 
resources) around the world will be somewhat 
oﬀ set by increases in natural resource investment; 
such developments are likely to reﬂ ect the resur-
gence of shale gas extraction through horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing.
Th e bottom line is that there will always be 
new technologies that absorb investment, and 
reallocations of investment between sectors ulti-
mately are led by changes in the relative returns 
to investment in each sector (which in turn is 
a function of relative output and factor prices 
between sectors). In short, the world is not about 
to “run out” of investible opportunities.
Developing-country infrastructure 
investment needs will be 
substantially higher in 2030
One investment priority consistent with the 
forthcoming shift toward services investment 
is the pressure in most developing countries for 
expanded infrastructural services. As discussed 
in the previous subsection, services investment 
in developing countries will rise substantially 
from current levels, amounting to almost $10 
trillion by 2030. Of this amount, $626 billion 
(slightly more than 6 percent) will be spent on 
infrastructure. Yet in spite of major advances over 
the past decade, infrastructural needs remain one 
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Infrastructure investment needs are likely to be 
most concentrated in East Asian and South Asian 
countries: the amount in just those two regions 
will total $501 billion in 2030, reﬂ ecting contin-
ued strong demand for infrastructure by the very 
large Chinese and Indian populations (ﬁ gure 1.17, 
panel b). In China, power needs will dominate, 
but this will be coupled with ﬁ xed-line telecom-
munications demand as more and more Chinese 
consumers and businesses seek high-speed connec-
tivity. In India, investment will need to be directed 
toward improving the country’s very poor road 
system, although mobile connectivity will draw 
infrastructure investment as well. 
Yet even the substantial sum of $501 billion 
may underestimate the tremendous infrastruc-
ture needs of Asian countries when considering 
international infrastructure links (those involv-
ing improving access between two or more 
countries). Using this more expansive deﬁ nition 
bumps up infrastructure needs for Asia to an 
estimated $750 billion per year for the decade 
between 2010 and 2020 (ADB 2010)—about 26 
percent more than estimated expenditures when 
only intracountry needs are considered. 
As for Sub-Saharan Africa, the region’s infra-
structure investment needs do not appear sig-
niﬁ cantly greater than that of other developing 
regions in absolute terms. Were they to be met 
in full, however, the amount would constitute a 
signiﬁ cant share of total investment in the region: 
$97 billion, or 15 percent of the total $662 bil-
lion. Moreover, this estimate excludes investment 
needs arising from the need to rehabilitate the 
estimated 30 percent of existing infrastructure 
that has been poorly managed (AfDB 2010) or 
the additional investment required to enhance 
regional interconnectivity (PIDA 2011).
Importantly, infrastructure investment needs 
at the regional level will not evolve monotoni-
cally. Given the easy availability of cellular mobile 
phones and their widespread adoption, demand 
for cellular telecommunications infrastructure, in 
particular, is likely to be greatest over the next ﬁ ve 
years. Th is front-loaded demand is likely to reach 
saturation in a signiﬁ cant number of developing 
countries by 2017 or 2018.26 As these needs taper 
oﬀ , ﬁ xed-line infrastructure will increase in impor-
tance. Power and transportation needs are likely to 
enhancing eﬃ  ciency (Li and Xu 2004). Today, 
fixed telephone lines are almost anachronistic, 
with many developing countries leapfrogging 
ﬁ xed lines and installing cellular transmitter tow-
ers instead. Finally, improved eﬃ  ciencies due to 
technological improvements in grid storage and 
digital power conversion could mean that future 
infrastructure spending in power will shift from 
investment in production toward storage.
Although the speciﬁ c composition and nature 
of infrastructural capital will adapt according to 
changes in the world economy, the nature of eco-
nomic services that characterize infrastructure 
nevertheless remain the same: high capital inten-
sity, elements of natural monopoly, and location-
speciﬁ c investment.24 Accordingly, the discussion 
in this report will retain the traditional categories 
of power, transportation, telecommunications, 
and water and sanitation, while acknowledging 
that the speciﬁ c technologies implied by these cat-
egories require some ﬂ exibility in interpretation.
Th ough estimates are not consistent, analysis 
of demand for infrastructure services generally 
reveals that although demand increases with per 
capita income, the pace of growth in demand is 
faster at lower per capita income levels. Currently, 
per capita electricity consumption in developing 
countries ranges from an average of 452 kilowatt-
hours (kWh) for low-income countries to 3,073 
kWh in upper-middle-income countries; by com-
parison, the average in developed countries is 
10,408 kWh. Th e sheer number of people who 
lack access to other forms of infrastructure pro-
vides another hint of how much investment will 
be required: 1.1 billion people in the world cur-
rently lack access to safe drinking water, and 2.4 
billion face inadequate sanitation services.
In 2030, infrastructure investment needs in 
developing countries will amount to an estimated 
$864 billion, as measured in 2010 dollars (ﬁ gure 
1.17, panel a).25 Th ese needs will be concentrated 
in the power ($243 billion) and transportation 
($254 billion) subsectors, which will together 
account for more than half of all infrastructure 
needs. Fixed-line telecommunications infrastruc-
ture—presumably in the form of digital and opti-
cal cables—will also be a major area of invest-
ment, amounting to $172 billion (or 20 percent 
of total infrastructure investment needs).
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sheer size of infrastructure investment needs 
(which does not distinguish between public or 
private investment) suggests that adequately 
meeting these needs will call for a rethinking 
of existing institutional arrangements of service 
delivery, increased internationalization of fund-
ing sources, and innovative ﬁ nancing strategies 
that are better designed to meet the high levels of 
capital intensity. Concurrent with meeting these 
purely financial goals is the necessity of being 
keenly aware of the broader public policy issues 
of eﬃ  ciency, access by the poor, and quality of 
services.
More than other sectors, infrastructure 
ﬁ nancing has witnessed a distinct shift in terms 
of government policy, public attitude, and intel-
lectual treatment. Since the mid-20th century, 
these trends first encouraged a model of pub-
lic ownership and control, vertically integrated 
industrial organization, and public ﬁ nancing of 
grow more gradually, a reﬂ ection of more gradual 
changes in population demands for these services.
Enormous resource mobilization 
will be required to meet 
infrastructure ﬁ nancing needs 
in developing countries
Successfully meeting developing countries’ cumu-
lative infrastructure ﬁ nancing needs of $14.6 tril-
lion between 2012 and 2030 will require an enor-
mous mobilization of financing—one akin to 
frontier expansion by European countries in the 
New World in the 19th century, which generated 
massive investment needs in the form of railways, 
real estate, and large-scale agricultural projects. 
Although infrastructure investment has tradi-
tionally been the purview of the public sector, as 
discussed earlier, this trend is changing, toward 
greater public-private partnership. Indeed, the 
FIGURE 1.17 Annual infrastructure investment needs in developing countries will be substantial for the 
next two decades (panel a), with the greatest needs arising in East and South Asia (panel b)
Source: World Bank projections.
Note: Details of the methodology underlying the projections are given in the Global Development Horizons online annex 1.5.
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international banks) to provide the necessary 
capital for large-scale infrastructure projects is 
questionable, given weaknesses in their postcrisis 
balance sheets (an issue also discussed in chapter 
3). Considered together, these factors will limit 
the options available to policy makers seeking to 
ﬁ nance infrastructure.
One respite offered by the long-term dura-
tion of infrastructure assets is that, in spite of 
global rollbacks in overall syndicated lending, the 
nature of the investment allows for more inno-
vative ﬁ nancing options through, for instance, 
increased securitization of future cash ﬂ ows. In 
fact, there is evidence that this shift toward bond 
ﬁ nancing has already occurred (ﬁ gure 1.18) and 
will continue to expand in the future, perhaps 
accounting for as much as half of all infrastruc-
ture investment ﬁ nancing.
The current trend toward globalization of 
corporate ﬁ nance is also likely to intensify in the 
future, and this will further support infrastructure 
financing sourced from global capital markets. 
Such bond market maturation will ultimately lead 
to lower credit spreads and hence the cost of capi-
tal. Th ere is evidence that this is already under way: 
emerging market corporate bonds carried spreads 
over comparable U.S. Treasury securities of about 
450 basis points in the early 1990s, but the average 
spread narrowed to 392 basis points in 2011. Of 
course, such ﬁ nancing structures are feasible only 
when the underlying ﬁ nancial, regulatory, legal, 
and institutional frameworks are sound, which in 
turn is premised on the developing world’s prog-
ress in developing their ﬁ nancial institutions. In 
situations where such frameworks are not properly 
in place or are in a state of transition, investors are 
likely to increase their hurdle rates. Th is is typically 
passed on as higher tariﬀ s for infrastructure ser-
vices, which, as experience indicates, leads to such 
services being prohibitively expensive, especially 
for the poor. But innovative ﬁ nancing need not 
be limited to securitization. Innovations can also 
occur in the manner by which funding is raised, 
especially when aided by modern ICT (box 1.8).
Conclusion and policy directions
The future face of global investment activ-
ity will see developing countries in far greater 
investment. Since the 1990s, the common model 
has shifted toward market liberalization, unbun-
dling of power and telecom utilities, privatization 
of public assets, and ﬁ nancing through private 
markets. More recently, the model has evolved 
toward public-private partnerships in ﬁ nancing, 
especially in middle-income countries.
The evolution toward greater private sector 
involvement in infrastructure ﬁ nancing could not 
have come at a more opportune time. Th e ﬁ nanc-
ing of future infrastructure investment needs will 
occur in a global environment where the public 
sector will almost certainly face funding diﬃ  cul-
ties. As will be further discussed in chapter 2, 
ﬁ scal balances worldwide were compromised as a 
result of the ﬁ nancial crisis. Th is was especially 
the case in advanced economies but also in the 
developing world. Furthermore, questions about 
the sustainability of sovereign debt, as detailed 
in chapter 3, are likely to negatively affect the 
global outlook for public sector access to global 
capital markets. Even the ability of traditional 
private sector financial intermediaries (such as 
FIGURE 1.18 Infrastructure investment ﬁ nancing modes 
have changed over time and will likely favor greater bond 
ﬁ nancing in the future
Source: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data from Dealogic 
Bondware and Loanware.
Note: Infrastructure ﬁ nancing is calculated as a share of cumulative investment ﬁ nancing 
needs during the respective time periods. Total values, in billions of current dollars, are given 
in parentheses. Projections for 2012–22 are based on the assumption of similar growth rates 
between the second two periods as between the ﬁ rst two periods and zero inﬂ ation. The 
cumulative infrastructure investment bill for 2012–22 is $8.8 trillion.
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that when large economies engage in profligate 
public policies or unrestrained private borrowing, 
there could be material contractions in the global 
supply of saving (to the extent that such actions are 
not fully oﬀ set by Ricardian equivalence). Th is can 
choke oﬀ  investment in small, vulnerable develop-
ing countries, which typically have less ﬁ scal space 
to oﬀ set negative shocks from abroad.
The anticipated fundamental forces that 
will shape the global economy in the years to 
come—asynchronous demographic transforma-
tion, asymmetric productivity growth, structural 
change, and ﬁ nancial globalization—will there-
fore alter not just investment needs and opportu-
nities but also saving decisions and choices along 
with the cross-border ﬂ ow of ﬁ nancial capital and 
international investment positions. Accordingly, 
the following chapters will address the issue of 
global patterns in saving (chapter 2), along with 
the saving-investment imbalance that constitutes 
international capital ﬂ ows (chapter 3), tying the 
notion of investment needs with opportunities 
together at the global level.
prominence, investing more than high-income 
countries in absolute value and as a share of global 
investment. Since 2000, developing countries’ 
investment as a proportion of their own output 
has been substantially higher than that of high-
income countries. Th ese trends are not expected 
to continue indeﬁ nitely into the future, but their 
eﬀ ects are already palpable, and their full ramiﬁ -
cations will be realized over the next two decades.
Although this chapter focuses on real invest-
ment activity—in particular, gross capital forma-
tion—across countries, the current account iden-
tity implies that investment should be understood 
alongside saving and capital f lows.27 For many 
small developing economies, shocks to saving in 
major economies, such as the United States, will 
inevitably aﬀ ect their domestic patterns of invest-
ment (Feyrer and Shambaugh 2012). Th is result is 
a double-edged sword. On one hand, it suggests 
that developing countries can leverage increases in 
national saving in large, high-income countries to 
relax domestic saving constraints and boost invest-
ment at home. On the other hand, it also means 
The idea behind crowdsourced capital has a relatively 
long, and reasonably venerable, history in developing-
world ﬁ nance. Distilled to its essence, crowd ﬁ nanc-
ing seeks to minimize the role of intermediaries in 
matching savers with investors. On the saving front, 
rotating savings and credit associations as well as 
the more recent innovation, community ﬁ nance asso-
ciations, can be regarded as forms of crowd ﬁ nanc-
ing (Besley, Coate, and Loury 1993). As for investing, 
some microﬁ nancing organizations, such as Kiva, have 
been known to employ crowd funding as their pri-
mary ﬁ nancing mechanism (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Morduch 2009).
Information technology, as well, has expanded the 
potential to draw on diverse sources to ﬁ nance infra-
structure in developing countries. One such initiative, 
Sokoni, has established a digital marketplace that con-
nects donors and investors directly to project develop-
ers and governments. Innovative ﬁ nancing mechanisms 
of this kind are possible pathways into a future where 
infrastructure financing breaks free from traditional 
modalities and embraces the power and connectivity 
made available by modern information and communica-
tions technologies.
Another alternative mechanism that has begun to 
take hold in infrastructure ﬁ nancing is Islamic ﬁ nance, 
particularly for large-scale projects in the Middle East. 
Although the broader applicability of Islamic finance 
may continue to face economic, legal, and systemic 
challenges (Hesse, Jobst, and Solé 2008), there is 
reason to believe that Islamic ﬁ nance could be cred-
ibly scaled up as an alternative medium for cross-
border infrastructure ﬁ nancing. The tenets of Islamic 
ﬁ nance—which focus on direct participation in asset 
performance—are well suited for the long-term nature 
of infrastructure ﬁ nance, where the rate of return could 
be difﬁ cult to predetermine and may be realized years 
after an initial investment.
BOX 1.8  Alternative ﬁ nancing mechanisms have begun to be adopted in ﬁ nancing 
infrastructure
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desirable projects and activities. Moreover, 
attracting investment from abroad often requires 
the presence of a professional, knowledgeable, 
and investor-focused investment facilitation 
agency, equipped with the capacity to ease cross-
border informational asymmetries (World Bank 
2012c).
For policy makers interested in boosting 
investment, a central element of the invest-
ment climate is the level of development of 
the ﬁ nancial sector. As discussed in this chap-
ter, an increasingly mature financial system is 
associated with rising levels of investment. More 
important, well-functioning financial systems 
ensure a superior mobilization and corresponding 
allocation of saving toward the most productive 
investment opportunities (Levine 2005) while 
providing investors diversiﬁ cation and risk man-
agement beneﬁ ts. A lengthy discussion of policies 
that can stimulate ﬁ nancial sector development is 
beyond the scope of this report, but recent work 
by the World Bank offers a menu of ideas for 
jump-starting such development, especially as it 
pertains to the role of the state, and for guard-
ing against circumstances of state capture and 
government failure (World Bank 2012b). For the 
purposes of relaxing credit-related constraints, 
especially for small and medium-size enter-
prises, the establishment of a credit information 
agency can be especially helpful. It is important 
to point out, however, that any policies designed 
to encourage financial sector development—a 
long-run goal—should not be interpreted simply 
as the pure expansion of credit; such a narrow 
view may give rise to the pursuit of unsustainable 
short-term policies that are ultimately detrimen-
tal to economic and ﬁ nancial stability.
Major developing economies have not stood 
idly by in seeking to foster enhanced ﬁ nancing 
facilities for South-South investment. Th e BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) touted a South-South development 
bank in early 2012, for example, as a mechanism 
to help recycle surplus saving for their developing 
countries’ investment needs, while regional mul-
tilateral development banks have also expanded 
their operations dramatically in recent years (a 
topic that will be revisited in chapter 3). 
Policy makers have an important 
role to play in supporting a 
favorable investment climate
Because investment is primarily a private sector-
led activity, government policy action in most 
countries exerts only an indirect eﬀ ect on chang-
ing the level of investment in a country. Rather, 
government’s role is often to establish an envi-
ronment—the investment climate—that is sup-
portive of robust and sustainable investment 
activity. Th is is not to say that public investment 
is irrelevant, since there may be a role for inter-
vention where market failures are clear and where 
social returns are especially large. For instance, 
governments in developing countries often have 
a well-deﬁ ned role in the provision of infrastruc-
ture, which serves as an important foundation 
for private investment activity. But the policy 
framework for investment is ultimately an indi-
rect one.
With this overriding framework in mind, the 
importance of changes to structural factors in 
attracting investment from the global pool of sav-
ing—amply demonstrated by the difference in 
investment patterns in the rapid versus gradual 
convergence scenarios discussed earlier—suggests 
that countries seeking to compete in the future 
world economy will need to pay attention to fos-
tering a favorable investment climate. In general, 
a favorable investment climate is characterized 
not only by traditional policy areas that can foster 
private sector investment, such as a stable macro-
economic and regulatory regime, but also by (a) 
the broader institutional environment in which 
firms operate (which includes secure property 
rights and stable rule of law); (b) the governance 
framework, such as adequate control of corrup-
tion and a limited burden from—and simpliﬁ ed 
administration of—direct and indirect taxation 
(which includes the risk of outright appropria-
tion); and (c) the level of maturity of the ﬁ nancial 
sector. In this sense, getting the investment cli-
mate right shifts the policy dialogue away from 
a laundry list of speciﬁ c actions and policies for 
reform, and toward a discussion of what consti-
tutes the appropriate set of rules, governance, and 
incentives that would stimulate the private sec-
tor to invest in economically eﬃ  cient and socially 
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maintained; and when interventions have a clear 
sunset clause. 
If policy makers do ultimately decide to pursue 
the targeted intervention route, their eﬀ orts 
may be best placed in supporting the upcom-
ing expansion in service sector investment (as 
discussed earlier), especially in areas (such as 
education and health care) where spillovers from 
positive externalities could be especially high. 
Even in manufacturing and agriculture, there are 
certainly subindustries (like “green” technology 
components or tropically adapted seeds) where 
social returns appear to be sufficiently large to 
justify the risks of direct intervention. 
Although the institutional design that best 
supports such successful interventions is likely to 
be idiosyncratic, a wholesale rejection of a public 
role in investment is probably unwarranted. Just 
as important, governments that currently engage 
in policies that, either directly or indirectly, favor 
investment in agriculture and manufacturing (for 
example, many governments explicitly prohibit 
FDI in certain “sensitive” or “strategic” services) 
will place a burden on their economies’ eﬃ  ciency 
in a world where services account for a larger 
share of output.
Indeed, the area where government policy 
is likely to offer some of the greatest social 
returns is in the provision of infrastructure. As 
discussed earlier, this is also a sector of the econ-
omy that will likely face increased demand for 
future investment. Yet even in this area, which 
has been the traditional bulwark of public sec-
tor investment, government roles are evolving. 
PPPs have helped move along projects that cash-
constrained public sectors sometimes have had 
trouble completing on their own. For example, 
by oﬀ ering guarantees on minimum concession 
charges for toll-road operations, private investors 
in Chile, India, and Mexico have funded trans-
portation infrastructure in many remote areas 
that were previously underserved. In Jordan and 
Russia, new airports have been built and operated 
by foreign investors, which in turn contribute 
to positive network externalities for future busi-
ness opportunities. Even in areas where citizen-
state conﬂ icts have arisen in the past—such as 
Improvements in the overall quality of gover-
nance in developing countries, especially with 
regard to the rule of law, can also have a major 
impact on the investment climate and serve to 
attract ﬁ nancing for investment from global 
sources. Th is is not surprising given that respect 
for the rule of law is essential to ensuring that 
investors can realize returns from their invest-
ment activities. However, successfully address-
ing governance challenges as they pertain to the 
investment climate calls for going beyond de jure 
corrections to the letter of the law or salutary 
actions such as the establishment of independent 
investment and regulatory commissions. Actions 
will need to ensure that the elements of rule of 
law are maintained de facto by bureaucrats and 
politicians and that formal institutional bodies 
can enforce violations of rule of law in an uncom-
promised fashion. 
Such fundamental reform, of course, is likely 
to encounter resistance by entrenched interests, 
and so reform eﬀ orts must be undertaken with 
a mind toward building coalitions for change 
through expanding the scope of stakeholders and 
encouraging partnership models of stakeholder 
interactions (World Bank 2008). Even seemingly 
innocuous reform eﬀ orts, such as routine, unbi-
ased implementation of investment-related com-
petition law, can face staunch political opposition 
if they would weaken existing monopolistic or 
oligopolistic positions of incumbent businesses.
Successful investment policy, of course, seeks 
to not only correct areas of government failure 
as described above but also to suggest direct 
intervention in cases where market failures are 
suﬃ  ciently evident (and remain uncorrected) 
or where social returns are suﬃ  ciently high. 
Recent research (Aghion et al. 2012; Bloom and 
van Reenen 2007; Rodrik 2009) has revived the 
idea that targeted interventions can better align 
private sector incentives and foster private sector 
competition (rather than rent seeking)—espe-
cially when such policies are not so much targeted 
at a speciﬁ c sector (where the risk of subsequent 
capture can be high) but at particular constraints 
(such as inadequate knowledge of good man-
agement practices or difficulties in obtaining 
credit); when high levels of accountability are 
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in terms of both economic payoﬀ s and political 
institutions, that would ensure that large invest-
ment expenditures are not misallocated.
4. PPPs are typically formed through the establish-
ment of a single long-term contract between a 
government and a private investor that bundles 
infrastructure investment and service provision.
5. Th e Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was estab-
lished in 1981 through an agreement between 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates. 
6. Indeed, in recent years there has been a major 
shift as investors from advanced economies have 
retreated and developing-country investors have 
emerged as a major source of investment ﬁ nance 
for infrastructure projects with private participa-
tion (Ettinger et al. 2005).
7. As discussed in online annex 1.1 (on the Global 
Development Horizons [GDH ] website), the deﬁ ni-
tion of “productive physical capital” intentionally 
excludes broader measures of capital, including 
that of human and natural capital. Such correc-
tions may be appropriate for the study of certain 
phenomena—such as the optimal rate of natural 
resource extraction (World Bank 2006, 2011)—
but a considered treatment is beyond the scope of 
this report. Moreover, as discussed elsewhere in 
this report, there are potential problems in regard-
ing all forms of investment (private, public, or 
investment in nonreproducible capital) as equiva-
lent to productive capital formation. With these 
caveats in mind, the goal of this subsection is to 
provide a better sense of the distribution of global 
ﬁ xed capital stocks, and caution is warranted in 
relying on the capital stock computations pro-
vided here in secondary analyses.
8. Although the capital stock calculations are based 
on constant 2000 dollars and the perpetual inven-
tory method assuming a constant depreciation rate, 
alternative calculations, using either PPP-adjusted 
investment or hyperbolic discounting of the capital 
stock, deliver a similar qualitative message.
9. Th e relationship between economic growth and 
investment is clearly endogenous. Nevertheless, 
there is a strong correlation between the two 
because sustained economic growth is the result of 
improvements in total factor productivity (TFP) 
and not factor accumulation alone. TFP, in turn, 
derives from a far richer set of factors over and 
above high levels of investment.
10. Th is relative yield  r∼ is deﬁ ned in the context of the 
investment ﬁ nancing equation in online annex 1.6 
(on the GDH website).
water utilities—a willingness to employ profes-
sional management in state-owned facilities has 
helped improve eﬃ  ciency and service quality in 
Colombia, Gabon, and the Philippines.
International f inancial institutions such 
as the World Bank, International Financial 
Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency can have an especially impor-
tant role to play in this regard. Th e World Bank 
has traditionally been active in infrastructure 
ﬁ nancing, and it can play an important interme-
diary function in oﬀ ering low-cost infrastructure 
ﬁ nancing through its participation in PPP lend-
ing syndicates or by designing structured ﬁ nanc-
ing options (such as infrastructure bonds). But 
the institution’s role goes beyond ﬁ nancing. Th e 
World Bank is now a repository for knowledge 
on PPPs in infrastructure, and as such can pro-
vide technical assistance and other advisory ser-
vices that draw on the diversity of cross-country 
experiences in infrastructure investment projects 
(World Bank 2012d).
Notes
1. Th e deﬁ nition of “investment” used in this chap-
ter is, in most cases, gross capital formation, 
including purchases of physical structures, plants, 
machinery, and equipment, together with inven-
tory accumulation, but gross of depreciation. 
Further information on this and other deﬁ nitions 
of investment may be found in online annex 1.1 
(available, with the rest of the annexes for this and 
the other chapters, at http://www.worldbank.org/
CapitalForTh eFuture). 
2. It is important to be aware that measurement dif-
ﬁ culties mean that the reported sectoral marginal 
products of capital (MPKs) should be regarded as 
indicative, rather than deﬁ nitive. It is also impor-
tant to keep in mind that calculated MPKs cap-
ture the mean of a distribution of ﬁ rm eﬃ  ciencies, 
and so the most productive ﬁ rms in a country 
or sector may still be highly eﬃ  cient. Analogous 
computations using a more familiar metric, the 
incremental capital-output ratio, are reported in 
online annex 1.2, with similar qualitative results.
3. Although there is still considerable debate over the 
veracity of such models in stimulating growth, it is 
well recognized today that any such approach can-
not occur in the absence of absorptive capacity, 
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investment projects, the importance of timing, 
and, crucially, the inherent uncertainty involved in 
assessing investment opportunities. 
16. Th e theoretical prediction of the negative eﬀ ect 
of uncertainty on investment is more ambiguous. 
Caballero (1991), for instance, has noted that the 
response of investment to uncertainty depends 
on assumptions regarding decreasing marginal 
returns to capital, while Lee and Shin (2001) show 
that the share of labor in the production function 
can aﬀ ect the balance between the positive and 
negative eﬀ ects of uncertainty.
17. As can be seen from box 1.7, ﬁ gure B1.7.1, there is 
signiﬁ cant uncertainty about the true impact of the 
shock; the error bands for both impulse responses 
include zero. Nevertheless, as Jordà (2009) has 
argued, the inclusion of zero within the conﬁ dence 
bands for the impulse response need not disqual-
ify the variable from having an eﬀ ect, especially 
if the function appears to trend smoothly in one 
direction or another during the propagation of 
the shock, rather than vacillate unstably around 
zero. It should also be noted that other studies (for 
example, Carrière-Swallow and Céspedes, forth-
coming) have found that the eﬀ ect of uncertainty 
shocks on investment is actually greater for emerg-
ing economies.
18. Because labor supply remains unchanged in this 
scenario, higher levels of ﬁ nancial development 
attract greater amounts of investment ﬁ nanc-
ing, which increases eﬃ  ciency-adjusted capital 
stocks and serves as an additional boost to growth 
over and above the productivity increase. When 
decomposed into the contribution of growth ver-
sus structural change (by separately running the 
scenario with only changes in either), the eﬀ ect 
of growth is generally twice as large as that of 
structural changes. Although not reported, these 
results are available on request.
19. Although one may reasonably expect that service 
sector investment would rise as countries become 
richer (given the trend that output in the service 
sector does rise with per capita incomes), this is 
not immediately obvious because the capital 
intensity of the service sector diﬀ ers from that of 
the manufacturing sector. In the model used in 
this report, the capital intensity of the service sec-
tor is indeed, on average, signiﬁ cantly lower than 
that of the manufacturing sector across develop-
ing countries.
20. For space reasons, this section will rely on esti-
mates consistent with the gradual convergence 
scenario. Although the numbers diﬀ er, the main 
11. Undoubtedly, interest rates should reﬂ ect some 
of the diﬀ erences that arise from these structural 
factors. However, interest rates may not fully 
capture the impact of structural diﬀ erences due 
to ﬁ nancial market imperfections. For example, 
ﬁ nancial repression—common in many develop-
ing countries—may result in a distortion so that 
a disconnect arises between reported interest rates 
and expected returns. 
12. Th e changes are measured by the simple average of 
the control of corruption and rule of law measures 
in the Worldwide Governance Indicators for the 
two years (1996 and 2010). For more information 
about the Worldwide Governance Indicators proj-
ect, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi 
/index.asp.
13. Th eory posits that the investment rate is equal to 
the ratio of ﬁ rms’ shadow value of capital per unit 
price of investment goods, a relationship known as 
marginal Q. However, because such shadow prices 
are not observable, economists have operational-
ized the concept by taking the ratio of the ﬁ rms’ 
(observable) market valuations to their replace-
ment costs of capital, or average Q. Under certain 
additional assumptions—which include perfect 
competition and perfect capital markets—these 
two ratios are in fact equivalent (Hayashi 1982). 
Recent research has even suggested that future 
investment opportunities are better captured 
by average, rather than marginal, Q. Empirical 
Tobin’s Q studies seeking to explain investment by 
Q alone, however, have had a disappointing track 
record, which may be attributable to the diver-
gence between these two measures as a result of 
ﬁ nancial frictions (Lorenzoni and Walentin 2007).
14. A common alternative interpretation of Tobin’s Q 
is that it is a proxy for adjustment costs for chang-
ing capital stocks. Absent such costs, the coef-
ﬁ cient on Q would be unity. A small coeﬃ  cient 
estimate for Q is thus interpreted as an indica-
tion of large (convex) adjustment costs (although 
recent research by Abel and Eberly [2011] dispute 
this traditional interpretation). In the reported 
sample, the coeﬃ  cient for Q in the full sample 
is 0.01, which is remarkably close to estimates 
typically obtained in the literature, using far more 
sophisticated estimation techniques and alterna-
tive speciﬁ cations.
15. Treating investment decisions as real options 
simultaneously accounts for three features of 
investment that are not well captured by the tra-
ditional approach of equating user cost to mar-
ginal product: the irreversible nature of many 
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estimate of $626 billion in the gradual conver-
gence scenario. Th ese estimates also suggest that 
infrastructure investment grows at an annual rate 
of only 0.6 percent for 2011–30, a rate one order 
of magnitude slower than the annual growth rate 
of services in developing countries (of 6.2 per-
cent). As can be seen in ﬁ gure 1.17, however, this 
slow rate is due mainly to a signiﬁ cant drop-oﬀ  in 
mobile infrastructure spending. Annual growth in 
infrastructure investment excluding this category 
grows by 2.5 percent, which remains slower than 
the overall rate of services growth, but not sub-
stantially so.
26. Th is saturation point is assumed to be at two 
cellphones per user. As of 2010, only Hong Kong 
SAR, China, has coverage (slightly) in excess of 
this level.
27. Th e current account identity states that the dif-
ference between national saving and investment 
is equivalent to a country’s net capital ﬂ ows. Th e 
surprisingly high correlation between saving and 
investment was ﬁ rst observed by Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980), who regarded the ﬁ nding as 
evidence of home bias in saving and investment. 
Subsequent work has punctured this notion that 
high saving-investment correlations necessarily 
imply poor capital mobility (Kraay and Ventura 
2000), although the more general point that the 
three variables are closely linked should not be 
understated.
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2
Global Saving in 2030
WHETHER SAVING IS A SERIOUS impediment to growth in developing countries has long been an issue of 
concern. In the late 1960s, developing countries 
saved only 18 percent of their income, and low-
income economies only 13 percent, compared 
with 21 percent in high-income economies. 
Given developing countries’ limited ability to 
attract foreign saving, it was felt that inadequate 
domestic saving constrained investment, and 
thus growth, necessitating large transfers from 
high-saving rich countries. Whether saving was 
the primary constraint on development can still 
be debated, but the situation has changed dra-
matically. Developing countries’ domestic sav-
ing averaged 32 percent of their income in 2009, 
while the rate in developed countries had fallen 
to 17 percent.1 Th is sharp increase in saving rates 
among developing countries has not laid to rest 
the concern that inadequate saving may limit 
their growth prospects, however, because aging 
populations may put downward pressure on their 
saving rates in the coming decades. 
A conclusion of this chapter is that despite 
the tendency of population aging to lower sav-
ing rates, saving is unlikely to be a binding con-
straint on global growth. Although this conclu-
sion applies at the global level, there will be clear 
disparities in saving rates across countries and 
regions and some of them may face diﬃ  culties in 
the future. 
The main messages of the chapter are as 
follows:
• Changes in saving rates in developing coun-
tries over time will be driven by three main 
factors: aging populations, economic growth 
rates, and the deepening of ﬁ nancial markets. 
Th e aging of populations in much of the 
developing world will put downward pres-
sure on household saving rates. However, 
aging will also make (young) labor scarcer 
with respect to capital, raising real wages 
relative to the return to capital. Th is shift 
in relative factor prices will entail a redistri-
bution of income from asset holders, who 
tend to be older and thus have lower saving 
rates, to workers who tend to be younger 
and thus have higher saving rates, contrib-
uting to mitigate downward pressure.
  The higher economic growth rates in 
developing countries will also encour-
age saving. Indeed, a scenario of gradual 
convergence between the developed and 
developing worlds in terms of income and 
structural change assumes that, for a large 
group of developing countries, growth rates 
will continue to increase up to around 2020, 
when they will stabilize and then slowly 
decelerate. For some countries, notably in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, growth rates are pro-
jected to follow an increasing trend through 
2030. Th ese accelerations of growth are even 
stronger in a scenario where the productivity 
gap between high-income countries and the 
developing world closes more rapidly. Th ese 
positive changes in the pace of growth boost 
saving and partially oﬀ set the drag from the 
increasing share of old people.
  Other growth-related mechanisms will 
also play a role. Longer life expectancy 
may have the effect of increasing saving 
to finance additional years of education 
and retirement. In turn, the increased 
number of better-educated workers with 
steeper age-earnings proﬁ les will also tend 
to increase saving rates. Moreover, higher 
incomes are associated with fewer children 
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and greater female labor force participa-
tion, increasing the potential for saving 
during workers’ most productive years.
  Financial deepening in developing coun-
tries is found to put downward pressure on 
saving rates. Speciﬁ cally, ﬁ nancial develop-
ment can relax liquidity constraints and 
thus reduce the need for saving by indi-
viduals and ﬁ rms with high-return invest-
ments. Financial deepening reﬂ ected in the 
greater availability and use of insurance and 
pension arrangements can also reduce the 
need for precautionary saving. But ﬁ nancial 
deepening is also associated with a more 
eﬃ  cient allocation of capital, and thus with 
higher growth in incomes, which would 
tend to support saving. Th is complex inter-
action among aging, growth, and ﬁ nancial 
deepening can be expected to result in a 
slight decline in developing countries’ aver-
age saving rate, from a peak of 34 percent in 
2014 to 32 percent in 2030.
• The evolution of saving will differ signifi-
cantly by region. In two regions—East 
Asia as well as Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia—downward pressure on saving rates 
due to rapid aging will be at least partially 
oﬀ set by rapid growth, so that saving rates 
will not fall by as much as in high-income 
countries. In Indonesia, for example, the 
old-age dependency ratio will increase at 
as rapid a pace as in high-income coun-
tries between 2010 and 2030, but its sav-
ing rate will fall only from 32 percent to 
31 percent (under the gradual scenario), in 
contrast to the expected decline in high-
income countries’ saving rate from 18 per-
cent to 16 percent. Some of this diﬀ erence 
reﬂ ects changes in structural variables such 
as financial sector depth and the size of 
social security systems, but mostly it is due 
to Indonesia’s higher growth rate. At the 
other end of the demographic spectrum, 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s relatively young and 
rapidly growing population, coupled with 
its increasing growth due to productiv-
ity catch-up, will make it the only region 
where the saving rate does not fall during 
the time horizon considered here.
• Th e rise of developing countries will support 
global saving rates. Developing countries 
will experience rapid growth in output, 
rapid population growth in regions with 
relatively young populations, and relatively 
high saving rates between 2010 and 2030, 
while high-income economies will expe-
rience slower growth and declining sav-
ing rates. By 2030, developing countries 
will contribute 62 of every 100 dollars of 
total world saving, up from 45 in 2010. 
Th e shift in economic weight to relatively 
high-saving developing economies will 
counterbalance the contraction of saving in 
high-income countries. Developing coun-
tries’ rapidly growing share of global sav-
ing implies also that their share of global 
wealth will also rise, albeit more slowly.
• Saving in developing countries appears to be 
concentrated among high-income households. 
Although the concentration of saving (and 
of wealth) within a small segment of a 
country’s population has the possibility to 
support growth by encouraging financial 
deepening, concentration also has somber 
implications for economic mobility and thus 
for the political and social consensus essen-
tial for growth. Not only do high-income 
households tend to save a greater proportion 
of their incomes than low-income house-
holds, but they also account for the bulk 
of saving in countries at various stages of 
development and demographic transition. 
In countries with high economic mobility, 
the relationship between low saving and 
low income could reﬂ ect eﬀ orts to smooth 
consumption by households experiencing 
temporary income losses. Unfortunately, a 
similar correlation is observed across house-
holds grouped by educational attainment—
a proxy for permanent income and thus a 
more stable condition than the position in 
the income distribution at a point in time. 
Consistently, the least educated groups in a 
country have low or no saving, suggesting 
an inability to improve their earning capac-
ity and, for the poorest, to escape a poverty 
trap. Policy makers in developing countries 
have a central role to play in boosting private 
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saving through policies that raise human 
capital, especially for the poor.
• Changes in household structure will increase 
the importance of ﬁ nancial markets in pro-
viding for income support during old age. As 
incomes rise, household size tends to fall 
because workers are more geographically 
mobile and older individuals are more able 
to live independently on their accumulated 
savings. Alongside this reduction in house-
hold size tends to come a profound trans-
formation of the old-age support struc-
ture—from an informal, multigenerational 
household system to more formal private 
pension or public social protection systems. 
Reliance on privately financed pensions 
rather than household saving and wealth 
during old age has the potential to improve 
welfare if the elderly and their children all 
prefer to live separately. Another benefit 
is that using private financial markets to 
intermediate pension savings can increase 
financial depth and contribute to devel-
opment. However, shifting from depen-
dence on the income of family members to 
dependence on ﬁ nancial institutions also 
underlines the importance of strong regula-
tion to limit fraud and excessive risk taking 
by ﬁ nancial intermediaries.
• Demographic change will challenge the sus-
tainability of public ﬁ nances. In developing 
countries experiencing a large increase in 
the share of their populations past working 
age, budgets will be strained by mounting 
pension and health-care costs. The shift 
in the composition of public expenditure 
toward old-age-related items, though, will 
be offset only marginally by the reduc-
tion in education spending expected in the 
face of aging populations. Furthermore, 
the scope for decreases in non-age-related 
expenditures is limited. Complex policy 
challenges will arise from eﬀ orts to reduce 
the burden of health care and pensions 
while limiting the decline in beneﬁ ts and 
services. Working through these challenges 
will be necessary to ensure the sustainabil-
ity of public finances without imposing 
severe hardships on the old. 
Saving at the aggregate level: 
Past, present, and future
Saving has increased in 
developing countries
A large portion of global saving now originates in 
the developing world. Th is is quite a recent obser-
vation, however. For the two decades from 1980 
to 2000, developing countries’ saving amounted 
to a fairly stable ratio of around 4 percent of 
world income (ﬁ gure 2.1). Th at ratio increased 
sharply since 2000, however, to more than 9 per-
cent by 2009, while total saving by high-income 
countries fell from 18 percent to 12.5 percent 
of global income over the same years. Th e rapid 
rise in developing countries’ saving has sustained 
global saving rates in the face of declines in high-
income countries. A notable follow-on eﬀ ect of 
the increase in saving in developing countries is 
that they account for a growing share of global 
wealth (discussed in box 2.1).
Th e growth in developing countries’ contribu-
tion to the global pool of saving can be decom-
posed into two parts: (a) the size of their econo-
mies relative to the global economy and (b) their 
saving rates. Looking at changes in developing 
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have increased total saving in developing coun-
tries by 1.5 percent of global income, while 
another increase of 1.9 percent was directly due 
to changes in economic size.
Saving in developing countries has risen 
sharply from the levels of some 50 years ago. 
Developing countries as a group saved 18 percent 
of their income in the 1960s, and low-income 
countries only 13 percent, compared with 21 per-
cent in high-income countries.2 Th ese low saving 
rates were viewed as a major constraint on invest-
ment and thus on future growth. Other factors 
such as uncertain policy environments, poor 
infrastructure, and undeveloped financial sys-
tems also hindered investment and at the same 
time reduced incentives to save. 
But much has changed since the 1960s. Th e 
past three decades in particular have seen impres-
sive policy improvements and large increases in 
growth, saving, and investment. Saving had risen 
to almost a third of developing countries’ income 
by 2009, despite some decline during the global 
financial crisis (figure 2.3). Conversely, aging 
populations have put signiﬁ cant downward pres-
sure on advanced economies’ saving rates. The 
ratio of developing-country saving rates to those 
in high-income countries rose steadily from 0.9 
in 1980 to 2.0 in 2009.
As in the case of investment, much of the 
increase in saving by developing countries is 
attributable to China, though other large emerg-
ing economies, such as India and Indonesia, have 
made significant contributions as well (figure 
2.4). Th e path of saving rates has diﬀ ered sub-
stantially across major developing economies: 
India’s saving rate has increased steadily; Brazil 
showed a slowly increasing trend in saving until 
the peak in 1989 and a distinct downward trend 
thereafter; and the Russian Federation’s saving 
rate has been erratic since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union.
Saving trends in China, in particular, have 
received considerable attention in both policy 
circles and academic literature. China is nota-
ble not only because of the large size of its saving 
pool and its high saving rate but also because the 
composition of saving is broad: China’s house-
hold, corporate, and government saving have all 
countries’ saving for ﬁ ve-year periods since 1980 
shows that both relative size and saving rates 
have, on average, contributed (ﬁ gure 2.2). For 
the years 2000 to 2009, changes in saving rates 
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has been concentrated in high-income coun-
tries, but middle-income countries have seen sig-
niﬁ cant deepening since the early 1990s as well 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2010).3
Regional saving trends among developing 
countries indicate that the recent rise in saving 
has been mainly due to increases among coun-
tries in East Asia and the Paciﬁ c, the Middle 
East and North Africa, and South Asia. Th is 
rise in saving has been concomitant with signiﬁ -
cant external surpluses (owing to robust exports 
of manufactured goods and energy), although, 
notably, in South Asia the rise has occurred even 
in the presence of small deﬁ cits.
Within regions, too, there is signiﬁ cant diver-
sity in the level and trend in domestic saving. 
Typically, saving rates tend to be lower in low-
income countries (ﬁ gure 2.5). In East Asia, for 
example, the region’s relatively high overall saving 
rate—averaging 24 percent between 1980 and 
2010—masks much lower rates of saving among 
low-income nations, although saving rates among 
countries in income groups in East Asia have 
risen over time (ﬁ gure 2.5, panel a). In times of 
crisis, such as during the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis of 
1997–98 and the global crisis of 2007–09, saving 
rates actually dropped because incomes fell and 
debt was incurred to smooth consumption.
seen large increases. Th e literature points to sev-
eral factors in the increasing saving rate, includ-
ing the following:
• Chamon and Prasad (2010) identify the 
rising private burden of housing, educa-
tion, and health care expenditures as well 
as increased precautionary saving as impor-
tant drivers of a seven percentage point 
increase in the urban household saving rate 
between 1995 and 2005. 
• Ma and Yi (2010) focus on the rapid 
increase in the working-age share of the 
population, the structural shift from agri-
culture and corresponding urbanization, 
tough corporate restructuring, a shrinking 
social safety net, and transition to a par-
tially funded pension system. 
• Wei and Zhang (2011) emphasize competi-
tive saving by parents with sons to make 
them more attractive for marriage given a 
skewed gender ratio in the population. 
• Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2011) show 
that China’s changing age distribution 
appears to be an important factor when 
a bequest motive for saving is taken into 
account. 
Another key factor is the relatively unbal-
anced pattern of ﬁ nancial market development 
in China; households and small and medium-size 
enterprises often face tight credit constraints, so 
they must save to self-ﬁ nance, while state-owned 
enterprises typically have easy access to credit. 
But perhaps the most important factor behind 
China’s high level of saving in recent decades has 
been its high rate of economic growth, which 
tends to push up saving rates.
Although the forces at work in driving up 
saving rates in China apply to many developing 
countries, nowhere is the impact of the forces as 
acute as it is in China; in fact, in much of the 
developing world, one or more of the character-
istics clearly observable in China is absent. For 
example, Sub-Saharan Africa is at an earlier point 
in the demographic transition than other devel-
oping regions, and the transition is proceeding 
more slowly than it did in other regions. Also, 
ﬁ nancial systems have deepened worldwide; this 
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substantially across major developing economies
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Private saving in several major developing 
countries (notably China and India) is atypically 
high and has actually grown relatively faster than 
household saving in recent years (figure 2.7). 
Th eory suggests that corporate saving is negatively 
related to cash ﬂ ow (Riddick and Whited 2009), 
which in turn suggests that external financing 
constraints—which could result from financial 
development not keeping pace with growth—may 
be responsible for the recent rise in corporate sav-
ing in these economies. As the ﬁ nancial sectors in 
China and India mature, however, this tendency 
for high corporate (and hence private) saving will 
likely diminish.
Public saving does not show such an obvious 
long-term trend. Although it has ﬂ uctuated to 
some extent, the public portion of national sav-
ing has remained roughly in the range of 10–20 
percent of national saving in developing countries 
over the 30-year period 1981–2011 (ﬁ gure 2.8). 
Th e notable exception was during the years lead-
ing up to the global recession in the late 2000s, 
when public saving exceeded 25 percent of 
national saving from 2006 through 2008 before 
quickly returning to historical levels in 2009. 
Th e trend in public saving for the entire world 
has followed a path roughly the same as that of 
developing countries over the past three decades, 
The private and public components 
of saving have varied signiﬁ cantly 
across countries and across time
When national saving is broken down into its pri-
vate and public components, it is clear that both 
are important. 
Private saving is typically the greater of the 
two, and historically private saving has tended 
to ﬂ uctuate more than public saving. For many 
countries, household saving alone accounts for 
most of national saving, although once country 
data are aggregated to a regional level the extent 
of household saving varies substantially (ﬁ gure 
2.6). Households’ share of total saving has ranged 
from around 25 percent in Latin America to an 
average of 68 percent in India since the 1950s. 
One reason for relatively low saving by Latin 
American households is probably that corporate 
saving is high there, and because ﬁ rms are ulti-
mately owned mainly by households, corporate 
saving substitutes for household saving. Because 
househo ld saving is sensitive to both economic 
growth and demographic change, diﬀ erences in 
the timing of the demographic transition and in 
growth over the coming decades have the poten-
tial to affect global patterns of saving through 
their impact on household saving decisions.
Upper-middle income
Upper-
middle 
income
Lower-middle 
income
Lower-
middle 
income
Low incomeLow income
a. East Asia and Paciﬁc
S
av
in
g
 a
s 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
G
N
I, 
%
0
30
10
20
40
50
b. Eastern Europe and Central Asia
S
av
in
g
 a
s 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
G
N
I, 
%
–15
0
–10
–5
5
10
15
20
25
30
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
FIGURE 2.5 Saving rates tend to be lower in lower-income countries
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database.
Notes: Saving rates were the unweighted shares for each income group. GDP-weighted results are qualitatively similar, with the exception of shares for the lower-middle-
income category for East Asia, due to the large weight of China.
Global Development Horizons  Global Saving in 2030 67
FIGU RE 2.6 Household saving varies signiﬁ cantly by region
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the UN National Accounts Main Aggregate database.
Note: Shares are the unweighted average of household saving as a share of national saving across countries in the region, reported only for years in which data are available 
for enough countries to account for at least 40 percent of the region’s gross domestic product.
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FIGURE 2.7 Corporate saving in China and India has grown faster than household saving in recent years
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in the ACMR All China Data Center database (China) and CSO National Accounts database (India).
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international investment positions (for more 
details on the recent evolution of the global dis-
tribution of wealth, see box 2.1).
Growth, demography, and 
ﬁ nancial development will drive 
changes in the global pattern of 
savings 
A key objective of this report is to provide a pre-
view of world saving for the next two decades. A 
deﬁ nitive theory of saving unambiguously iden-
tifying its determinants is not yet available (for 
a recent survey, see Attanasio and Weber 2010). 
However, there is broad consensus that economic 
growth, demographic transition, and certain 
structural variables such as ﬁ nancial sector devel-
opment aﬀ ect saving. Th eoretical models as well 
as reduced-form empirical equations show the rel-
evance of these variables. 
For example, the importance of income 
growth and changes in the age structure due 
to population growth are central in explain-
ing saving behavior in the life cycle (Modigliani 
and Brumberg 1954) and permanent income 
(Friedman 1957) models. Th ese models remain 
common benchmarks against which saving 
behavior is evaluated. More recent models con-
sider how the stock of wealth can serve as a pre-
cautionary buffer against unexpected shocks 
(Carroll 1997) and how uncertainty about future 
income may inf luence saving at the household 
(Weil 1993) and firm (Riddick and Whited 
2009) levels, especially absent complete markets 
for risk insurance (Aiyagari 1994).4 Increased 
longevity can potentially raise saving rates at 
all ages (Bloom, Canning, and Graham 2003; 
Kinugasa and Mason 2007). Th us, if increased 
growth and improvements in longevity happen 
together, this eﬀ ect would reinforce the positive 
impact of growth on saving.
Structural changes in developing countries can 
alleviate uncertainty and informational asymme-
tries and contribute to moving toward more com-
plete markets. For example, ﬁ nancial development 
can relax liquidity constraints and hence affect 
saving activity (Deaton 1991; Jappelli and Pagano 
1994). At the same time, presence (or absence) of 
social insurance mechanisms can also condition 
although public saving in developing countries 
typically accounted for a greater share of total 
saving than in high-income countries until the 
late 1990s, and public saving fell more sharply for 
developing countries than for high-income coun-
tries during the early-2000s global recession. 
It remains an open question whether the global 
ﬁ nancial crisis interrupted what would have been 
a sustained upward shift in governments’ role 
in saving and capital formation (perhaps due to 
greater infrastructure investment in developing 
countries) or whether the ramp-up was a short-
run phenomenon. Regardless of which descrip-
tion of the precrisis years is more accurate, it is 
clear that any upward trend in public saving in 
the coming decades is likely to be oﬀ set by signif-
icant pressure from aging populations on public 
health care and pension expenditures. 
Although stocks of wealth evolve much more 
slowly than output, saving, investment, and capi-
tal ﬂ ows, developing countries’ rapidly growing 
shares of these f lows will gradually accumu-
late into a growing share of global capital and 
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ﬂ uctuated within a ﬁ xed range
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
Note: Gross national saving is deﬁ ned according to the national income accounting standard: 
the difference between gross national income and public and private consumption, plus net 
current transfers. Gross public saving is current revenues minus current expenditures, for all 
levels of government. Current expenditures consist of government consumption expenditures, 
current transfer payments, interest payments, and subsidies; public investment is not included 
in current expenditures, so it essentially counts toward public saving. For years 1992–2011, the 
graph represents the unweighted average of the ratio of gross public saving to gross national 
saving for all countries for which data exist for all years (omitting Kuwait, which experienced 
large swings in its saving around the time of the First Gulf War). This sample includes 40 
advanced countries and 102 developing countries. For years prior to 1992, the sample includes 
all countries for which data were available in a given year (again omitting Kuwait). 
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saving equation whose determinants are per capita 
income growth, demography (aged dependency), 
ﬁ nancial development, social protection, and past 
saving rates. Following standard practice, this 
equation is calibrated using observed data and 
how much households in a country choose to save 
(Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995). 
Th e scenarios for the future of world saving are 
constructed using a global dynamic computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model that includes a 
 
The rise in savings rates in developing countries 
relative to high-income countries has resulted in an 
increase in developing countries’ share of global 
wealth (the accumulation of national saving over time). 
The growing importance of developing countries is 
most evident in terms of external wealth holdings: 
the emerging world saw rapid reductions in negative 
external positions in the 1990s and early 2000s (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti 2007), which have since become 
positive and continue to grow.a Despite the fact that 
distributions change at a glacial pace, there was a 
noticeable shift in the global distribution of national 
wealth in the 15 years between 1992 and 2007, in 
both absolute and per capita terms.
Figure B2.1.1 shows, in panel a, the global intercoun-
try distributionb of wealth per capita in 1992 and 2007, 
along with, in panel b, the difference between the two 
when the 1992 mean is preserved to show the change 
in the shape of the distribution independent of the shift 
in the global average. That the distribution shifted to 
the right means that the world became wealthier in 
real terms. The bimodal pattern of the distribution in 
panel a is indicative of the presence of two clubs of 
countries: the change in the peak on the left, which 
became slightly higher in 2007, reﬂ ects the fact that 
a number of previously poor countries (such as China, 
the Dominican Republic, and Namibia) amassed assets 
and became middle-income countries. the change in 
the peak on the right, consisting of moderately wealthy 
high-income countries, fell as rapid growth in per capita 
wealth (in economies such as Hong Kong SAR, China; 
Luxembourg; Norway; and Singapore) meant that they 
moved from the right peak to the right tail of the dis-
tribution. There was thus an increasing gap between 
the wealthiest high-income countries and those around 
the right peak—for example, Gulf States and southern 
European countries, respectively.
Most of the world’s stock of wealth remains 
entrenched in high-income countries. Recent analy-
sis of household wealth by Davies et al. (2011), for 
example, shows that North America, Europe, and high-
income Asia-Paciﬁ c countries account for 90 percent 
of global wealth. Among developing countries, wealth 
tends to be held in nonﬁ nancial assets, such as hous-
ing and land (Shorrocks, Davies, and Lluberas 2010). 
The continued concentration of wealth in high-income 
countries, however, has been accompanied by marginal 
progress toward more equal distribution of national 
wealth per capita among countries of different income 
levels over the past 15 years. When countries are 
weighted by their populations,c the Gini coefﬁ cient fell 
from 0.77 in 1992 to 0.74 in 2007. This moderate con-
vergence in national per capita wealth can be expected 
to continue, albeit gradually, in the future as developing 
countries account for a growing share of global output, 
saving, and investment.
BOX 2.1  A gradual shift in the global distribution of wealth is under way
(continued)
a. Net international investment positions are available from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (http://www.imf.org/
external/data.htm). It should be noted that China’s position constitutes a large part of the developing-country aggregate.
b. Milanovic (2005) discusses three broad concepts for measuring income inequality across countries. In principle, these can also be applied to wealth 
inequality. Intercountry inequality is based on giving each country’s per capita wealth equal weight in the world distribution. International inequality takes 
into account the relative sizes of countries, weighting each by its population. Global inequality takes within-country inequality into account, measuring 
the distribution across individuals regardless of their nationality (see, for example, Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). The global inequality approach 
is plagued by data limitations. The international inequality approach gives a good picture of what is happening at the global level, but the results can be 
dominated by one or two large countries (in the case of developing countries, China and India appear as two spikes that dominate the distribution).
c. The population-weighted Gini measure of international inequality was calculated by assigning each country’s average per capita wealth to each of its 
residents and taking the Gini coefﬁ cient of the resulting global distribution. Over the same period, the unweighted (intercountry) Gini rose from 0.66 to 
0.68, indicating that the result on international inequality depends in large part on changes in populous developing countries such as China and India.
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income growth is found to be positive. For each 
10 percent increase in the rate of growth of per 
capita income, the national saving rate rises 0.5–
1.0 percent. Th is fairly strong relationship goes 
some way toward explaining why—over the past 
decade during which developing countries have 
enjoyed robust per capita income growth—sav-
ing rates in many developing countries have also 
moved upward. 
Th is positive link between saving and growth 
is moderated by two factors: changes in the 
aged dependency ratio and changes to the level 
of ﬁ nancial development, both of which have a 
negative relationship with the saving rate. As 
the ﬁ nancial sector develops, there is generally a 
downward pressure on saving: with credit more 
readily available in more sophisticated ﬁ nancial 
elasticities obtained from econometric estima-
tions. Measuring global saving, accounting for the 
general equilibrium eﬀ ects of growth patterns and 
policy changes, and predicting the future are all 
diﬃ  cult things to do in economics, and they can 
all be easily criticized. However, the main advan-
tage of a model-based analysis is not in providing 
precise forecasts but in having a framework that 
is consistent with economic theory and that can 
be used to test and explain the other-things-equal 
eﬀ ects of changes in key determinants.
The elasticities used in the CGE model are 
obtained from a formal multivariate econometric 
analysis, and graphical representations of its main 
results are oﬀ ered in ﬁ gures 2.9 and 2.10.5
As depicted in ﬁ gure 2.9 (panel a), the condi-
tional6 relationship of saving rate and per capita 
BOX 2.1 (continued)
FIGURE B2.1.1 The global distribution of national wealth per capita has changed over time
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators and Global Economic Monitor databases and Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2007.
Note: Panel a shows the probability distribution of the logarithm of total national wealth, computed for the 100 countries for which data are available for 
both years, as Gaussian kernel density estimates. National wealth is deﬁ ned as the sum of the capital stock and net foreign assets, deﬂ ated to 2000 
dollars. Capital stocks are calculated using a perpetual inventory method with an assumed constant depreciation rate of 5 percent, and are deﬂ ated 
with the country’s respective investment deﬂ ator. Net foreign assets, by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), are calculated to account for changes in stock, 
valuation, and exchange rate, and are deﬂ ated with the respective country’s GDP deﬂ ator. The mean-preserving difference in the per capita wealth dis-
tributions for the two years (1992 and 2007), shown in panel b, is computed by subtracting the increase in the mean of 2007 relative to 1992 from the 
observed countries’ values of 2007 prior to calculating differences.
a.  Intercountry distribution, 1992 (solid) 
and 2007 (dashed)
b.  Change in distribution mean preserving,
2007 versus 1992
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markets, households are more likely to draw on 
consumer credit to address their ﬁ nancing needs. 
Similarly, ﬁ rms face a weaker incentive to retain 
earnings when it is easier to access capital markets 
to meet their working capital needs.
Th e negative relationship between aged depen-
dency and saving is illustrated in ﬁ gure 2.10, and 
it confirms a standard result of the life-cycle 
theory. 
Forthcoming demographic shifts 
will have a strong impact on 
global labor supply and saving
Momentous demographic change, already under 
way, will be a key factor in shaping the future of 
global saving. Th ree major demographic forces 
must be taken into consideration: (a) an increase 
in the size of the population of developing coun-
tries relative to the world population, (b) change 
in the age structure of the world population, and 
(c) the asynchronicity of changes in age structure 
FIGURE 2.9 Saving rate s tend to increase with growth (panel a) and decrease with ﬁ nancial development 
(panel b)
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and Financial Structure and Development database.
Note: The ﬁ gures depict added variable plots of the residuals of the saving rate against per capita income growth (panel a) and saving rate against ﬁ nancial development 
(panel b), where saving rate is deﬁ ned as domestic saving share of gross domestic product (GDP), measured in local currency; ﬁ nancial development is deﬁ ned as domes-
tic credit provision to the private sector as a share of GDP; and per capita income growth is calculated from real per capita income, measured in 2000 dollars. The relation-
ship between the x-axis and y-axis variables is conditional in the sense that the relationship takes into account the effects of other determinants whose contributions are 
held constant. The graphs above are constructed from the results of speciﬁ cation S4 in table 1A.4 of online annex 1.6. All variables are in logarithm form, are unweighted, 
and are signiﬁ cant in multivariate regressions at standard levels. Plots for the developing country subsample show very similar patterns.
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FIGUR E 2.10 Saving rates tend to decrease with 
population aging
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database and Financial Structure and Development database.
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household, which may be quite diﬀ erent, on aver-
age, in developing versus advanced economies. In 
a typical household, however, the life cycle leads 
to a hump-shaped saving proﬁ le over time: saving 
rises from low or negative levels in the ﬁ rst phase, 
reach a maximum level in the second phase, and 
begin to decline in the third phase. This third 
phase thus implies that as the share of elderly 
people in a country’s population rises, national 
saving may fall.
Indeed, considerable change is under way in 
the structure of the world’s population. By 2021, 
less than a decade into the future, growth in the 
world’s working-age population will be exclu-
sively determined by developing-country natives 
(that is, the blue line in ﬁ gure 2.11 will meet the 
horizontal line at 100 percent). By 2050, this sce-
nario will be quite diﬀ erent: each 100 working-
age individuals added to the global population 
will be the result of 110 additional working-age 
people among developing country natives and 
10 fewer working-age people in high-income 
countries. Assuming that working-age people 
have higher saving rates than elderly people, this 
growing representation of natives of developing 
countries in the world’s working-age population 
implies that developing countries will account for 
a growing share of global saving.
Large disparities in birth, death, and migra-
tion rates between developing and high-income 
countries help explain both the developing 
world’s growing population and the change in the 
world’s age structure. For any given country, the 
gap between death and birth rates (assuming no 
net migration) is the rate of population growth, 
while the sequencing in the reduction of these 
two rates—the demographic transition—deter-
mines a period of rapid population growth. 
A recent phase8 of the demographic transition 
is depicted in ﬁ gure 2.12 for the six developing 
regions. Several aspects of population dynam-
ics in recent decades are emphasized by this ﬁ g-
ure: First, for all the regions, birth rates are still 
higher than death rates. Second, death rates are 
still falling, but they seem to be leveling oﬀ  at 
around 10 deaths per 1,000. Finally, the diﬀ er-
ence between death and birth rates and the speed 
of its closing are different across developing 
across regions. Together with high economic 
growth rates, these forces will mean that global 
saving will be increasingly determined by occur-
rences in developing countries. 
Th e world population will grow considerably 
in future decades, from around 7 billion in 2010 
to 9 billion in 2050 (United Nations Population 
Division 2011).7 Although the rate of popula-
tion growth over this period will be far less 
than during the previous four decades, the addi-
tion of more than 2 billion people to the world 
through 2050 (an addition roughly equivalent 
to the current population of China, Indonesia, 
and the United States combined) is not incon-
sequential. Importantly, this increase in popu-
lation will be almost exclusively due to growth 
within developing countries. Already, developing 
countries represent the main source of growth of 
the world population, and their contribution has 
steadily increased. In 1950, 80 out of 100 new 
people were natives of a developing country; the 
share increased to almost 95 percent by 2010; 
and from 2050 onward, developing countries 
will likely be the only ones contributing to the 
growth of the world population. As developing 
countries represent a growing proportion of the 
world economy, their saving patterns will play a 
larger role in shaping the overall picture of global 
saving.
Th e evolving age structure of both developing- 
and advanced-country populations will also have 
profound implications for saving rates. Typically, 
households go through three broad phases during 
the life cycle: (a) a ﬁ rst phase, when a household 
is raising young children and when its income 
is growing, but so are its expenditures and its 
investment in the education of the oﬀ spring; (b) 
a second phase, during which the household head 
and possibly the spouse reach their maximum 
earning potential and purchasing power; and (c) 
a ﬁ nal phase, when the main breadwinners cease 
participating in economically productive activi-
ties and rely on accumulated assets and pensions 
or other transfers to fund consumption. During 
these three phases, income and consumption—
key determinants of the welfare of the household 
members—are strongly inﬂ uenced by life-cycle 
factors such as the age and composition of the 
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asynchronous—with high-income countries 
and some parts of the developing world much 
more advanced in their demographic transition. 
Th e asynchronicity is shown by the considerable 
diversity of the height of the peak of the ratio of 
working-age to nonworking-age population, the 
timing of this peak, and the slope of the curve 
around the peak.
In high-income countries, the ratio of work-
ing-age to nonworking-age persons increased 
slowly from 1950 to 2000, and now is declin-
ing.9 As a consequence of the fairly slow demo-
graphic transition, this group has experienced 
mild age structure eﬀ ects. By contrast, in the East 
Asia and Paciﬁ c region, the reduction in fertil-
ity has been rapid (see box 2.2) and the increase 
in the ratio of working-age population steep. 
South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, 
and Latin America and the Caribbean follow a 
somewhat similar path: their fertility rates have 
been decreasing, but their demographic dividend 
has not yet reached its maximum. Sub-Saharan 
Africa is once again an exception, showing a gla-
cial pace in its demographic transition. Fertility 
rates have remained high (as shown in figure 
regions’ trends (the determinants of which are 
explored in box 2.2). 
A somewhat complex set of mechanisms lies 
behind the timing of changes in the gap between 
a country’s birth rate and death rate. When a 
country experiences an initial fall in child mor-
tality, this generates a cohort of young people that 
is much larger than that of earlier generations. At 
a certain point, fertility rates begin to slow down 
and the increase in the very young population 
ends. But, as shown in box 2.2, ﬁ gure B2.2.1, the 
closing of the gap proceeds at a diﬀ erent pace in 
diﬀ erent regions. Th e larger the initial gap and 
the shorter the time period to close this gap, the 
bigger will be the “bulge” in the age structure. As 
time goes by, the “bulge” cohort enters the labor 
market, increasing the ratio of working-age to 
nonworking-age population. Th e opposite eﬀ ect 
occurs when the bulge cohort reaches retirement 
age, with an increase in the ratio of nonworking-
age people to working-age people.
A graphical representation of this “bulge” con-
cept can be seen for various regions in ﬁ gure 2.13. 
One of the most interesting features highlighted 
by this figure is that aging is geographically 
FIGURE 2 .11 By 2020, growth in world’s working-age population will be exclusively 
determined by developing countries
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and United 
Nations Population Division 2011.
Note: The green line shows the linear time trend in the data presented by the blue line. Where the share exceeds 100 percent, it reﬂ ects loss of 
working-age people in high-income countries. For example, by 2050, each 100 additional working-age individuals in the global population will be 
the result of 110 additional working-age people in developing country natives and 10 fewer working-age people in high-income countries. 
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FIGURE 2.12 Birth and death rates have shown distinct trends across regions
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the World Bank  World Development Indicators database.
Note: The crude death rate is the number of deaths among the population of a given geographical area during a given year, per 1,000 midyear total population of the 
given geographical area during the same year. Crude birth rate indicates the number of live births occurring during the year, per 1,000 population estimated at midyear. 
Subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate provides the rate of natural increase, which is equal to the rate of population change in the absence of migration.
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For any given country, declines in two major demo-
graphic measures, mortality rates and fertility rates, 
contribute to the aging of a population. Consider ﬁ rst 
the mortality rate. Reductions in infant and child mortal-
ity due to the expansion of access to clean water and 
sanitation as well as to preventive health care (such as 
vaccination against infectious diseases) are the initial 
drivers of population growth and explain the increase 
in life expectancy experienced in the recent past. High-
income countries have long had an advantage in terms 
of having the ﬁ nancial resources to address these con-
cerns, as reﬂ ected in their dramatically lower under-5 
mortality rates in 1960 than in any developing region 
(figure B2.2.1). In the five decades since, however, 
developing countries have made signiﬁ cant progress in 
reducing child mortality, although from different start-
ing points and at different rates.a 
As of 2010, under-5 mortality rates in the East 
Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
and Latin America and the Caribbean regions were 
similar to those in high-income countries in the 1970s. 
Meanwhile, the rate in the Middle East and North 
Africa as of 2010 was roughly equivalent to the rate 
in high-income countries in the 1960s. Under-5 mor-
tality remains comparatively high in South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, however, with rates 10 and 19 
times those of high-income countries, respectively, as 
of 2010. For high-income countries, by comparison, 
recent reductions in the overall mortality rate are attrib-
utable to the reductions in old-age mortality, which 
result from more expensive health treatments and, 
more generally, higher incomes.
The aging of populations in recent decades also 
reﬂ ects sharp reductions in fertility rates. In the 1960s, 
developing regions (excluding Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia) had fertility rates of around 6.2 births per 
woman, or more than twice the rate of high-income 
countries. That gap has now become much smaller 
(ﬁ gure B2.2.2). As of 2010, East Asia and the Paciﬁ c 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia had fertility rates 
equal to that of high-income countries and approxi-
mately equal to the so-called replacement rate of 2 
BOX 2.2  The geographically asynchronous demographic transition is driven by 
cross-country differences in some key factors
FIGURE B2.2.1 Developing countries have made signiﬁ cant progress in reducing child 
mortality, although from different starting points and at different rates
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
Note: The under-5 mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age ﬁ ve if subject to current age-speciﬁ c mor-
tality rates.
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versus wages); and pension, health care, and other 
old-age support needs. Th ese, in turn, will aﬀ ect 
international capital ﬂ ows (see box 2.3).
World saving patterns are set to 
shift in the decades ahead
Th is report’s view of the future evolution of global 
saving is based on scenarios built with a multi-
country dynamic general equilibrium model. Th e 
B2.2.2), and as long as they continue to do so, 
the average age of the population and its share 
of working-age individuals will remain low com-
pared with other regions. Th e high incidence of 
acquired immune deﬁ ciency syndrome (AIDS) 
among young adults has added to the reduction 
in the ratio of workers to young and old. 
Given this heterogeneity in demographic 
conditions, regions will diﬀ er in terms of their 
saving dynamics; relative factor returns (capital 
 
births per woman. The fertility rate in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is now only slightly higher than 
the replacement rate, and, at 2.7 and 2.8 births per 
woman, respectively, the Middle East and North Africa 
and South Asia are not terribly far above that level. 
Sub-Saharan Africa remains the exception, with a 
fertility rate of 5 in 2010. Two main reasons have been 
advanced to explain this rapid reduction in fertility: fall-
ing infant mortality rates and increased female edu-
cation, the latter of which improves the labor market 
opportunities of women and increases the opportunity 
cost of childraising.
BOX 2.2 (continued)
FIGURE B2.2.2 The gap in fertility rates across regions has narrowed 
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the  World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
Note: The total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and 
bear children in accordance with current age-speciﬁ c fertility rates.
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a. Infant mortality rates, although lower than the under-5 mortality rates shown in ﬁ gure B2.2.1, show similar regional dispersion and reduction patterns.
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change in both private and public saving. Given 
its long-term view, the model makes the sim-
plifying assumption that governments run bal-
anced budgets: any increase in public expendi-
tures is passed on to households via an increase 
in direct taxation. Th e impact of demographics 
on both private and public age-related spending 
is ref lected in a change in private sector con-
sumption and saving and, thus, national saving. 
Th e mechanisms by which demographic change 
aﬀ ects the public component of national saving 
are not explicitly modeled in the CGE framework 
but are nevertheless captured. A later section of 
the chapter presents a more detailed, but partial 
equilibrium, analysis of the forthcoming expan-
sion of age-related public expenditures. 
Under a gradual convergence 
scenario, global saving will almost 
double from its 2010 level
Developing countries will represent a very large 
share—almost two-thirds—of all global saving 
by 2030 (ﬁ gure 2.14, panel b), up from slightly 
less than half in 2010. China and other Asian 
economies (both developing and high-income) 
will continue to be major savers, with China 
accounting for a larger share of global savings 
than any other individual country. Together, 
high-income European countries also will con-
tinue to contribute a signiﬁ cant share of global 
savings.
model is used to assess the eﬀ ects on saving of 
several major forces: the forthcoming changes in 
demographics, the fact that developing countries 
will continue to grow faster than high-income 
countries, and shifts of other structural determi-
nants such as the level and coverage of ﬁ nancial 
development and social protection. Th e approach 
is broadly similar to that taken in the second 
group of studies described in box 2.3. 
Two scenarios are run with the model. Th e 
main difference between the two scenarios is 
the pace of convergence between developing 
and high-income countries in terms of economic 
growth and ﬁ nancial development. Th e gradual 
convergence scenario assumes a certain degree of 
economic growth convergence, accompanied by 
endogenous increases in financial deepening. 
The rapid convergence scenario imposes faster 
growth convergence, together with the assump-
tion that developing countries will be able to 
reduce the gap between their financial devel-
opment and that of the United States in 2030 
by about 25 percent. All of the other exogenous 
variables (notably, demographic shifts in the age 
composition and labor supplies) as well as other 
policy variables (such as tax rates, tariﬀ s, and 
government expenditures) are held at the same 
levels in both scenarios. (Th e assumptions and 
parameters of the model are detailed in online 
annex 1.6).
Th e scenarios’ results reported are for national 
saving—that is, they represent the combined 
FIGURE 2.13 The size and timing of the demographic “bulge” differs across regions
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and United 
Nations Population Division 2011.
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A recent wave of studies uses multicountry or multi-
region general equilibrium models to account for the 
impact of cross-country demographic changes on 
saving—some considering the historical experience, 
and others the outlook for future decades. It is pos-
sible to identify at least two different strands of this 
literature. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) provide an early 
example of an approach that uses large-scale over-
lapping generations models to analyze the implica-
tions of policy reform. A large number of papers fol-
low this approach to study social security reform (for 
example, Conesa and Krueger 1999) and basic tax 
reform (for example, Altig et al. 2001; Conesa and 
Krueger 2006), among other issues. Within this ﬁ rst 
group of studies, a subset of papers focuses on the 
economic consequences of population aging in closed 
economies. A speciﬁ c question addresses the adjust-
ments required in the social security system because 
of demographic shifts. Important examples include 
Huang, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Sargent (1997); De Nardi, 
I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Sargent (1999); and, with respect to 
asset prices, Abel (2003).
In a closed-economy setting, geographically asyn-
chronous aging does not matter, and the saving effects 
of the demographic transition—particularly in the latter 
phases, when the society is aging—are determined by 
the speed of change in the age structure and size of the 
bulge cohort. More speciﬁ cally, in an economy closed 
to international capital ﬂ ows, changes in labor supply 
and aggregate saving affect the relative returns of labor 
and capital and the growth of the economy. In an aging 
economy, young labor becomes scarcer with respect 
to capital, thus the return to labor rises relative to the 
return to capital. 
This change in factors’ relative prices also has inter-
generational distribution effects. The people who lose 
from lower capital returns will tend to be asset hold-
ers who are older than the average person, while those 
who gain from higher wages will tend to be younger 
than the average.b
These effects are intensiﬁ ed by a rapid demographic 
transition and a quickly closing gap between an initial 
mortality reduction and subsequent fertility reduc-
tion. These two aspects of the demographic transition 
strengthen the changes in aggregate saving and labor 
supply, thus exacerbating the changes in relative factor 
supplies and the divergence in relative factor prices. 
For an open economy, geographically asynchronous 
aging across other countries will affect saving, and thus 
the relative factor prices, through international capital 
ﬂ ows.c A country’s current account deﬁ cit and its capital 
inﬂ ows are determined by the excess of its investment 
over its saving (and vice versa for a surplus and capital 
outﬂ ows). Because the supply of saving is related, via 
the life cycle, to the age structure of its population, the 
current account balance is affected, all things equal, by 
demographic change. In a world with free capital move-
ment, capital should ﬂ ow from fast-aging regions, where 
capital is relatively abundant, to regions with fast-grow-
ing populations, where labor is abundant. 
A second strand of studies extends the previous 
approaches by explicitly considering these open-econ-
omy issues. By taking into account international links 
(trade and capital ﬂ ows) and using multicountry or mul-
tiregion general equilibrium models, this third strand 
of literature reassesses the impact of cross-country 
demographic changes on various economic issues. 
Several studies use demographic projections to quan-
tify, for example, the effects of pension reforms on the 
viability of social security systems (Aglietta et al. 2007; 
Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante 2006, 2007; Börsch-
Supan, Ludwig, and Winter 2006; Fehr, Jokisch, and 
Kotlikoff 2003). Krueger and Ludwig (2007) study the 
impact of demographic forecasts on the distribution 
of wealth and welfare in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development countries. Other stud-
ies adopt an ex post approach. For example, using 
calibrated life-cycle models, Domeij and Flodén (2006), 
Feroli (2003), and Henriksen (2002) ﬁ nd that changes in 
demographics explain a large part of historical current 
accounts.
BOX 2.3  Literature on modeling the effect of aging on saving at the global levela
a. This box draws heavily on Marchiori (2011) and Krueger and Ludwig (2007).
b. The intergenerational distribution effects are further complicated when the funding of pension schemes comes from payroll taxes.
c. International migration will also be affected, and the mechanisms will be similar to those described for international capital ﬂ ows. 
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the global saving rate will remain constant at 
around 24 percent.
China will continue to be dominant in the 
global savings picture. Th e continuous increase 
in the country’s saving over the scenario horizon 
will mean that by 2030, its absolute saving will 
be far and away the largest among all economies 
worldwide, at around $9 trillion (measured in 
2010 dollars) (ﬁ gure 2.15). Th is large amount of 
saving is a function of China’s large population 
and high propensity to save, as often noted, but 
those strong upward pressures on saving will be 
to some degree oﬀ set by a rising old-age depen-
dency ratio (China’s ratio will surpass 2010 U.S. 
levels in the latter half of the 2020s) and decreas-
ing economic growth. Thus, although China’s 
saving will undoubtedly remain large, it will 
nevertheless be smaller than it would be in the 
absence of changes in population structure and 
the slowdown of economic expansion.
Th e eﬀ ects of a large population on national 
saving will also be seen in India, which will over-
take both Japan and the United States in terms 
of its absolute level of national saving sometime 
in the 2020s. A major factor supporting the rela-
tively rapid rate of growth of saving in India is 
its favorable demographics: India’s old-age depen-
dency ratio will rise far more slowly than in East 
Compared with the start of the 21st century, 
saving rates will have fallen by 2030, a reﬂ ection 
of increased demographic pressures from aging 
populations in much of the world and slowing 
growth rates. In both the developing and devel-
oped worlds, saving rates will decline from their 
respective peaks (ﬁ gure 2.14, panel a). For devel-
oping countries collectively, saving is anticipated 
to reach a peak of 34 percent of their income in 
2014 and steadily creep downward to 32 percent 
in 2030; for high-income countries, the corre-
sponding reduction will be from 20 percent to 
16 percent. The significantly slower decline in 
the developing world’s saving rate, coupled with 
the increasing size of developing countries in the 
global economy, will contribute to a widening 
difference between the global saving contribu-
tions of the two groups.
Another implication of the increased relative 
size of developing countries is that the global 
saving rate will not fall in spite of decreases in 
the saving rates of both groups. Th e larger eco-
nomic size of the developing world, alongside 
the slower rate of decline in its relatively higher 
saving rate, will oﬀ set the decline of saving in 
high-income countries. In summary, although 
the global ﬂ ow of saving will rise dramatically 
in absolute terms between 2010 and 2030, 
FIGURE 2.14 Saving rates will decline more slowly in developing countries, and by 2030 those countries 
will account for two-thirds of global saving
Source: World Bank projections.
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evident when comparing the saving rate paths 
among developing countries (figure 2.16). In 
economies that will experience a simultane-
ous sharp reduction in the working-age share of 
their population and an increase in the old-age 
share of their population, such as Indonesia and 
Russia, the saving rate will fall signiﬁ cantly. Th e 
more moderate decline in saving rates in Mexico 
will be due in part to its relatively more positive 
demographic evolution. 
A remarkable exception to these general trends 
will be Sub-Saharan Africa, where the saving rate 
will not fall thanks to a stable old-age depen-
dency ratio and healthy rates of economic growth 
(the region will average about 5 percent annual 
growth in the gradual convergence scenario). 
Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa stands as a remark-
able outlier to the global pattern of declining sav-
ing rates worldwide, largely because of the favor-
able combination of productivity growth and 
little demographic pressure. 
Under the rapid convergence 
scenario, the absolute level of 
global saving will be slightly 
larger 
Global saving will be $27 trillion under the rapid 
scenario, whereas under the gradual conver-
gence scenario, it will be $25 trillion. Th is larger 
amount of global saving is mainly due to the 
assumption of a higher growth rate in the global 
economy. The overall global saving rate under 
this new scenario will, however, still fall slightly: 
this is mainly because, even though developing 
countries save more in absolute terms, the nega-
tive impact of higher levels of ﬁ nancial develop-
ment on saving rates will dominate—households 
and ﬁ rms need to set aside less saving in the pres-
ence of better ﬁ nancial intermediation—and the 
net eﬀ ect will be a reduction in developing coun-
tries’ saving rates, to 30 percent, versus 32 percent 
in the gradual convergence scenario (ﬁ gure 2.17, 
panel a).10 
In the rapid scenario, faster ﬁ nancial devel-
opment in developing countries tends to bring 
down their saving rates. Th e impact on the global 
saving rate, however, is oﬀ set by the fact that the 
global weight of developing countries (which still 
Asia or high-income nations. Still, as discussed 
earlier in the chapter, India’s demographic divi-
dend will gradually peter out as it approaches 
2030, and this will moderate its increase in sav-
ing. Regardless, the saving rate in India will 
remain higher than that of many other develop-
ing countries, in no small part because of growth 
in per capita incomes. 
Th e expected eﬀ ects of asynchronous demo-
graphic changes on saving activity are most 
FIGURE 2.15 China will continue to be dominant in the 
global saving picture
Source: World Bank projections. 
Note: Saving levels are measured in 2010 U.S. dollars.
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FIGURE 2.16 Differences in the demographic transition 
will translate into different saving rate trends
Source: World Bank projections.
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development and thus a greater negative impact 
on its saving rates.
Th e small reduction in global saving implies 
an increase in the rental rate of capital worldwide, 
however, because lower global saving reduces the 
supply of capital, while higher overall growth 
increases the demand for capital (as discussed 
more thoroughly in chapter 1). Interest rates turn 
out to be signiﬁ cantly higher in the rapid con-
vergence scenario than in the gradual scenario. 
However, stronger price signals, and better ﬁ nan-
cial intermediation in terms of coverage and eﬃ  -
ciency, mean that savings will be channeled more 
eﬀ ectively to its most productive uses.
A more nuanced view of the 
future of saving: Distribution, 
public ﬁ nance, old-age support, 
and other impacts
The scenarios presented in the previous sec-
tion explored the implications for global saving 
of forecasts for productivity growth, demogra-
phy, and financial development. The principal 
conclusions were that higher growth tends to 
increase saving, a rise in the elderly dependency 
tend to have higher saving rates than advanced 
countries) is greater relative to the gradual sce-
nario. Th us, the path of the global saving rate is 
roughly the same across the two scenarios.
Relative to the ﬁ rst scenario, developing coun-
tries will capture a  slightly larger share of global 
saving under the rapid convergence scenario (ﬁ g-
ure 2.17, panel b). Th is small change obscures a 
signiﬁ cant degree of heterogeneity in the paths 
of diﬀ erent countries, however. Th is heterogene-
ity, in turn, results from the diﬀ erence in impact 
of ﬁ nancial development on saving in this sec-
ond scenario: for countries starting at low ini-
tial levels of ﬁ nancial development, reducing by 
one-fourth their distance from the United States 
means a larger increase of ﬁ nancial development. 
China, for example, will experience a decline in 
its saving rate of 7 percentage points (from 52 
percent to 45 percent), whereas Indonesia will 
see a sharp drop in its saving rate of more than 
7 percentage points (from 32 percent to 25 per-
cent). Both countries will follow healthy growth 
paths, but Indonesia, which in 2010 had a level 
of ﬁ nancial development only a ﬁ fth of the high-
income-country average (compared with China, 
with a level close to two-thirds in the same year) 
will experience a larger change in its ﬁ nancial 
FIGURE 2.17 National saving rates (panel a) and share of global saving (panel b), by income groups, 
gradual versus rapid convergence scenario, 2010–30
Source: World Bank projections .
Note: The gradual and rapid convergence scenarios refer to numerical simulations based on two sets of assumptions on productivity growth and structural changes (see 
details in the main text).
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Th is second part of the chapter complements 
the general equilibrium-generated scenarios of 
global saving discussed above. Th e more disaggre-
gated analyses of the household and government 
saving in this part are based on different tools 
and datasets, and therefore some of the mecha-
nisms operating in these settings—for example, 
the impact of education on the life-cycle saving 
behavior and the eﬀ ects of demographic changes 
on government expenditure—were not integrated 
in the CGE modeling.
Saving at the household level: 
Who actually saves?
Th e evolution of household saving and economic 
development are strongly interrelated. A glance 
back at ﬁ gure 2.6, for instance, shows that house-
hold saving represents a large share of national 
saving of an economy and, therefore, its capacity 
to ﬁ nance investment using domestic resources. 
Indeed, fundamental economic decisions con-
cerning saving are made at the household level: 
how time is allocated between leisure and work; 
how income is earned and shared; how much of 
income is consumed (and for which goods and 
services) versus saved; and what proportion of 
resources is devoted to investment in the educa-
tion of the young.12 Analysis at the micro level 
can thus provide substantial insights, also because 
it considers distributional aspects ignored by rep-
resentative-agent approaches.
Th e microeconomic analysis undertaken here 
considers the household-level data of a group of 
developing economies in which saving behavior 
is driven by distinct characteristics: a middle-
income economy with modest economic growth 
rates (Mexico), a middle-income country with 
robust growth (Th ailand), a transition economy 
with an aging population (Russia), and a coun-
try with a large demographic dividend (Ghana). 
Th e analytical approach adopted here is a cohort 
(or pseudo-panel) approach that uses a series of 
repeated cross-sectional data on both income and 
consumption. Th is approach allows not only the 
measurement of saving rates of individuals at dif-
ferent ages, but also determines whether these 
individuals belong to diﬀ erent cohorts (that is, if 
they were born in diﬀ erent years). In other words, 
ratio tends to reduce saving, and higher ﬁ nancial 
development may lower saving rates but improves 
the eﬃ  ciency of investment allocation and thus 
increases growth. Overall, average global saving 
rates would remain roughly constant through 
2030, in part because of the rising global gross 
domestic product (GDP) share of the relatively 
higher-saving developing countries. Th is macro-
economic analysis requires a number of simpli-
fying assumptions. For example, the population 
age structure of a country (or groups of countries) 
is approximated by a simple old-age dependency 
ratio, growth is assumed to beneﬁ t all households 
in the same way, and saving is not disaggregated 
into households, government, and ﬁ rms. 
Other approaches to studying the future of 
global saving are to consider how demography 
and growth will aﬀ ect saving at the household 
level, and how aging will aﬀ ect public ﬁ nances. 
Examining saving from a microeconomic per-
spective can provide a more realistic and nuanced 
view of the likely evolution of saving, although at 
the price of considering a limited set of countries 
given the data availability. Although the house-
hold-level analysis conﬁ rms the broad conclusions 
of the macroeconomic analysis, the micro-level 
data also expose the complexities of the interac-
tion among aging, saving, and growth. Th e anal-
ysis ﬁ nds that (a) aging tends to reduce saving; 
(b) the size and composition of households simul-
taneously aﬀ ect saving, labor supply, and other 
key economic decisions; and (c) all three of these 
factors have feedback eﬀ ects on demography. It 
also ﬁ nds that saving tends to be highly concen-
trated, which may initially help boost develop-
ment of ﬁ nancial systems but also has potentially 
negative implications for economic mobility and 
inclusion.11 
Th ese ﬁ ndings have signiﬁ cant public policy 
implications, not least of which is that the decline 
in the extended family support system in many 
developing countries will require greater reliance 
on formal ﬁ nancial institutions, which in turn 
will aﬀ ect both ﬁ nancial markets and government 
ﬁ nances. Many countries will ﬁ nd it challenging 
to provide health care and retirement beneﬁ ts for 
their aging populations while ensuring ﬁ nancial 
sustainability and encouraging healthy rates of 
economic growth.
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online annex 2.1 provide additional methodologi-
cal details. 
Following cohorts over time is appealing 
because it helps shed light on how the two key 
drivers of saving—demography and growth—
operate at a more disaggregated level. Cohort 
analysis can help determine whether saving has 
been rising because the share of the population at 
high-saving ages has increased or because younger 
the diﬀ erences in incomes and saving of a younger 
individual relative to an older one can be decom-
posed into a portion attributable to their diﬀ erent 
ages (the age eﬀ ect) and a portion attributable to 
the fact that the younger individual belongs to 
a cohort that, on average, has diﬀ erent income 
and saving (the cohort eﬀ ect). In addition, saving 
rates change from one year to another (the time 
eﬀ ect) as agents respond to shocks. Box 2.4 and 
 
Separating the age, cohort, and time effects in the esti-
mation of the age-saving proﬁ le is not straightforward 
and requires several identiﬁ cation restrictions. The micro 
analysis presented in this report follows an approach 
that was pioneered by Heckman and Robb (1987) 
and subsequently used by Deaton and Paxson (1994); 
MaCurdy and Mroz (1995); Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and 
Sabelhaus (1996); Paxson (1996); Attanasio (1998); and 
more recently, Chamon and Prasad (2010). The saving 
data, consisting of data points for each cohort and each 
year, are the dependent variables; these are regressed 
on dummies for age, cohort, and time (where time is 
the year of the survey). The restrictions are equivalent 
to assuming that “all deterministic trends in the savings 
rate data originate from a combination of cohort and age 
effects” (Attanasio and Szekely 2003, 15).a
For the four countries examined here, household 
saving is estimated from high-quality household sur-
veys. These surveys are all nationally representative 
and were conducted using a broadly comparable meth-
odology over a fairly long period covering the mid-
1980s to the late 2000s. The saving variable estimated 
from the surveys is obtained as simply the difference 
between total household disposable income (which 
includes imputed amounts—for example, imputed 
rents from owning a house, income in kind, and con-
sumption of automobiles) and total expenditures.b, c
Most of the ﬁ ndings that follow from this analysis 
are illustrated by graphing variables of interest along 
the life cycle. Thus, it is useful to describe how these 
graphs are constructed. In each country and for each 
household survey, approximately 14 five-year birth 
cohorts are constructed. Cohort 1 is the youngest 
cohort; for example, in Mexico, cohort 1 is represented 
by all household heads born 1985–89, so that, in the 
most recent surveys of 2009–10, they are 20 to 25 
years old. Cohort 2 represents household heads who 
were born 1980–84 and were repeatedly observed 
in the surveys of 2004 at the “average” age of 22, in 
the survey of 2005 at the age of 23, and so on, until 
the most recent survey of 2010 at the age of 28. The 
oldest cohort, cohort 14, represents household heads 
who were born 1920–24; in the ﬁ rst Mexican survey of 
1984, these heads were 60–64 years old. The graphs 
plot the cohort’s average for the variable of interest 
against the age of the head, and so the age profile 
of the cohort is obtained by connecting the different 
points in time when the cohort is observed. Given that 
the surveys cover a period of about 20 years, cohorts 
can be followed over a large portion of their life cycles. 
Furthermore, this construction allows different cohorts 
to be observed at the same age. Figures 2.23, 2.27, 
2.28, and 2.29 are presented in this manner.
BOX 2.4  Micro analysis is a useful tool for determining likely trends in 
future savings
a. For more details on the estimation procedure and its relationship with the life-cycle theory, see online annex 2.1. 
b. Other deﬁ nitions of saving have been used, but the main results do not vary signiﬁ cantly. Additional deﬁ nitions include (a) excluding investment com-
ponents—such as purchases of durable goods and spending on education and health—from the total expenditures; and (b) netting transfers, such as 
pensions, from the income aggregate. Note that for the case of Russia, the estimation of consumption is not reliable, but the questionnaire included a 
speciﬁ c question on saving. Therefore, for the case of Russia, we used this self-reported saving variable.
c. These micro-based estimations of household saving are not strictly comparable with domestic saving in the national accounts (NA): for these coun-
tries, NA’s domestic saving includes corporate saving, and the deﬁ nitions of income and consumption are not consistent across the NA and the house-
hold surveys.
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analyses can be used to make qualiﬁ ed general-
izations regarding broader groups of countries.
As is the case for national saving rates, trends 
in household saving rates in the four countries 
of interest have varied greatly in recent decades 
(table 2.1). In Ghana and Thailand, there has 
been an upward trend in household saving rates 
since the late 1980s. Th ailand’s household sav-
ing rate was also much higher than in the other 
three countries over the same period. Mexico’s 
household saving rate shows some sign of increas-
ing toward the mid-late 2000s, but it is reduced 
again if 2010 is included, presumably an eﬀ ect of 
the global ﬁ nancial crisis. Th e household data for 
Russia show not only a much lower saving rate 
relative to the other three countries  but also little 
variation over time. The low rate of household 
cohorts have been saving more, possibly because 
of stronger economic growth. Discerning the 
diﬀ erence between these two cases is important 
because it may suggest whether the expansion of 
aggregate saving is temporary (because a large 
cohort is currently in the working-age stage of 
its life cycle) or more permanent. Th e estimated 
age and cohort proﬁ les of saving can also be used 
to make exploratory inferences about how saving 
will evolve in the future. 
Before considering the results of the analysis 
in detail, it is useful to examine some descrip-
tive statistics on saving. Figure 2.18 shows that 
the levels and movements of national saving rates 
of Thailand, Russia, Mexico, and Ghana are 
similar to those of their regions, thus supporting 
the notion that the ﬁ ndings of speciﬁ c country 
FIGURE 2.18 National saving rates of Thailand, the Russian Federation, Mexico, and Ghana are similar to 
those of their regions
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the UN National Accounts Main Aggregate database. 
Note: Series represent three-year moving averages (MA).
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fraction is the income weight of cohort c for 
the year t. Th ese weights are also predicted 
for time t using the age and cohort eﬀ ects for 
the income levels (Yˆc,t) and the future popula-
tion levels (Nc,t). 
Th e results of this exercise are shown in ﬁ gure 
2.20, which depicts an upward trend in projected 
aggregate household saving rates in Ghana and a 
downward trend in Russia. 
These opposite trends in household saving 
are due to the diﬀ erent shapes of the age eﬀ ects 
for saving (as reported in ﬁ gure 2.19) and to the 
diﬀ erent patterns of demographic transition in 
Ghana and Russia. Figure 2.20 (panel a) shows 
that the ratio of working-age population to 
nonworking-age population will rise from about 
1.4 to 1.8 in Ghana (and, in fact, for the entire 
saving in Russia is perhaps not surprising because 
household saving in the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia region is lower than in other devel-
oping regions.
These micro data confirm one of the main 
findings from the macro trends described ear-
lier in the chapter: apart from Russia, develop-
ing countries have increased their saving rates, 
and micro data show that some of this increase 
is attributable to increases in households’ saving 
rates. 
How do demographic differences 
drive differences in savings? 
Ghana versus Russia
Together with the assumptions of the life-cycle 
hypothesis, the age-saving profiles identified 
with the pseudo panel approach can be used to 
make some simple inferences on the outlook for 
household saving. Th eory suggests that the bulk 
of an individual’s lifetime saving occurs dur-
ing the middle of his or her life cycle—that is, 
during the individual’s working years. Th us, an 
increase in the share of a population of work-
ing age should increase aggregate savings. Th is 
inference rests on strong assumptions, however: 
it assumes no behavioral change and no price, 
wage, rental rate, or other general equilibrium 
eﬀ ects. In fact, it is mainly an accounting projec-
tion, and as such it should be taken with a good 
bit of caution. However, studying the relationship 
between the age structure and saving is still rel-
evant and interesting in that it can give an indica-
tion of how diﬀ erences in countries’ progression 
along the demographic transition will aﬀ ect their 
saving proﬁ les in the coming decades. Th e case of 
Ghana versus Russia is considered ﬁ rst.
Th e projected saving rate (as shown in ﬁ gure 
2.19) is estimated using the following equation:
 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ,
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, ,
S S
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Y Ntot,t c
c t
c t
c t
c c t c t
= ∑∑  (2.1)
where Sˆtot,t is the projected aggregate sav-
ing rate for year t , Sˆc,t is the saving rate of 
cohort “c” predicted for year t (using the age 
and cohort proﬁ les identiﬁ ed by the regres-
sions described in online annex 1.5), and the 
TABLE 2.1 Trends in saving rates differ widely across 
countries 
percent
Year Mexico
Russian 
Federation Thailand Ghana
1984  7.2 —  —  — 
1987 —  —  —   4.9
1988 — —   8.6  6.4
1989 11.1 —  —  — 
1990 —  —  17.1 — 
1991 —  —  —  14.2
1992 12.0 —  20.9 — 
1994 14.2 —  21.2 — 
1996  9.5 —  27.8 — 
1997 —  4.7 —  — 
1998 13.0 3.8 31.6 13.2
1999 —  3.4 33.5 — 
2000 11.0 5.2 31.2 — 
2001 —  5.5 —  — 
2002 11.0 5.4 29.9 — 
2003 —  4.6 —  — 
2004 10.3 3.3 27.6 — 
2005 14.2 4.4 —  — 
2006 10.8 5.9 20.6 11.3
2007 —  5.3 22.8 — 
2008 20.3 4.0 —  — 
2009 —  —  24.1 — 
2010 11.1 —  —  — 
Source: World Bank calculations using household surveys. 
Note: For all countries except Russia, household saving rates are estimated as the ratio of 
the difference between the household income and household consumption over house-
hold income. For Russia, the household saving rate is self-reported by survey participants. 
— = not available.
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can be explained by considering more closely 
how the forecast is generated. First, note that 
the saving rate among people of retirement age 
in Thailand will fall only slightly (figure 2.21, 
panel a). Second, the cohort eﬀ ect will play an 
important role in Thailand (figure 2.21, panel 
b). In the forecast, the future (still-unborn) 
cohorts are assigned the cohort eﬀ ect of the most 
recent cohort (that is, those near the vertical 
axis)—which, in the case of Th ailand, reﬂ ects a 
fairly high saving rate (as younger cohorts’ rapid 
growth in incomes results in higher saving rates 
than for older cohorts). Th us the aggregate saving 
Sub-Saharan region, as shown previously in ﬁ g-
ure 2.13) between 2010 and 2050. In Russia, 
however, the ratio will fall considerably over the 
same decades, from about 2.3 to less than 1.4. 
How do demography and growth 
interact to affect saving? Thailand 
versus Russia 
In Thailand, the saving rate is forecast to rise 
between 2010 and 2050 despite the expected 
decline in the share of the working-age popu-
lation over the projection period. This result 
FIGURE 2.19 Projection of age effects on household saving rates in Ghana and the Russian Federation
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data.
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FIGURE 2.20 Demographic change will drive large changes in saving rates in the decades ahead
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data.
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the saving rate will be about half a percentage 
point higher by 2050 in the alternative scenario 
than in the baseline scenario (ﬁ gure 2.22). Th is 
conclusion—that rising incomes are associated 
with higher saving rates—reinforces the ﬁ nding 
from the previous macro modeling section that 
rate rises over time as younger (higher-saving) 
cohorts replace older (lower-saving) cohorts. Th is 
eﬀ ect is re inforced because these younger cohorts 
are larger in size and move along an income-age 
proﬁ le that is above that of older cohorts, so their 
weight in aggregate saving rises over time. 
Another illustration of how higher income 
growth increases saving can be seen by comparing 
the baseline forecast for Russia with an alternative 
case. In the alternative case, higher growth is sim-
ulated by increasing the cohort eﬀ ect on incomes 
of the new (still-unborn) cohorts.13 As will be the 
case for Thailand, these new cohorts will have 
higher saving rates and higher incomes than older 
cohorts. By 2030 in the alternative, increased-
growth scenario, the share of total income earned 
by the younger cohorts (considered those born 
between 1990 and 2009) would reach 37 percent, 
versus 27 percent in the baseline scenario. Th e 
gap between the two scenarios is even larger, with 
incomes of the younger cohorts (now considered 
those born between 2010 and 2029) accounting 
for 51 percent of the total, versus 26 percent in 
the baseline scenario. 
As the share of total income accounted for by 
cohorts with higher saving rates rises, so will the 
aggregate saving rate. Th us, in the case of Russia, 
FIGURE 2.21 Due to strong growth, the cohort effect will play an important role in the path of Thailand’s 
saving rate
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data.
Note: Cohorts are deﬁ ned in terms of ﬁ ve-year age ranges of birth year. For Thailand, cohort 1, the youngest cohort, is represented by all household heads born 1985–89, 
so that, in the most recent surveys of 2009–10, they are roughly 20 to 25 years old. Cohort 2 represents household heads who were born 1980–84, and so on. 
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The saving profiles of Mexican households 
diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly by education level. Th e age-
saving proﬁ les tend to be quite ﬂ at for the least-
educated group and higher and steeper for the 
more-educated groups (see ﬁ gure 2.24, panel a). 
Th ere are some mild declines in saving rates for 
household heads who are above age 65, especially 
in the case of the group with tertiary education. 
Higher saving by more-educated heads of house-
holds reﬂ ect their anticipated rising income lev-
els, while heads with lower education face a much 
ﬂ atter age-earning proﬁ le. Because education is 
typically a good proxy for permanent income,15 
this analysis helps explain why low-income (and 
typically not well educated) households tend to 
save less than high-income (and typically better-
educated) households.
Another observation that can be gleaned from 
ﬁ gure 2.24 (panel b) is that young cohorts (those 
closest to the vertical axis) have higher saving 
rates than old cohorts: saving rates for the young-
est cohorts are 10 percentage points higher than 
for the oldest cohorts, a signiﬁ cant change. Th is 
indicates that the long-term trend (at least for 
the most recent decades observed in these sur-
veys) has been upward-sloped for saving.16 Th e 
growth generates the means to sustain itself (it is 
also consistent with a basic prediction of the stan-
dard life-cycle model).14 
Increases in educational 
attainment will support growth 
and saving: The case of Mexico 
In Mexico, as in other developing countries, the 
entry of larger numbers of skilled workers into the 
labor market in the coming decades will support 
growth in both incomes and saving rates, even 
after accounting for some erosion in the wage 
premium due to the increased supply. Th is eﬀ ect 
can be seen by grouping households according to 
educational attainment of the household head. As 
shown in ﬁ gure 2.23, panel a, household heads of 
young cohorts are much more likely than those 
of older cohorts to have a secondary or higher 
education: only about 10 percent of household 
heads born in the 1920s have a secondary educa-
tion, but that ﬁ gure has steadily risen over time to 
about 50 percent for household heads born in the 
mid-1980s. Similar progress can be observed for 
the share of heads with higher education (ﬁ gure 
2.23, panel b). 
FIGURE 2.23 Educational attainment in Mexico has been rising over time
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data.
Note: Box 2.4 provides details of how the cohorts shown in these ﬁ gures were constructed
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steepness of the upward trend, however, diﬀ ers 
across education groups. The data for Mexico 
show that the positive cohort eﬀ ect is strongest 
for the most-educated group. 
To estimate the path of aggregate saving in 
Mexico over coming decades, we begin with a 
baseline forecast in which the impact of educa-
tion on saving rates is not taken into account. 
Th e results show that the aggregate saving rate 
will rise until about 2025 because the share of 
working-age people in the total population will 
increase over the same period, thus allowing 
aggregate saving rates to rise because more of the 
population will be earning income. Th e forecast 
aggregate saving rate levels oﬀ  in 2025, however, 
as the share of the nonworking-age population 
starts to decrease after reaching a peak. 
An alternative scenario, which ref lects the 
impact of rising education levels on savings, pre-
dicts considerably higher saving rates over the 
forecast period. To generate projections that take 
into account the diﬀ erent saving and income pro-
ﬁ les, equation (2.1) can be applied separately to 
three groups of households: those with low or no 
education, those with secondary education, and 
those with tertiary education. An average saving 
rate is then calculated by weighting each of the 
three groups by its share of total income. Th ese 
education-augmented demographic projections 
(figure 2.25, panel a) show that by 2050, the 
least-educated group will account for the small-
est share of nonworking-age people in Mexico. 
Because the least-educated group’s earnings and 
saving rates—in terms of both age and cohort 
eﬀ ects—can be expected to continue to be lower 
than those of other groups, the economywide sav-
ing rate will be almost 5 percentage points above 
the baseline scenario by 2050. 
Poor households save little, 
limiting their ability to escape 
poverty: Mexico and Thailand
In most countries, saving tends to be concen-
trated in households that are relatively high-
income compared with the country average. In 
Mexico and Th ailand, saving rates are actually 
negative up to the 25th percentile of the income 
distribution. Even if this is partly due to measure-
ment error or temporary ﬂ uctuations,17 the poor-
est quarter of households seems to accumulate 
much less saving, while saving rates of households 
beyond the 75th percentile of the income distri-
bution are high: saving rates among the richest 1 
FIGURE 2.24 The saving life cycle differs signiﬁ cantly by educational attainment (panel a), but across all 
educational levels, young cohorts tend to save more than older cohorts (panel b)
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data. 
Note: 0 indicates whole population, 1 population with no education or just primary education, 2 secondary education, and 3 tertiary education. Cohorts are deﬁ ned in terms 
of ﬁ ve-year age ranges of birth year. 
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income. Grouping the saving data by the level of 
education of the household head provides a good 
proxy for permanent income because heads sel-
dom change their educational attainment after 
forming a household. Th erefore, tracking house-
holds grouped by education over time minimizes 
the potential bias introduced by composition 
eﬀ ects.
In both Mexico and Thailand, households 
where the head has low educational attainment 
tend to also have low saving. According to the 
most recent household survey data—2010 for 
Mexico and 2009 for Th ailand—the least-edu-
cated group accounted for 17 percent and 34 per-
cent of saving, respectively. By contrast, in Mexico 
about 60 percent of total saving was provided by 
the most-educated group of heads of household 
versus 47 percent in Th ailand. Moreover, saving 
tends to be even more concentrated than income: 
shares of total income accounted for by the most-
educated groups were 50 percent and 37 percent 
for Mexico and Th ailand, respectively, according 
to the most recent survey data. Th e fact that these 
income shares are much lower than the saving 
shares means that more-educated people not only 
save more in absolute terms but also save, on aver-
age, a higher proportion of their incomes.
Th is concentration of saving among household 
heads with greater education, and thus greater 
percent of households are consistently above 60 
percent in Mexico and 70 percent in Thailand 
(table 2.2). Furthermore, this gap between rich 
and poor households’ saving rates does not appear 
to have diminished in recent decades. 
Admittedly, there are drawbacks to comparing 
the saving behavior of households across income 
percentiles to ascertain whether there are perma-
nent vulnerabilities for certain groups. Low or 
negative saving rates may result from consump-
tion smoothing by households facing a temporary 
shock. Similarly, the highest-income households 
are disproportionately in the high-earning years of 
their life cycles, and their earnings likely include 
greater than average non-age-related transitory 
components as well. Total transitory components 
of income can be large and, because of economic 
mobility, saving by those households that make 
up an income percentile at a given point in time 
may be determined either by long-term saving 
behavior or by composition eﬀ ects. Th at is, low 
saving among the lowest percentiles may reﬂ ect 
income smoothing by households that are tem-
porarily poor, while high saving among the high-
est percentiles may reﬂ ect smoothing by house-
holds that are temporarily f lush. Alternatively, 
low saving may reﬂ ect a permanent incapacity of 
some households to accumulate assets for their 
retirement or to cope with unexpected drops in 
FIGURE 2.25 Increased earning power will be the greatest driver of saving by Mexican households
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data.
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Mexico, reductions in the skill premium may 
have moderated the increase in the share of the 
highly educated in total saving.19
Low saving among the poorly educated likely 
ref lects a long-term incapacity to save because 
they face much f latter age-earning profiles. 
Negative saving may ref lect these households’ 
long-term incapacity to accumulate resources 
because they face unemployment or other bar-
riers to income generation, while consumption 
exceeds income because of either public or pri-
vate transfers. Lack of saving makes it diﬃ  cult for 
these households to achieve sustainable increases 
in income by investing in the education of their 
members or to cope with adverse shocks. The 
permanent earning capacity, has increased over 
the most recent two decades for Thailand but 
not for Mexico. In Th ailand, the share of total 
saving by households with secondary education 
has basically been stable, while there has been 
an increase among the group with higher edu-
cation, counterbalanced by a reduction for the 
group with no or very little education. Th is trend 
toward increased concentration of savings par-
tially ref lects the increased weight of educated 
individuals in the total population. The share 
of households with a highly educated head has 
increased quite signiﬁ cantly as well, not just for 
the two countries considered here but also in the 
developing world more generally.18 However, for 
TABLE 2.2 Household saving rates differ signiﬁ cantly along the income distribution
  Percentile
1st 5th 10th 25th 75th 90th 95th 99th
 Year Mexico
1984 −177.4 −69.7 −38.2 −12.9 22.7 39.2 48.0 64.1
1989 −215.9 −79.1 −49.1 −14.9 25.6 41.9 52.5 70.5
1992 −140.0 −60.6 −40.3 −13.0 21.7 36.4 46.1 65.4
1994 −120.4 −47.5 −29.5 −8.6 22.8 38.4 47.4 64.6
1996 −135.9 −55.2 −34.2 −12.7 17.2 32.0 41.8 60.4
1998 −178.9 −66.8 −39.7 −13.4 21.9 38.8 47.1 64.9
2000 −142.8 −54.9 −33.5 −10.3 22.2 36.8 45.4 62.2
2002 −131.5 −53.3 −32.3 −8.7 23.6 39.0 47.6 61.7
2004 −158.2 −72.9 −45.2 −14.7 24.6 40.2 49.0 62.7
2005 −178.8 −66.8 −39.2 −11.2 27.9 43.2 51.5 67.5
2006 −154.5 −66.7 −41.7 −12.4 24.2 39.1 47.7 63.8
2008 −151.6 −76.9 −49.7 −16.8 31.5 49.0 58.5 73.8
2010 −237.2 −91.8 −55.0 −17.5 26.8 42.9 52.1 68.0
  Thailand
1990 −387.2 −141.6 −81.8 −28.4 26.7 45.2 55.3 71.6
1992 −302.2 −127.2 −76.3 −23.1 28.0 46.3 55.8 73.8
1994 −332.7 −130.5 −80.0 −26.3 31.8 49.6 58.9 74.6
1996 −193.7 −108.3 −64.1 −14.5 36.9 54.6 63.1 76.5
1998 −254.5 −97.9 −55.8 −11.7 37.2 54.3 63.0 78.3
1999 −264.3 −95.4 −51.5 −9.3 36.2 52.9 62.3 75.6
2000 −226.2 −88.5 −47.7 −8.1 37.5 54.6 63.5 77.7
2002 −239.9 −85.0 −46.5 −8.0 37.9 53.8 62.0 76.1
2004 −231.3 −83.3 −46.4 −8.7 37.3 53.7 62.5 76.7
2006 −278.6 −98.2 −54.9 −16.1 24.9 43.3 53.9 72.7
2007 −214.4 −79.6 −44.5 −10.6 26.3 44.8 55.0 72.9
2009 −166.9 −60.3 −32.2 −6.9 26.2 43.5 54.3 73.4
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data.
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poor households’ limited participation in formal 
financial markets further limits the financial 
inclusion of other poor households, potentially 
contributing to poverty traps.
Saving behavior depends 
on household formation and 
composition over the life cycle
Th ere are several reasons why household data for 
developing countries may not reveal the expected 
inverted-U shape for the relationship between 
aging and saving (saving rises during a person’s 
working years, then levels oﬀ  and declines during 
retirement): 
• Because consumption is measured at the 
household level, it is often diﬃ  cult to pre-
cisely attribute consumption amounts to 
individual members of the household. As 
pointed out by Deaton and Paxson (2000), 
many individuals may live in multigen-
erational households, such as a 45-year-old 
household head living with his 20-year-
old son and 70-year-old father. At the 
household level, the positive saving of the 
45-year-old may be cancelled out by the 
negative saving of the young and old mem-
bers of his household. Th us, the age pro-
ﬁ le of household saving may be biased and 
quite diﬀ erent from the age proﬁ le of indi-
vidual saving. 
• Elderly individuals who are relatively poor 
may be more likely to live with their chil-
dren than richer ones, thus creating a selec-
tion bias. 
• Different mortality rates may affect the 
composition of the cohorts because longev-
ity and wealth may be positively correlated, 
as Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) point out. 
As a cohort ages, richer individuals survive 
longer and become the larger subgroup 
within the cohort. If they continue saving 
to leave bequests, the inverted U age-saving 
profile may disappear mainly because of 
changes in the composition of the cohorts. 
The potential biases introduced by these 
observations help explain why the hump-shaped 
relationship between aging and saving predicted 
by theory is not always observed in the cases 
examined here. 
concentration of saving thus exacerbates the dif-
ﬁ culties involved in reducing poverty, raising the 
prospect of a permanent underclass with little 
potential for upward mobility.
The concentration of saving among high 
earners also has important implications for 
ﬁ nancial inclusion in developing countries. On 
one hand, concentration of ﬁ nancial services, 
in terms of either geography or income levels, 
can make it less costly for f inancial institu-
tions to enter and operate in developing-coun-
try markets. On the other hand, the resulting 
concentration of financial institutions among 
the high-income segment of a population, and 
in the areas where they live and work, has the 
potential to perpetuate lack of access to ﬁ nancial 
services for the poor. Analysis of recent survey 
data on saving vehicles in developing countries 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012) shows 
that the bottom 40 percent of income earners 
in developing regions are not only less likely to 
save than the top 60 percent but are also less 
likely to save using formal ﬁ nancial institutions 
(ﬁ gure 2.26). Th is suggests that the concentra-
tion of saving associated with income inequality 
may be exacerbated by a spillover eﬀ ect in which 
FIGURE 2.26 The bottom 40 percent of income earners in 
developing regions are not only less likely to save than the 
top 60 percent but are also less likely to save using formal 
ﬁ nancial institutions 
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the World Bank Global Financial Inclusion data-
base and Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012.
Note: The left bar for each region represents the bottom 40 percent of the population by 
income; the right represents the top 60 percent. 
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Figure 2.27 shows, for Mexico, Th ailand, and 
Russia, the average age of the household head 
against the age of the individuals who live with 
that head. Four panels are displayed for each coun-
try: one for the whole population, and three for the 
diﬀ erent education levels. Th e 45-degree line indi-
cates the cohort proﬁ le that would be observed if 
all individuals were heads or were living with heads 
of their same age. However, as shown in the ﬁ gure, 
there are clear deviations from this case, especially 
at the beginning and end of the life cycle. 
At the beginning of the life cycle, household 
heads tend to be older (above the 45-degree line) 
than other members of their households. Th is is 
because there are fewer heads at fairly young ages, 
and some young individuals still live with their 
parents. The opposite effect occurs toward the 
end of the life cycle, when the elderly cease being 
household heads when they return to live with 
their children, thus making household heads 
younger (below the 45-degree line) than other 
members of their households. 
The deviations from the 45-degree line dis-
play a common pattern across all countries: the 
higher the education level, the less likely it is 
that old people live in a household headed by a 
person younger than themselves. Th is suggests 
that more-educated individuals may have better 
means by which to support themselves (accumu-
lated saving) during old age. Conversely, families 
play an important role of smoothing consump-
tion for old people with lower education and with 
lower earning and saving capacity. 
Apart from this commonality, the three coun-
tries diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly in the relevance of this 
intergenerational (or extended) household setup. 
Speciﬁ cally, this phenomenon seems less preva-
lent in Mexico than in Russia or Th ailand. Th is 
ﬁ nding can also be observed at the regional level, 
where a larger proportion of old people maintain 
head-of-household status in Latin America than 
in East Asia or in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, as shown in table 2.3. Th e table also illus-
trates that the proportion of elderly people who 
are not household heads, and for whom the sup-
port of extended families is important, decreases 
as income levels increase: the share declines from 
about 30 percent in low-income countries to 10 
percent in high-income countries. Th e reduction 
is even more striking for females. 
Notice that ﬁ gure 2.27 also provides a visual 
corroboration of the potential bias due to the 
FIGURE 2.27 The age composition of households varies 
by age of the household head; more highly educated 
individuals are less likely to live in a household headed by 
someone younger
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data. 
Note: In each set of four panels, 0 indicates whole population, 1 population with no education 
or just primary, 2 secondary education, and 3 tertiary education. Box 2.4 provides details of 
how the cohorts shown in the panels were constructed. The 45-degree line indicates the 
cohort proﬁ le that would be observed if all individuals were heads or were living with heads of 
their same age.
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in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa after reaching a peak, 
indicating once again that multigenerational 
households are common in these regions of the 
world.
Evolving systems of old-age 
income support
In most developing countries, extended fami-
lies have traditionally cared for the elderly who 
can no longer work. However, this is changing 
for the educated population in the four countries 
analyzed here: the higher the level of education, 
and thus the higher the level of accumulated sav-
ing, the less likely it is that elderly persons join 
younger households. Thus, rising incomes in 
developing countries can be thought of as shift-
ing the support system for the elderly from infor-
mal provision by relatives to formal provision 
through pension systems. Th e shift from infor-
mal to formal provision of support for the elderly, 
which is likely to accelerate as incomes rise in 
the developing world, changes the nature of the 
risks the elderly face in sustaining their levels of 
consumption after retirement. It will also require 
changes in the regulation of developing countries’ 
ﬁ nancial systems. 
The existence of large pools of saving, and 
the need to maintain the real value of this 
change in household composition discussed 
above. Even if the group of household heads born 
in the same year is followed through time, the age 
composition of their households is changing, and 
this may aﬀ ect saving decisions beyond the pure 
(individual head’s) age eﬀ ect. 
Changes in household size during the life 
cycle also aﬀ ect household behavior. Figure 2.28 
plots household size against the age of the house-
hold head for the four countries across diﬀ erent 
cohorts and education levels. As postulated by 
Becker (1993) in his economic theory of family 
formation, there is a trade-oﬀ  between quantity 
and quality of offspring. Households with low 
levels of income tend to opt for more children 
because they are unable to invest in their human 
capital. Th is is clearly visible across all the four 
countries, where household size is larger for lower 
education groups.
Additional observations that can be gathered 
from ﬁ gure 2.28 are that younger cohorts tend 
to have smaller family sizes than older ones, and 
that family sizes diﬀ er quite a lot across diﬀ er-
ent countries.20 Once again, these ﬁ ndings can be 
validated by a broader regional analysis, as shown 
in ﬁ gure 2.29 (additional background informa-
tion on how this ﬁ gure was generated is discussed 
in box 2.5).
In the regional breakdown, it is also possible 
to see that household size declines quite slowly 
TABLE 2.3 The prevalence of intergenerational households varies by country income level 
and by region
percentage who maintain head-of-household status
 
Population above 70 Population above 65
  Female Male Female Male
Low-income economies 23 66 24 71
Lower-middle-income economies 30 76 28 80
Upper-middle-income economies 47 81 45 82
High-income OECD members 56 89 53 90
East Asia and Paciﬁ c 32 79 32 82
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 50 76 48 77
Latin America and the Caribbean 45 85 44 87
Middle East and North Africa  5 24  5 29
South Asia 14 72 14 77
Sub-Saharan Africa 42 88 43 89
Source: World Bank calculations using household surveys of the Global Income Distribution Dynamics, data for 2005.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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pension plans incur substantial investment losses 
or are inadequately regulated. Poorly designed 
public pension systems present similar invest-
ment risks for the elderly in addition to the 
potential loss of beneﬁ ts that may accompany a 
redeﬁ nition of beneﬁ ts or age-related eligibility 
levels. Changes in the taxation of pensions, or 
the presence of high inﬂ ation that reduces the 
real value of ﬁ xed-income annuities, can nega-
tively affect both private and public pensions. 
Of course, informal support systems also present 
signiﬁ cant risks for the elderly, principally in the 
saving over several decades, will encourage the 
growth of ﬁ nancial intermediaries such as pen-
sion funds, investment ﬁ rms, and life insurance 
companies. The growth of such intermediar-
ies has the potential to improve the efficiency 
of investment by increasing the involvement by 
professionals who specialize in evaluating the 
proﬁ tability and soundness of diﬀ erent invest-
ment vehicles. On the other hand, the growth 
of formal pension systems can also present the 
elderly with new risks, including a reduction in 
their expected standard of living if their private 
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FIGURE 2.28 Household size varies by age of the household head, and this relationship varies somewhat 
by educational level 
Source: World Bank calculations using household survey data. 
Note: In each set of four panels, 0 indicates whole population, 1 population with no education or just primary, 2 secondary education, and 3 tertiary education. Box 2.4 pro-
vides details of how the cohorts shown in the panels were constructed.
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care and pension expenditures are likely to grow 
even more rapidly than incomes. Moreover, tax 
revenue is heavily dependent on the size of the 
working-age population, which will shrink in 
some developing regions in the years ahead. Th e 
rising burden of expenditures on the elderly will 
not be oﬀ set by the declines in expenditures on 
education that one might expect to result from a 
decreasing share of young people because rising 
incomes will also lead to increased demand for 
education per child. Th us, aging and growth can 
be expected to increase the ﬁ scal burden of age-
related expenditures. 
Th is strain on public ﬁ nances has important 
implications for national saving. Th e public com-
ponent of national saving could contract because 
of ﬁ scal deﬁ cits or reduced public investment. In 
form of unanticipated declines in their family 
members’ incomes. Th e important point is that 
the risks will evolve in the decades ahead.
Aging will challenge the 
sustainability of ﬁ scal policy in 
both developing and advanced 
countries
Two of the largest components of government 
expenditures in many countries are health care 
and pensions. Both of these components require 
more resources as the average age of the popula-
tion rises. At the same time, as incomes increase, 
the share of these expenditures in income tends to 
rise. Th us, as populations age and incomes con-
tinue to increase in developing countries, health 
FIGURE 2.29 Younger cohorts tend to have smaller family sizes, but this relationship 
varies signiﬁ cantly across regions
Source: World Bank calculations using census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International (IPUMSI).
Note: Values in each panel are simple averages. See box 2.5. 
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countries. Pension systems are also potentially 
highly sensitive to demographic change, so pro-
jections of public pension costs are critical for 
thinking about the magnitude and timing of 
demographic pressures on overall public ﬁ nances. 
Most projections suggest that the increased pub-
lic spending on health care will be as important 
as pensions, accounting for roughly half of the 
increase in age-related liabilities over the next few 
decades.22
Th e data available on age-related public expen-
ditures by age of recipient (from the National 
addition, various policy changes to counteract 
demographic pressures—such as tax increases, 
reduction in coverage or generosity of age-related 
beneﬁ ts, or cuts to non-age-related spending—
may affect household saving behavior. These 
important saving dynamics are not explicitly 21 
accounted for in the general equilibrium model-
generated scenarios; therefore, this section com-
plements the previous analysis, although in a par-
tial equilibrium setting. 
Already, pensions are a signiﬁ cant component 
of the government budget in many developing 
The data behind figure 2.29 come from censuses 
that have been carried out in 43 developing countries 
since the 1960s. These censuses are collected and 
standardized by the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series, International (IPUMSI, http:// international.
ipums.org). Table B2.5.1 shows the number of coun-
tries by region with available census data. 
Using these data, we calculated the year of birth for 
each household head in the censuses and thus iden-
tified all household heads between 15 and 90 years 
old. Their birth years range from 1870 to 1994. Five-
year cohorts were then constructed according to the 
birth year of the heads. For example, household heads 
born between 1870 and 1874 belong to cohort 1, while 
those who were born between 1875 and 1879, to 
cohort 2, and so on. These cohorts are then followed 
through time for all the dates for which the censuses 
were repeated. For most countries, there are at least 
four or ﬁ ve repeated censuses. The data for the vari-
ous countries were then averaged to obtain information 
at the regional level. The averages were calculated as 
simple averages or as weighted averages where the 
weights are the population sizes of the countries.
BOX 2.5  A global dataset of household censuses provides a nuanced view of 
saving at the micro level
(continued)
TABLE B2.5.1 Number of countries with available census data, by region, 1960–2009
 WB Region 1960–64 1968–72 1973–77 1978–82 1983–87 1988–92 1992–97 1998–02 2003–07 2008–09
East Asia and Paciﬁ c 2  3  6 1  6 2
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
1  1  4
Latin America and 
the Caribbean
7 5 4  7 2  9 3 10 3
Middle East and 
North Africa
2 3
South Asia 1  1 2 1  3 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 3  5 2  9 2 2
Total 7 7 6 11 7 21 9 32 9 4
Source: World Bank compilation.
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ages. Finally, education expenditures tend to be 
a larger share of GDP in high-income countries 
than in developing countries. Th is implies that 
even as aging reduces the share of developing 
countries’ school-age populations, higher enroll-
ment rates and more rapid growth in per-student 
expenditures than in incomes will limit any 
decline in total education expenditures relative to 
GDP. 
Although the burden of age-related expen-
ditures will be signiﬁ cant in many countries in 
the years ahead, age-related expenditures will be 
highly sensitive to the generosity and coverage of 
pension and health care systems (the model gen-
erating these scenarios is described in box 2.7). 
Absent changes in beneﬁ ts and coverage, four of 
Transfer Accounts [NTA] project, discussed in 
box 2.6) show wide variation across countries in 
the extent to which public transfers rise with age 
(ﬁ gure 2.30). Health care  transfers to the elderly 
tend to be much greater in advanced countries, 
not only relative to GDP per capita but also 
relative to health care spending at other ages (in 
per capita terms). This is consistent with find-
ings that, at the micro level, health care at very 
advanced ages is a luxury good (see, for example, 
De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010). In the case 
of public pensions, transfers tend to begin at sub-
stantially younger ages in developing countries 
than in advanced countries; thus, there may be 
signiﬁ cant room for reforming developing coun-
tries’ public pension systems by raising retirement 
Family size represented in ﬁ gure 2.29 is a variable 
directly coded in the IPUMSI censuses. Smoothed lines 
connecting the cohort data were plotted by adopting a 
polynomial approximation. Figure B2.5.1 shows how 
this polynomial method ﬁ ts two set of points relating 
family size and household heads’ age for two separate 
cohorts (the youngest and the oldest) in an example for 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela.
BOX 2.5 (continued)
FIGURE B2.5.1 Family size for the ﬁ rst and latest cohort, points and ﬁ tted 
values, República Bolivariana de Venezuela
Source: World Bank calculations using República Bolivariana de Venezuela census data.
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countries; the resulting increase in the ratio of 
public transfers to GDP from 2010 to 2050 in 
the six developing countries ranges from 14 per-
centage points in India to 47 percentage points in 
China. Even adopting U.S. coverage and beneﬁ ts 
levels would increase the public transfers-to-GDP 
ratio significantly from current levels, ranging 
from 9 percentage points in Brazil to 19 percent-
age points in China. 
Th ese scenarios include projections of public 
health care expenditures. It should be born in 
mind that speculating on the future of public 
health care expenditures is subject to more error 
than predicting pension expenditures because 
the costs of public health care depend to a large 
extent on factors beyond the control of policy 
makers. Prices of medical services and medi-
cines, for instance, are determined at least in part 
by market conditions—international as well as 
domestic—and technological innovations not 
only aﬀ ect prices but also make altogether new 
treatments available. Thus, any projections on 
health care spending have a high degree of uncer-
tainty, even assuming an unchanged policy envi-
ronment.23 Th e changing nature of demand for 
the six developing countries considered in table 
2.4—Brazil, Chile, China, and Costa Rica—will 
experience a substantial increase in the ﬁ scal bur-
den of their old-age expenditures as their popula-
tions age in future decades. But this calculation 
may understate the potential burden on public 
expenditures because rising incomes could result 
in demands for higher beneﬁ ts and more wide-
spread coverage in countries where the public sec-
tor currently provides only limited pension and 
health-care services. 
Some further insight can be gained by com-
paring (a) projections of public age-related expen-
ditures in individual countries assuming an 
unchanged policy scenario, with (b) projections 
assuming convergence with the 2003 benefits 
and coverage levels oﬀ ered by a European coun-
try with a deep beneﬁ t system (Sweden) and (c) 
convergence with the somewhat lower benefits 
provided in the United States, which has a more 
modest public pension program even than most 
developing countries but high public health care 
expenditures on the elderly. A path of conver-
gence with Swedish levels of benefits and cov-
erage would be untenable for most developing 
 
Data on age-related public expenditures are typi-
cally not disaggregated by age group. However, the 
National Transfer Accounts (NTA) Projecta aims to 
measure public transfer inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows by one-
year age cohort, and data for at least some series have 
been prepared for 21 countries so far. Most of these 
countries have series on public education, health care, 
and pension transfer inﬂ ows by age, and among these 
are six developing countries with data on all three: 
Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, India, and Mexico. 
The project is still under way; more countries will be 
added, and some existing data may yet be revised. 
Data are currently available for only one year for each 
country, and the year varies by country. 
Some countries have undergone signiﬁ cant reforms 
since the year for which its accounts are available—for 
example, Brazil, in the case of public pension reform—
which have undoubtedly altered age-related expendi-
tures since then, both in terms of magnitude and age 
distribution. Bearing these caveats in mind, the NTA 
data are nonetheless useful estimates of age-related 
public transfers disaggregated by age. The NTA meth-
odology is harmonized so that age distributions of 
transfers are directly comparable across countries.
BOX 2.6  The National Transfer Accounts project is a valuable source of data on  
age-related public transfers
a. The NTA Project is a collaborative effort to measure, analyze, and interpret macroeconomic aspects of age and population aging around the world 
(http://www.ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/). Funded by an array of public and private sources, the lead institutions for the project are the Center for the 
Economics and Demography of Aging at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Population and Health Studies Program of the East-West Center 
in Honolulu. For details on the project, see Lee and Mason (2011) and http://www.ntaccounts.org.
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FIGURE 2.30 There is wide variation across countries in the extent to which public transfers tend to rise 
with age
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) project (http://www.ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/). 
Note: NTA data are at the one-year age cohort level, in terms of average transfers to a person at that age. They are shown here as percentages of the country’s GDP per 
capita, in ﬁ ve-cohort rolling averages, for the year for which each country has NTA data available. The vertical axes of the China and Mexico graphs are on a different scale 
than the graphs of the other four countries.
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d. Japan, 2004
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f. United States, 2003
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c. China, 2002
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Fiscal balances are affected by changes in the age 
distribution of a population mainly because public 
health care and pension expenditures are greater for 
older people, education expenditures are greater for 
younger people, and tax revenue comes mainly from 
people in their working years. A simple decomposition 
of expenditures (equation B2.7.1) common in the liter-
ature (see, for example, Miller, Mason, and Holz 2011), 
shows aggregate public expenditures E, on a particu-
lar program or category of programs (for example, 
public pensions), as a fraction of GDP Y, expressed as 
the sum across ages of expenditures relative to GDP 
on people of each age. For each age cohort, this is 
broken down into average expenditures per person 
Eage /Cage (where Cage is the population of the cohort), 
relative to output per working-age person Y/W (where 
W is the working-age population, for example, aged 
20–64 years), and the ratio of the population of each 
age cohort to the working-age population Cage /W. For 
a given Eage /Cage for each age, total expenditures E/Y 
increase relative to Y/W as Cage /W rises for ages with 
higher than average costs per person Eage /Cage, that is, 
as more expensive cohorts grow in size relative to the 
working-age population.
The above identity can be further disaggregated 
(equation B2.7.2), separating the average expenditures 
per person of each age into average expenditures per 
participant in the program Eage /Page, and the share of 
the population of the cohort covered by the program 
Page /Cage. This highlights that average expenditures 
per person in the age group can change because of 
either an increase or a decrease in the generosity of 
the system, or because of diminished or expanded 
coverage. 
In principle, all of the above components can be 
expected to change over time. For example, coun-
tries that experience a fall in the ratio of the school-
age population to the working-age population are often 
experiencing rising incomes at the same time (which 
is typically associated with having fewer children but 
also with rising school enrollment rates) as well as 
increased education spending per student (Becker and 
Lewis 1973). Thus, the first two ratios on the right-
hand side of the identity rise while the third falls, and 
the sign of the net change in education expenditures as 
a fraction of GDP depends on the relative magnitudes 
of the effects. However, holding expenditures per per-
son constant relative to average income (or relative to 
income per working-age adult) can be a useful thought 
experiment, and in any case there is not always an a 
priori reason to expect program generosity or coverage 
to change in one direction or another.
BOX 2.7  The impact of aging on government budgets is clariﬁ ed by breaking it 
down into its components
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are useful—first, for illustrating that U.S. lev-
els are not extraordinarily high for an advanced 
country (and therefore that convergence with 
those levels is not unthinkable for developing 
countries over a time horizon of 40 years); and, 
second, for illustrating just how greatly outcomes 
may vary if per capita expenditures are driven up 
by rising health care costs because the ﬁ scal eﬀ ect 
of a large increase in costs would be similar to 
that of a large increase in generosity. Indeed, the 
greatest task for governments in preparing for the 
impact of aging on public health care liabilities 
may not be to tweak coverage and generosity of 
conventional systems but to make deep institu-
tional reforms to health care systems so that ben-
eﬁ ciaries have stronger incentives to seek low-cost 
heath care options, reducing contingent liabilities 
stemming from unforeseeable shocks to health 
care costs.
health services must also be taken into account in 
assembling any estimate of future costs. At pres-
ent, health care spending for persons near the end 
of their lives is much higher in advanced coun-
tries than in developing countries. If elderly pop-
ulations in developing countries begin to demand 
costlier medical services in their final years, 
the impact of aging on public ﬁ nances in those 
countries will be much greater than it would be 
assuming a static level of services. 
Table 2.4 illustrates that if the generosity of 
public health care programs were to gradually 
converge with current U.S. levels, for a number 
of countries the ﬁ scal burden of health care costs 
would be roughly double what it would be from 
aging alone. Sweden, with one of the most lav-
ish public health care systems in the world for its 
elderly, is an outlier. However, the projections in 
which generosity converges with Swedish levels 
TABLE 2.4 The path of age-related ﬁ scal pressures will depend strongly on beneﬁ t and coverage levels
Eage
Cage(
( )
)
Y
W  
Pensions
(% GDP)
Health care
(% GDP)
Education
(% GDP)
Total 
change
(% GDP)
 Country 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050  2010–50
Brazil constant 9.1 14.0 20.9 3.0 3.5 4.5 2.6 1.9 1.7 12.4
Brazil →Sweden 9.1 10.9 12.8 3.0 5.9 13.2 2.6 4.9 6.9 18.2
Brazil →United States 9.1 14.2 11.0 3.0 4.6 8.8 2.6 3.0 3.6 8.7
Chile constant 5.5 8.8 11.7 2.2 2.6 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.5 6.3
Chile →Sweden 5.5 11.1 18.2 2.2 6.3 15.0 2.2 4.8 7.2 30.5
Chile →United States 5.5 9.5  11.8 2.2 4.7 9.8 2.2 3.0 3.8 15.5
China constant 3.4 5.9 8.1 1.7 2.2 3.0 2.1 1.6 1.5 5.4
China →Sweden 3.4 13.6 33.7 1.7 5.4 14.3 2.1 4.0 6.4 47.2
China →United States 3.4 7.0 12.8 1.7 4.2 9.7 2.1 2.5 3.3 18.6
Costa Rica constant 4.3 7.1 11.0 4.7 5.4 6.8 4.2 3.0 2.6 7.2
Costa Rica →Sweden 4.3 9.8 20.3 4.7 6.8 13.4 4.2 5.4 6.7 27.2
Costa Rica →United States 4.3 7.3 11.1 4.7 5.6 8.9 4.2 3.6 3.5 10.4
India constant 1.0 1.2 1.4 2.3 2.4 2.6 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.1
India →Sweden 1.0 1.6 2.9 2.3 4.4 8.1 1.7 5.7 8.2 14.3
India →United States 1.0 3.6 6.9 2.3 3.4 5.7 1.7 3.3 4.4 12.0
Mexico constant 1.5 2.3 3.2 2.1 2.2 2.6 3.5 2.5 2.0 0.8
Mexico →Sweden 1.5 8.0 22.0 2.1 5.0 11.9 3.5 5.9 7.6 34.4
Mexico →United States 1.5 4.1 9.8 2.1 3.8 8.0 3.5 3.7 4.0 14.8
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the National Transfer Accounts (http://www.ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/), United Nations 
Population Division 2011, IMF 2011, and World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
Note: Figures in the table are estimated using age distribution data on public transfers (from the National Transfer Accounts [NTA]) and projected demographic change. The 
2010 pension expenditures are calibrated to public pension expenditure estimates given in IMF (2011). The NTA data are combined with population projections by ﬁ ve-year 
age cohort from the United Nations. The methodology underlying the projections is given in online annex 2.2. Eage
Cage( )/ YW( )  denotes average expenditure on each person of a given age, relative to average output per working-age person; additional details are given in box 2.7.
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although, from the 2030s on, the latter will be 
a signiﬁ cant factor in China and also in Brazil 
given the enormous scale of Brazil’s current pub-
lic pension system and thus the sensitivity of its 
ﬁ scal balance to even modest demographic shifts. 
Some East Asian countries, as well as India, 
Mexico, Pakistan, and South Africa, do not face 
enormous pressure because they do not have large 
public pension systems.
Increases in pension expenditures as a share of 
GDP can imply signiﬁ cant increases in dollar val-
ues. For example, if Turkey’s GDP growth aver-
ages 4.2 percent from 2010 through 2030 (in line 
with a range of projections), then an increase in 
pension expenditures from 6.3 percent of GDP in 
2010 to 9.6 percent in 2030 would imply annual 
growth of 6.4 percent—more than tripling 
expenditures in constant dollars. Countries fac-
ing the prospect of this kind of sustained growth 
in pension liabilities will need to consider means 
of reducing coverage and/or benefits or make 
large cuts in other areas of expenditures.
Th e two most dramatic projections in table 2.5 
are for Brazil and Ukraine, where pension costs 
would exceed 20 percent of GDP by 2050. Brazil 
made signiﬁ cant reforms in 1999 and 2003, but 
more will be necessary soon because the aged 
dependency ratio is set to nearly double by 2030. 
In 2011, Ukraine enacted overdue but politically 
unpopular reforms to overhaul its already quite 
fiscally burdensome, Soviet-era public pension 
system, in part by raising retirement ages (this 
change is not reﬂ ected in the scenario).
For countries with unsustainable pension sys-
tems, several avenues of reform are available.25 It 
may be necessary to reduce payments per recipi-
ent, relative to contributions. Policy makers can 
generally adjust the generosity and coverage of 
pension systems, subject to political constraints; 
in most cases, the promise of future pension pay-
ments is implicit—an intergenerational agree-
ment that is not legally binding—and is subject 
to renegotiation. But signiﬁ cant headway can also 
be made by the relatively straightforward route of 
raising retirement ages. Th is change would have 
the added beneﬁ t of expanding the labor force, 
thus adding to economic growth and tax rev-
enues. Th ere is considerable scope for later retire-
ment in some countries, and pension systems are 
Overall, these simple scenarios suggest not 
only that the ﬁ scal challenge of rising old-age-
related costs in the coming decades will be sig-
niﬁ cant but also that gradual changes in beneﬁ ts 
or coverage can have an impact as great as that 
of demographic change. Th ese scenarios should 
be viewed as illustrating the potential impact of 
aging on ﬁ scal balances, not as forecasts of expen-
diture levels. Additionally, it is important to 
recognize that the evolution of government sav-
ing patterns in the future will depend on other 
changes that have the potential to moderate 
the ﬁ scal impact of aging: for example, pension 
reform, tax reform, labor market reform, changes 
in labor market participation, and changes in 
non-age-related public expenditures.
Aging will increase the cost of 
public pensions 
When considering a broader sample of countries 
than that of the National Transfer Accounts proj-
ect, it is clear that pension expenditures are set to 
rise substantially relative to GDP across the devel-
oping world (table 2.5).24 Th is scenario assumes 
no change in pension coverage or policies, so that 
expenditures per person at each age are held con-
stant relative to GDP per working-age person, 
and changes in expenditures as a share of GDP 
are driven purely by the changing age distribution 
of the population. Lacking data on the distribu-
tion of expenditures across age cohorts for most 
of these countries, an approximation is made by 
assuming that average pension payments are the 
same for all ages 50 and older, and zero for ages 
under 50. Under this assumption, pension expen-
ditures as a share of GDP change proportionally 
to a modiﬁ ed dependency ratio (the methodology 
is given in online annex 2.3).
Developing countries vary widely in their 
exposure to rising pension costs. Countries in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle 
East and North Africa (to the extent that a 
generalization can be made based on the Arab 
Republic of Egypt and Jordan) generally face sig-
niﬁ cant increases in their pension liabilities in the 
decades ahead. Th ese increases are due mainly to 
ballooning retirement-age populations and much 
less to declining working-age population shares, 
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for women. With adult mortality rates and fertil-
ity both falling, the average length of retirement 
and the ratio of retirees to the labor force is set 
to rise dramatically in China, and policies aimed 
at later retirement have been among the main 
reforms being discussed to address this.27
A more fundamental reform is to transition 
from a pay-as-you-go to a funded system. A 
not always designed well to encourage labor force 
participation by those in their mid-50s to 60s who 
are still able to work productively. For example, 
even after the last round of reforms, the average 
retirement age of those who retire under Brazil’s 
Length of Contribution rule26 is 54 for men and 
51 for women (Gragnolati et al. 2011). In China, 
the statutory retirement age is 60 for men and 55 
 TABLE 2.5 Population aging will put severe pressure on some countries’ public pension systems
Public pension costs
(% of GDP)
Age 65+
 (% of population)
Age 20–64
(% of population)
2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(62.8% of population covered)
 Argentina 7.4 8.8 11.2 10.6 13.6 19.1 56.1 58.2 56.9
 Brazil 9.1 13.8 20.1 7.0 13.7 22.5 59.1 61.7 57.5
 Chile 5.5 8.1 10.6 9.3 17.3 23.5 59.9 58.8 56.0
 Mexico 1.5 2.3 3.2 6.3 11.7 19.9 54.9 59.6 57.7
East Asia and Paciﬁ c 
(90.2% of population covered)
 China 3.4 5.5 7.7 8.2 16.5 25.6 64.5 63.3 56.3
 Indonesia 0.7 1.1 1.6 5.6 10.5 19.2 58.4 62.1 58.4
 Malaysia 3.0 4.3 5.5 4.8 10.3 15.0 55.7 57.9 58.2
 Philippines 1.7 2.2 3.0 3.6 6.7 10.8 50.5 55.5 58.2
 Thailand 1.0 1.6 2.1 8.9 17.6 25.1 63.0 61.6 55.5
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(72.9% of population covered)
 Bulgaria 7.2 9.2 11.0 17.5 22.3 28.7 63.4 58.1 51.0
 Latvia 6.1 7.6 8.9 17.8 21.3 25.7 62.4 57.2 53.6
 Lithuania 7.6 9.6 11.3 16.0 20.4 24.2 62.0 57.5 55.2
 Romania 7.5 10.0 12.9 14.9 19.2 27.9 64.3 61.1 52.7
 Russian Federation 8.1 10.7 12.6 12.8 19.1 23.1 66.4 58.9 54.7
 Turkey 6.3 9.6 13.8 6.0 11.4 19.6 58.7 61.8 58.6
 Ukraine 17.7 21.8 26.2 15.5 19.5 24.1 64.2 59.2 54.6
South Asia 
(85.7% of population covered)
 India 1.0 1.3 1.8 4.9 8.3 13.5 54.7 59.7 60.8
 Pakistan 0.6 0.7 1.1 4.3 6.0 10.4 49.1 57.5 61.7
Middle East and North Africa 
(26.7% of population covered)
 Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.0 5.2 7.3 5.0 8.7 14.2 53.8 57.9 59.2
 Jordan 4.1 5.8 9.3 3.9 5.6 12.8 47.6 59.5 60.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(5.9% of population covered)
 South Africa 1.9 2.3 2.9 4.6 7.8 10.1 55.3 58.2 61.2
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the IMF 2011 and United Nations Population Division 2011.
Note: These projections assume that the ratio of average expenditures per person of retirement age (50+) to GDP per person of working age (20–64) remains constant. 
Given this simplifying assumption, these projections are less precise than those given in table 2.4, and, for this reason, the paths for countries that are in both sets of 
projections (Brazil, China, Chile, India, and Mexico) differ somewhat between the two tables. Also, any pension reforms that had not come into effect by 2010 are not 
accounted for. Details are given in online annex 2.3.
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debt, making the fiscal situation still worse in 
the future. One long-term option is to raise taxes, 
which may carry with it a political cost but will 
probably be a component of any balanced policy 
package to adapt to aging. Second, unnecessary 
and wasteful spending will have to be cut in non-
age-related areas; the areas and scope for cuts 
vary by country, but most developing countries 
have space for non-age-related expenditure cuts 
that can go part of the way toward freeing ﬁ scal 
space for age-related liabilities.30 Th ird, reform-
ing the scale and institutional design of public 
pension and health care systems will be essential. 
Th is process is already under way in a number 
of countries facing the most imminent pressure 
from aging, but it will need to be accelerated in 
many countries.
The path of age-related public expenditures 
has important implications for household saving 
as well as public saving. Increased generosity and 
coverage of public health care and social security 
programs is associated with signiﬁ cant reductions 
in household saving,31 all things equal; not only 
is there less need to smooth consumption over the 
life cycle, but precautionary saving is also reduced 
because public programs play an insurance role, 
pooling the risk associated with the uncertainty 
of lifespan and health care needs. Th e eﬀ ect can 
work in reverse as well: China experienced this 
during the 1990s and 2000s, with urban house-
hold saving rates increasing as social safety nets 
were scaled back.32 
Over the coming decades, developing coun-
tries will experience some of the typical increases 
in demand for public services that have, histori-
cally, accompanied rising incomes. But at the 
same time, governments’ ability to ramp up 
pension and health care programs will be con-
strained by aging to a much greater extent than 
high-income countries experienced when they 
were going through a similar stage of economic 
development. If governments do not follow the 
path that high-income countries did in the past, 
and instead reduce the generosity or coverage of 
age-related programs in the face of a swelling 
number of beneﬁ ciaries, then private saving can 
be expected to rise because a greater proportion of 
retirement and health care costs will be paid for 
out of pocket. Increased generosity and coverage 
number of countries are making the change, par-
ticularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
Th e transition itself is costly, but the switch to 
a funded system is a long-term ﬁ x, relieving the 
government of the imbalance between inf lows 
and outf lows that results from demographic 
change. It is also noteworthy that the change can 
be expected to have a positive impact on total 
national saving, provided that the funding of the 
system is ﬁ nanced by taxation rather than public 
borrowing.28
The ﬁ scal burden of aging will 
affect the composition and level of 
national saving
As shown above, public saving has not shown 
any strong trend historically at the global level, 
either up or down. It did rise noticeably for a few 
years leading up to the 2007–09 global ﬁ nancial 
crisis but quickly returned to its normal histori-
cal range of 10–20 percent of global GDP when 
the crisis hit. Even if public saving does resume 
an upward trend in the next few years, the sce-
narios just discussed suggest that, in the medium 
to long run, most countries will face pressure on 
public ﬁ nances—in some cases, quite severe pres-
sure—from the aging of their populations, and 
this can be expected to constrain public saving. 
Furthermore, developing countries may face sig-
niﬁ cantly greater demand for infrastructure as 
economic growth proceeds (see chapter 1); and if 
public saving levels need to be kept up to support 
rising infrastructure investment without running 
sustained ﬁ scal deﬁ cits,29 demographic consider-
ations will be still more pressing.
Looking forward, gross public saving will 
likely stay in the range that it has been in for the 
past several decades, constituting roughly 10–20 
percent of gross national saving. Th is is required 
for the public sector to play a signiﬁ cant role in 
any sustained investment in infrastructure. To 
maintain this level as age-related expenditures 
increase, policy makers will have a few options. 
In the short to medium term, they may run ﬁ s-
cal deﬁ cits, but this solution is not sustainable 
and only delays inevitable costly adjustments to 
long-term demographic shifts; indeed, running 
deficits will only burden the government with 
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choices includes lower standards of living for 
retirees, longer working lives, higher saving dur-
ing the working life, and larger transfers from 
workers to retirees. 
Most developed countries have opted for 
(or are considering) a mix of a delayed retire-
ment age, increased private saving for retirement 
(through favorable tax regimes), and reformed 
public pension systems—while most have 
rejected the option of declining living standards 
for the elderly (see Pensions Commission 2005 
for the United Kingdom). 
Depending on its position in the demographic 
transition, a specific developing country will 
more likely be successful in applying one or a 
mix of these options. For example, countries at 
early stages of their demographic transition, such 
as the Sub-Saharan countries, could probably 
set up tax incentives to encourage saving. A key 
issue is assessing whether tax-deferred individual 
retirement saving crowds out other forms of sav-
ing. Th e literature on the United States ﬁ nds little 
evidence that 401(k) contributions substitute for 
other forms of personal saving (Poterba, Venti, 
and Wise 1996; Benjamin 2003; Gelber 2011).
For other regions, longer working lives and 
larger transfers may be a better solution. As 
described in the chapter, there are some strong 
rationales for transfers to elderly households: (a) 
redistribution (productivity growth will raise 
incomes of future cohorts, and public programs 
are replacing family transfers); and (b) correction 
of market failures such as limited insurance mar-
kets against the risk of long-term care needs.
For developing countries with an increasingly 
large share of old people, an often overlooked 
policy challenge consists of recognizing the het-
erogeneity among the elderly. Th is is not a homo-
geneous group, but it varies in terms of ﬁ nancial 
disparities, health status, capacity to work, and life 
expectancy. For example, recent research on labor 
market conditions at older age (Gruber and Wise 
2007) has found that higher tax on earnings from 
ages 55 to 69 is positively correlated with unused 
labor capacity (workers aged 55 to 65). 
Regarding the second issue—the concen-
tration of saving within restricted population 
segments—this chapter highlighted that the 
within-countries high concentration of saving 
of education systems should be feasible because 
the ﬁ scal impact will be oﬀ set by the decreasing 
number of children as a share of the population. 
Pensions and health care are a different story, 
and there will likely be an important role here 
for markets, and private saving, alongside public 
programs. Higher tax rates will also aﬀ ect house-
hold saving, so even if public saving does not fall, 
private saving can be expected to fall if tax hikes 
constitute a large part of the policy response, and, 
in this case, total national saving will fall.
Conclusion and policy directions
Th e downward pressure on saving rates associated 
with the aging of the global population through 
2030 is unlikely to become a severe constraint 
on growth overall. However, some crucial policy 
challenges lie ahead, especially for those coun-
tries aﬀ ected by more rapid aging and with less 
potential for productivity catch-up. Th is chap-
ter outlines two of the main challenges: first, 
the potential pressure of old-age-related public 
expenditures on government finance, and sec-
ond, the concentration of saving, in terms of both 
amounts and rates, within a restricted segment of 
the population. 
Looming policy challenges with respect to 
government ﬁ nances include uncertainty about 
the rate at which old-age-related expenditure will 
increase and the lack of policy frameworks to deal 
with this long-term issue. As Heller (2003) clearly 
put it: “While budgets increasingly encompass a 
medium-term framework of three to ﬁ ve years, 
few countries provide long-term scenarios. . . . 
Most countries’ sustainability analyses focus on 
their ability to service current debt and antici-
pated future deﬁ cits. . . . Projections of broader 
ﬁ scal aggregates lack credibility, because they are 
based on unchanged policy assumptions, current 
laws, or constant shares of revenues and expendi-
ture in output. Budget processes also lack mecha-
nisms to foster debate on policy commitments 
or guarantees whose ﬁ scal consequences emerge 
only over the long term.” (emphasis added)
A fundamental policy choice with respect 
to the allocation of the burden of demographic 
change is about its distribution between future 
retirees and future workers. Th e menu of policy 
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 4. Th ere are, however, some empirical ﬁ ndings 
that are inconsistent with the life-cycle model: 
for example, preference for default saving plan 
options, demand for commitment devices that tie 
one’s hands in making saving decisions, and evi-
dence of habit formation in saving behavior (Atta-
nasio and Weber 2010).
 5. Detailed results are reported in online annex 1.5, 
and for a technical description of how the econo-
metric estimates are used in the CGE model, see 
online annex 1.6; all annexes are available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/CapitalForTh eFuture.
 6. “Conditional” in the sense that the relationship 
between saving rate and per capita income growth 
takes into account the eﬀ ects from other deter-
minants—in this speciﬁ c case: lagged saving, per 
capita GDP, ﬁ nancial development, aged depen-
dency ratio, social protection (and other controls 
as shown in speciﬁ cation S4 in online annex 
2.5)—whose contributions are held constant. 
 7. Th e UN’s high scenario estimates that the world 
population will reach 36.4 billion by 2300, and 
the low scenario estimates 2.3 billion.
 8. Th e global demographic transition is assumed to 
last three to four centuries. It started in Europe 
around 1700, and it will probably be complete for 
the whole world in 2100. Figure 2.12 thus depicts 
only a “snapshot” of about 60 years of this three- 
or four-century process.
 9. Note that the heterogeneity highlighted in ﬁ gure 
2.13 still masks the full heterogeneity because 
countries within each group diﬀ er in their demo-
graphic transition. In the case of high-income 
countries, there are sharp diﬀ erences between 
Europe and the United States. In the former, fer-
tility rates are quite below the replacement rate 
and net migration has been slow.
10. Th e dominance of the ﬁ nancial development 
eﬀ ect can also be veriﬁ ed by separately running 
the scenario with only the change in productivity 
or only the change in ﬁ nancial development (not 
reported, but available on request). Performing 
such a decomposition makes it clear that the eﬀ ect 
of a reduction in the saving rate in developing 
countries is, indeed, due primarily to more rapid 
ﬁ nancial development.
11. Economists have been interested in the relation-
ship between economic inequality and saving since 
the original observation of Kaldor (1957) that the 
rich should have a higher propensity to save than 
the poor, and thus higher inequality should have 
a positive eﬀ ect on saving. In fact, various post-
Keynesian models (Lewis 1954; Pasinetti 1962) 
and wealth may create inequality traps that have 
negative implications for economic mobility and 
thus for the political and social consensus essen-
tial for growth. In fact, the recent literature has 
emphasized other, more direct channels through 
which inequality may affect productivity and 
growth. A main lesson from this body of work 
(see World Bank 2005) is that in the highly 
imperfect markets of poor countries, individu-
als without enough wealth or social status would 
tend to underinvest or use their resources for 
some less productive purpose, reducing economy-
wide productivity. And the related broad policy 
advice has been to reduce the unequal access 
to finance. A simple initial step could include 
improving financial literacy: many households 
lack adequate knowledge and decision-making 
tools when it comes to credit markets. An inter-
esting example is oﬀ ered by a policy intervention 
in Mexico consisting of an information cam-
paign on how to use the banking system to chan-
nel remittances toward investment rather than 
immediate consumption. 
Th e chapter has also shown that consistently 
the least-educated groups have low or no savings, 
suggesting an inability to improve their earning 
capacity and, for the poorest, to escape a poverty 
trap. Leveling the playing ﬁ eld in terms of edu-
cation opportunities would thus have the added 
beneﬁ t of boosting private saving. 
Notes
 1. Note that for maximizing country coverage for 
comparison across time, the ﬁ gures in this para-
graph represent ratios of saving to gross domestic 
product (GDP). Following standard practice, the 
rest of the chapter uses ratios of saving to gross 
national income (GNI). 
 2. Undoubtedly, the composition of countries is not 
static over time, and the data reported generally 
use the maximum available sample coverage. How-
ever, these variations in the sample over time do 
not alter the main qualitative messages in the text.
 3. As discussed more extensively in relation to the 
scenarios of saving in the coming two decades, 
ﬁ nancial deepening is associated with lower rates 
of saving, which may also help explain why saving 
rates have tended to stay low in Latin American 
countries.
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earnings in the economy and no economywide 
net savings. However, if the population is expand-
ing, the total amount of saving by the young will 
be larger than the total amount of dissaving by 
the elderly. Similarly, even if the population shares 
of savers and dissavers are constant, growth in 
income (per capita) implies that the working-age 
population has a higher lifetime income and that 
the economy will accumulate more wealth than 
that held by the elderly. Th us, the saving rate rises 
as population or income (or both) grow.
15. Th e fact that the lines representing these educa-
tion proportions for the various cohorts tend to 
be quite ﬂ at means that as cohorts proceed along 
their life cycles, their composition in terms of edu-
cation does not change much. 
16. Note that this long-term trend is captured by the 
cohort eﬀ ect given the estimation restrictions 
imposed on the time dummies, as these sum to 
zero and are orthogonal to a time trend and thus 
they pick up deviations from a long stable trend.
17. Income is more likely to be underestimated for 
poor households because of greater informal and 
in-kind components, thus biasing imputed saving 
downward for these households. Underestimation 
could also arise from temporary ﬂ uctuations in 
income; temporary low-income levels in a cross-
section would correspond to negative saving rates.
18. For Ghana, Mexico, Russia, and Th ailand as a 
group, the share of households with a head with 
tertiary education has risen from 6–10 percent of 
the total in the 1980s or early 1990s to 20–25 per-
cent in the late 2000s.
19. Th is is consistent with ﬁ ndings in the literature. 
For example, López-Calva and Lustig (2010) show 
that a large part of the recent reduction of inequal-
ity in Latin America is due to the entry of a greater 
number of educated people into the labor market 
and the related reduction of skill premia in wages.
20. Th e vertical distance between cohorts—in this case, 
the diﬀ erence in household sizes for two cohorts at 
the same age—cannot always be interpreted as a 
pure cohort eﬀ ect. Because cohorts are observed at 
the same age but in diﬀ erent time periods, the verti-
cal distance may be due to a year eﬀ ect. However, 
it may be diﬃ  cult to justify that year eﬀ ects are 
important for a variable such as household size (or 
number of children). Th erefore, in this speciﬁ c case, 
the vertical distances can be assumed to represent 
the cohort eﬀ ect. 
21. Th e general equilibrium model includes govern-
ment saving; however, consistent with its long-run 
nature, it assumes that each government’s deﬁ cit 
stress the link between the functional distribution 
of income and saving. Th ese models conclude that 
redistribution (for example, via diﬀ erential tax 
rates) toward proﬁ ts from wages should increase 
saving because capitalists tend to have higher 
propensities to save than workers. More recent 
research has focused on the personal distribution 
of income, but empirical analyses have not yet 
found a signiﬁ cant relationship between income 
inequality and saving (see Leigh and Posso 2009 
for a recent example). 
12. Th ese micro decisions can sometimes be aggre-
gated to create a representative household within 
an economy. In these cases, an aggregate “macro” 
approach and a “micro” approach provide the same 
type of results and could be used interchangeably. 
But this is not always possible, and, for the many 
cases where there is an “aggregation problem,” 
these two approaches provide diﬀ erent and com-
plementary insights. Th is problem exists whenever 
the aggregate agents’ behavior, such as aggregate 
private demand, cannot be “treated as if it were 
the outcome of the decision of a single maximizing 
consumer” (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, 148). 
Th e conditions for aggregation are quite severe and 
break down easily in the presence of discontinui-
ties and nonlinearities. Consider, for example, the 
case of participation in the labor market. Th eory 
says that participation should increase with the 
wage rate. At the micro level, this can be obtained 
as increasing hours for an already employed indi-
vidual or as the entrance in the market of some-
one who was not working. Th e eﬀ ects, in terms 
of income distribution, may be very diﬀ erent in 
these two cases. However, at the macro level, it is 
impossible to model these two alternatives with an 
aggregate representative worker (even if the num-
ber of representative workers is greatly increased). 
And comparable cases, where aggregation condi-
tions do not hold, arise in almost all markets with 
imperfection and asymmetric information: goods, 
credit, education, and others. 
13. Note that this simulated growth rate approximates 
the growth rate of the rapid convergence scenario 
of the global general equilibrium model described 
in the macroeconomic projection section. 
14. In the simplest version of the life-cycle model, 
consumption-smoothing individuals save during 
their working years to purchase assets that they 
will sell later in life to ﬁ nance consumption (in 
other words, they dissave later in life). Without 
income or population growth, the model predicts 
that there will be a constant ratio of wealth to 
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30. For an example of methodology for estimating 
the scope for cutting non-age-related expenditures 
(applied to European countries), see Heller and 
Hauner (2006).
31. Baldacci et al. (2010) ﬁ nds that for OECD coun-
tries from 1990 to 2008, an increase in social 
security spending of 1 percent of GDP reduced 
household saving by 0.22 to 0.29 percent of GDP, 
and an increase in public health spending of 1 per-
cent of GDP reduced household saving by 0.70 to 
0.78 percent of GDP (evaluated at the respective 
sample means). Chou, Liu, and Hammitt (2006) 
ﬁ nd a qualitatively similar impact of public health 
care provision in Taiwan, exploiting the natural 
experiment of an expansion of public health insur-
ance coverage.
32. Although there are many factors behind high sav-
ing in China, Chamon and Prasad (2010) identify 
the rising private burden of education and health 
care expenditures, and increased precautionary 
saving, as important drivers of a 7 percentage 
point increase in the urban household saving rate 
between 1995 and 2005.
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3
Capital Flows in the 
Third Age of Financial Globalization
CO M I N G  C H A N G E S  I N  T H E  patterns of investment and saving, as described in the ﬁ rst two chapters of this 
report, raise several imperative questions. Should a 
shortage of saving be anticipated at the global level, 
which would push up yields on investment? Or, on 
the other hand, will the future bring a global excess 
of saving and a lack of investment opportunities 
that can return current yields? Similar questions 
can be asked at the country level, but the analysis 
is more complicated. In a speciﬁ c country, future 
domestic saving might be suﬃ  cient to ﬁ nance all 
investment opportunities at current yields, but this 
domestic saving might also be invested abroad, and 
foreign saving may ﬂ ow into the country as well. 
What are the resulting net capital ﬂ ows, and what 
are the pressures on yields in individual countries? 
Th is chapter not only addresses all of these perti-
nent questions, but also goes beyond them to cover 
what may be the most dominant trend in interna-
tional ﬁ nance in the coming decades: the increase 
in gross capital ﬂ ows and the role of developing 
countries in that process. 
What the analysis in this chapter ﬁ nds is that 
developing countries will become more impor-
tant as both sources and destinations of capital 
through 2030, and for the first time in history 
they seem poised to play a signiﬁ cant role in global 
intermediation of capital. In tracing the potential 
path of capital ﬂ ows across borders through 2030, 
this chapter focuses on the interplay of three 
key long-term structural forces: economic con-
vergence, demographic transition, and ﬁ nancial 
globalization. Policy choices at the national and 
international levels, of course, will aﬀ ect the speed 
and intensity of these forces on global capital 
ﬂ ows, chief among them the management of what 
Global Development Horizons (GDH) identiﬁ es as 
the Th ird Age of Financial Globalization, when 
developing economies will become much more 
deeply integrated into the fabric of global ﬁ nance 
and will account for a growing share of the world’s 
gross capital inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows. Th is age fol-
lows two previous eras: the first era was domi-
nated by Great Britain through the 1930s, and the 
second, which began after World War II and now 
appears to be concluding, has been dominated by 
the United States (box 3.1).
Relative to their contribution to global output 
and trade, emerging and developing economies 
historically have accounted for a much smaller 
share of activity in global ﬁ nance. In recent years, 
developing countries have accounted for 30 per-
cent of world production and trade and more 
than half of global growth but only 22 percent 
of the world’s capital market capitalization of 
$49.5 trillion, merely 8 percent of gross capital 
ﬂ ows, and 9.6 percent of global external assets. 
Of the 25 banks that set the London interbank 
oﬀ ered rate (LIBOR) based on their costs of bor-
rowing in one or more of the 10 currencies cov-
ered by the measure, not a single bank is based 
in a developing country. Even after the surge 
of cross-border capital f lows in the 1990s and 
2000s, global investors’ exposure to developing 
countries remains limited relative to their expo-
sure to developed countries. No emerging-market 
currency is used internationally to a signiﬁ cant 
extent. But all these statistics may change consid-
erably through 2030.
The defining aspect of the Third Age of 
Financial Globalization will be a change in the 
dynamics of global capital f lows. Because the 
relevance of capital f lows extends well beyond 
the balance of a country’s borrowing or lend-
ing captured by net inf lows or outf lows, the 
approach taken in this chapter is to examine the 
future paths of both gross ﬂ ows and net ﬂ ows. 
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As developing countries’ volumes of gross inﬂ ows 
and outﬂ ows expand in the future, the potential 
benefits to these countries are significant: the 
diversiﬁ cation of idiosyncratic national risks, the 
imposition of greater market discipline on policy 
making, the opportunity to supplement domes-
tic saving in ramping up fixed investment and 
growth, and the promotion of financial sector 
competitiveness. 
Realization of these outcomes could be partic-
ularly valuable for developing countries with rela-
tively young populations and signiﬁ cant potential 
for economic convergence with the developed 
world. But the potential risks involved—par-
ticularly with developing countries’ absorption 
of large amounts of capital inﬂ ows—cannot be 
overlooked. Exchange rate appreciation (and thus 
decreased trade competitiveness), the formation of 
asset bubbles, and economic overheating have all 
been problematic in the past. A potential reversal 
in capital inﬂ ows can also have detrimental eﬀ ects. 
Designing policy frameworks at the national and 
international levels that take into consideration all 
of these potential beneﬁ ts and risks will become 
more urgent as the amount of capital moving 
across borders rises in the decades ahead.
During the First Age of Financial Globalization, starting 
in the second half of the 19th century, large amounts 
of capital were directed from European countries to 
the New World, mostly for investment in railways, real 
estate, and large-scale agricultural projects (Obstfeld 
and Taylor 2003). By the start of World War I in 1914, 
more than one-quarter of British wealth was invested 
outside of Great Britain, mainly in foreign government 
securities and railroads (Gilpin 1987). In 1913, almost 
half of Argentine and one-fifth of Australian capi-
tal stock was owned by foreign investors in Europe 
(Taylor 1992). This age wound down as European 
countries dramatically reversed their nondefense 
capital outﬂ ows during World War I, eventually giving 
way to the Bretton Woods arrangements shortly after 
World War II.
As noted by several observers of international mon-
etary affairs, the Bretton Woods Agreement gave pri-
ority to multilateral trade expansion and investment at 
the expense of ﬁ nancial liberalization. To the extent that 
private capital moved across borders in the post–World 
War II era, it was conﬁ ned to the foreign currency busi-
ness of major banks, largely in the form of trade ﬁ nanc-
ing and payment services.
Progress toward full capital market liberalization 
among developed countries took a large step forward in 
the post–Bretton Woods period, which may be regarded 
as the Second Age of Financial Globalization (Bordo and 
Eichengreen 2003). Obligations under the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Code 
of Liberalization were broadened to include virtually all 
capital movements, including short-term transactions 
by enterprises and individuals. Rapid globalization in the 
ﬁ nancial industry in the 1990s and 2000s brought even 
more dramatic change to the landscape of the global 
ﬁ nancial system, not only encouraging steep increases 
in cross-border capital ﬂ ows as money market instru-
ments, forwards, swaps, and other derivatives were 
created, but also allowing developing countries to be 
integrated into the global ﬁ nancial system in earnest. 
At present, the world appears to be in a transition 
into a Third Age of Financial Globalization. The begin-
nings of this shift would likely have occurred in the 
early 2000s as developing countries became more 
integrated into the global ﬁ nancial system and capital 
inﬂ ows to them became signiﬁ cant in absolute terms 
for the ﬁ rst time. The trend became more noticeable 
during the global ﬁ nancial crisis, when gross inﬂ ows 
of capital to developing countries declined much 
less than inﬂ ows to advanced countries, after having 
increased more rapidly on an annual basis over 2003–
07. Scenarios for gross capital ﬂ ows produced for this 
chapter indicate that developing countries will likely 
account for a steadily increasing share of inﬂ ows in the 
future—a continuation of the trend that began in the 
precrisis years.
BOX 3.1 The Third Age of Financial Globalization follows two previous eras
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Several key messages emerge from the chapter:
• Investment demand and saving are likely to 
remain more or less in balance at the global 
level, causing no substantial changes in global 
rates of return over the coming decades. At 
the country level, however, trends in invest-
ment and saving may result in significant 
tensions and current account imbalances. At 
the global level, not only will returns stay 
relatively constant under the two scenarios 
considered, but global saving and invest-
ment relative to global gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) is also expected to be surpris-
ingly stable: the eﬀ ect of falling rates within 
countries will be oﬀ set by the rising share in 
the world economy of developing countries 
with relatively high saving and investment 
rates. At the country level, tensions exist for 
specific countries in terms of their excess 
demand for capital, relative to supply, at ini-
tial rates of return. Th ese tensions will put 
pressure on rates of return, attracting capital 
inﬂ ows and aﬀ ecting current account posi-
tions. Such tensions are more pronounced 
in the rapid convergence scenario. 
  Countries and regions with relatively 
young populations and those with the 
greatest scope for financial market devel-
opment—both of which tend to moderate 
saving and at the same time boost invest-
ment—have the greatest potential to expe-
rience increases in investment relative to 
domestic saving and net inﬂ ows of capital 
from abroad. For example, India and, on 
aggregate, Sub-Saharan Africa will run cur-
rent account deﬁ cits averaging 2.4 percent 
and 3.2 percent of GDP, respectively, over 
2010–30 under the gradual convergence 
scenario. The corresponding net capital 
inﬂ ows will not come primarily from the 
North but from newly industrialized East 
Asian countries, most notably China.
• Developing countries are poised to account for 
a growing share of global gross capital ﬂ ows 
in the decades ahead. Although establishing 
a picture of net capital ﬂ ows in the future 
offers important information about the 
path of balance-of-payments imbalances, 
from the perspective of financial market 
development and integration—and, cru-
cially, global f inancial stability—gross 
ﬂ ows are a much more relevant metric than 
net ﬂ ows. To complement the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE)-based scenar-
ios for saving, investment, and net capital 
ﬂ ows, this chapter builds a picture of gross 
capital f lows corresponding to the same 
gradual and rapid convergence scenarios. 
By 2030, gross capital inﬂ ows to develop-
ing countries will reach $6.2 trillion under 
the gradual convergence scenario (47 per-
cent of the global total) and more than 
$13 trillion under the rapid convergence 
scenario (60 percent), rising from $1.3 
trillion (23 percent of the global total) in 
2010.1 Th e increase will be driven by more 
rapid economic growth and slower popu-
lation aging in developing countries than 
in advanced countries, as well as by devel-
oping countries’ relatively greater scope 
for increasing openness and strengthening 
ﬁ nancial sector institutions. Th e seemingly 
large increase in the share of gross f lows 
destined for developing countries is not as 
dramatic when considered relative to out-
put, however: the scenario analysis fore-
sees gross inﬂ ows to developing countries 
of 6–11 percent of their GDP as of 2030. 
Th e previous all-time peak was 9 percent, 
in 2007. 
  Institutional improvement in developing 
countries, combined with greater perceived 
risk in high-income economies, is set to 
remove advanced countries’ monopoly on 
supplying high-quality liquid assets in the 
decades ahead. Encouraged by positive 
business environment changes, solid eco-
nomic growth, and demographic trends 
supportive of growing consumer demand 
in the long term, investors are showing 
increasing interest in developing countries 
far beyond the largest emerging markets.
• As developing countries become more deeply 
integrated into the global ﬁ nancial system and 
account for a larger share of the world’s gross 
capital flows, they will also have a greater 
impact on financial and monetary policy 
118 Capital Flows in the Third Age of Financial Globalization Global Development Horizons
• Policy makers will need to prepare for a greater 
role of capital markets in international ﬁ nan-
cial intermediation and promote the develop-
ment of domestic capital markets. Looking for-
ward, as gross capital inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows 
grow in scale, the composition of these ﬂ ows 
will become more important because dif-
ferent channels have diﬀ erent capacities for 
creating stabilizing or destabilizing condi-
tions in recipient countries. Globally, capital 
markets will likely intermediate an increas-
ing share of gross ﬂ ows in the future, and 
bank loans will account for less. Whether 
this will be good news for countries that 
currently receive most of their inﬂ ows in the 
form of bank loans remains to be seen; bank 
lending tends to be highly procyclical and 
generally less supportive of risk sharing than 
foreign direct investment (FDI) or equity 
portfolio investment (Brunnermeier et al. 
2012). In  middle-income countries, port-
folio investment has historically been even 
more volatile than bank lending, in rela-
tive terms (that is, adjusting for the smaller 
magnitude of this component of develop-
ing countries’ inﬂ ows) (World Bank 2012). 
Moreover, as households and ﬁ rms in devel-
oping countries increasingly demand not 
only greater access to credit but also greater 
choice and variety in financial assets and 
services, domestic financial markets will 
have to compete globally in terms of their 
structure and their depth. Although the 
many eﬀ orts under way to improve regula-
tion of the international banking sector will 
remain highly relevant, policies should also 
be prepared to accommodate—and in some 
cases actively promote—the development 
of domestic capital markets. At the same 
time, regulatory authorities in developing 
countries should monitor the composition 
of both capital ﬂ ows and domestic ﬁ nancial 
intermediation, and, more broadly, should 
develop regulatory institutions to be more 
forward-looking—ready to adapt to poten-
tially destabilizing changes in the composi-
tion of balance sheets and ﬁ nancial market 
innovations.
making. Because the use of international 
currencies in ﬁ nancial transactions extends 
beyond their home country borders, the 
monetary policies of the Euro Area and 
the United States currently have a dispro-
portionate eﬀ ect on global monetary con-
ditions and developing countries’ access to 
capital. Looking ahead, this suggests that 
developing countries may become increas-
ingly exposed to spillovers of Euro Area 
and U.S. monetary policy shocks as their 
international balance sheets grow. Th is out-
come is uncertain, however, considering 
that because developing countries account 
for a growing share of global capital ﬂ ows, 
their own monetary policies might have a 
greater impact on the world. Th is is a pos-
sibility for China, in particular. There is 
also the potential for greater regional mon-
etary policy spillover from large emerging 
economies such as Brazil and the Russian 
Federation. 
  For small and medium-size developing 
countries, a world in which China, the 
Euro Area, and the United States all have 
key international currencies could be sta-
bilizing in that they will be less affected 
by monetary policy spillovers from any 
one source. At the same time, as growing 
amounts of capital are transferred among 
developing countries, monetary policy 
coordination between developing countries 
will become more critical in promoting 
stable ﬁ nancial and macroeconomic con-
ditions among them. An increasing share 
of global ﬂ ows going to and from develop-
ing countries indicates that these countries 
should have a larger role in management 
of capital f lows within multilateral orga-
nizations as well as bilaterally. But, given 
that monetary policy coordination has 
never been perfectly feasible even among a 
small number of major players—and could 
become even more diﬃ  cult in an increas-
ingly multipolar world—second-best 
policy solutions at the national level may 
become increasingly crucial to stability as 
well.
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Th is report estimates each country’s yield to 
suppliers of capital as the marginal product of 
reproducible capital, after adjusting for the rela-
tive price of capital to consumption goods and 
depreciation.5 By this measure, the average yield 
in developing countries for 2007 was 12.4 per-
cent, compared with 5.3 percent in high-income 
countries.6 Of course, the true extent of diﬀ er-
ences in yields across countries remains an open 
question, and an important one. Steps toward 
resolving this question can shed light on a wide 
range of policy questions, such as the potential 
for oﬃ  cial aid ﬂ ows to stimulate growth, eﬀ ects 
of political instability on investment, and the role 
of policies designed to spur human capital accu-
mulation and knowledge spillovers in driving 
investment and growth.
There will not be much pressure 
on global rates of return to 
investment
Saving and investment are set to remain more or 
less in balance at the global level, so there will not 
be signiﬁ cant pressure on equilibrium yields. Th e 
global saving rate can be expected to hold more 
or less steady over the next two decades. Th is is 
because, at least up to 2020, acceleration of eco-
nomic growth in developing countries will mod-
erate the negative impacts of aging and ﬁ nancial 
market development on developing countries’ 
saving rates, so that they tend to fall only mod-
erately. More important, the eﬀ ect of falling sav-
ing rates across countries on the global aggregate 
saving rate will be oﬀ set by the growing weight of 
relatively high-saving developing countries in the 
world economy.
To compare trends in demand for capital to 
trends in its supply, a measure of investment 
demand must be constructed that is indepen-
dent of yields. Th is measure—“notional” demand 
for investment—reﬂ ects the level of investment 
that producers desire, at a given ﬁ xed yield.7 Of 
course, at the global level the quantity of invest-
ment demanded is ultimately determined by the 
supply of saving, with yields adjusting so that the 
two are equal.
Rates of return around the world 
It has long been argued that large diﬀ erences in 
output per worker across countries imply simi-
larly large diﬀ erences in capital-labor ratios and 
thus higher returns to capital in developing coun-
tries than in high-income countries. Th is result 
came to be viewed as something of a puzzle, with 
a number of hypotheses competing to explain 
why, given high rates of return to capital, invest-
ment is not much greater in the developing world 
or, alternatively, why returns are not in fact higher 
in developing countries despite lower capital 
stocks. Th is question was articulated most nota-
bly by Lucas (1990), who argued that accounting 
for disparate endowments of complementary fac-
tors, in particular human capital, goes a long way 
toward resolving the puzzle.2 Some other poten-
tially relevant factors are political risk and barri-
ers to capital ﬂ ows.
Empirically, the evidence on cross-country 
diﬀ erences in returns is mixed. Observed interest 
rates tend to be signiﬁ cantly higher in develop-
ing countries, but these rates depend on default 
risk and, in some cases, on ﬁ nancial repression, 
both of which are not straightforward to quan-
tify but almost certainly tend to have a greater 
impact on interest rates in developing countries 
than in advanced ones.3 Th e underlying return to 
capital is not directly observable, and alternative 
assumptions upon which its measurement can be 
based produce widely varying estimates. Gollin 
(2002) made an important advance in attempting 
to account for self-employment income, which is 
often incorrectly counted as capital income and is 
important for cross-country comparisons because 
self-employment typically constitutes a greater 
share of economic activity in developing coun-
tries than in developed ones. Caselli and Feyrer 
(2007) extended this line of reasoning to land 
and natural resources and used estimates of the 
stocks of these other factors to measure the return 
to reproducible capital distinctly from the income 
that should be attributed to them. Th is greatly 
reduces the variation in returns across countries 
because land and natural resources tend to play a 
larger role in production in developing countries 
than in developed countries.4
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demand for investment exceeds notional supply, 
therefore signaling a tension in favor of higher 
yields. However, the excess demand is modest 
and decreasing over time, hence yields in India 
between 2010 and 2030 remain fairly stable, at 
around 10 percent. Th e current account deﬁ cit 
for India—and hence capital inﬂ ows—likewise 
remains fairly stable, at around 2 percent of GDP.
Th e excess demand for investment is slightly 
higher for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
trending upward; this leads to a small increase in 
yields (by close to one percentage point over two 
decades), to around 13 percent. Were saving to 
remain unchanged, this would imply a worsening 
current account deﬁ cit over time; however, ris-
ing African saving actually oﬀ sets the increasing 
excess demand, resulting in an improvement in 
the current account (which nevertheless remains 
in slight deﬁ cit for the entire projection horizon).
It is also illuminating to contrast these coun-
tries’ experiences in the rapid convergence sce-
nario, where brisk growth has a disproportion-
ate eﬀ ect on the demand for, relative to supply 
of, capital. In this scenario, for the case of India, 
excess demand remains high throughout the 
projection period. Th is induces a more substan-
tial increase in yields, by almost two percentage 
points. Th is increase attracts more capital inﬂ ows 
and, as a consequence, current account deﬁ cits in 
India rise from −2 percent to −6 percent of GDP. 
Sub-Saharan Africa, in the rapid convergence 
scenario, oﬀ ers the starkest example of how ten-
sions between notional investment demand and 
supply can affect the evolution of yields and 
resultant capital ﬂ ows. Here, excess demand for 
capital rises substantially throughout the 20-year 
period—the ratio of notional demand to supply 
rises by ﬁ ve percentage points—and the region’s 
yields reach 14 percent by 2030 (from slightly less 
than 15 percent). As a result, Sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole eventually runs current account deﬁ -
cits of almost 7 percent of GDP. 
Changing patterns in 
net capital ﬂ ows
Capital ﬂ ows, on a net basis, reﬂ ect the diﬀ erence 
between a country’s saving and investment; as 
In the scenario of gradual economic con-
vergence between the developed and develop-
ing worlds, global notional investment demand 
remains fairly close to global saving supply, 
which demonstrates that investment demand 
is not constrained by the availability of saving.8 
Consequently, the global average yield stays 
essentially constant in this scenario. In the rapid 
convergence scenario, however, rapid growth and 
financial development in the developing world 
results in faster global capital demand growth 
relative to saving supply, which translates to some 
moderate upward pressure on yields.9 Even in this 
scenario, however, the deceleration of labor force 
growth (and even shrinking labor forces in some 
parts of the world) will mean that global invest-
ment will not be constrained by the supply of sav-
ing much more severely than it is today.10
The evolution of returns to 
capital at the country level has 
implications for net capital ﬂ ows
At the country level, to better understand the 
forces that are shaping the direction of yields to 
capital, it is useful to conduct a thought experi-
ment where not only the ex ante notional demand 
is estimated but also the ex ante notional supply. 
Th is will allow one to identify whether the demand 
for capital—at a ﬁ xed yield—is met by a supply 
of investment ﬁ nancing at the same ﬁ xed rate. If 
notional demand exceeds supply, for instance, 
there will be pressure for the rate of return to rise; 
the observed ex post rate of return is a reﬂ ection, in 
equilibrium, of the easing of such tensions, if any, 
between notional demand and supply of capital.
In the gradual convergence scenario, invest-
ment demand in most economies remains fairly 
muted, which translates to a fairly stable path 
for yields between 2014 and 2030 (figure 3.1, 
panel a). Th ere is greater heterogeneity in invest-
ment demand in the rapid convergence scenario, 
with certain economies experiencing signifi-
cant increases in capital demand; this results in 
sharply rising yields over the next 15 years in 
some countries (ﬁ gure 3.1, panel b), in contrast to 
global average yields.
Consider, for example, the case of India in 
the gradual convergence scenario. Here, notional 
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ﬁ nancial market development has the potential 
to reduce many develo ping countries’ current 
account surpluses (or raise their deﬁ cits). China 
is a special case, facing relatively severe aging but 
also having less scope for a rapid expansion in 
credit, so that investment will likely fall at least 
as much as saving in the years ahead. To put the 
scenarios in context, box 3.2 provides a brief look 
at the historical record of shifts in the global pat-
tern of net capital ﬂ ows.
The evolution of net capital ﬂ ows 
depends on the paths of growth 
and ﬁ nancial market development
The configurations of which countries are net 
importers or exporters of capital will continue 
to shift in the future.12 Under the gradual con-
vergence scenario, developing countries’ sav-
ing rates will tend to fall somewhat because of a 
such, the disparities in levels of saving and invest-
ment within individual economies through 2030 
described in chapters 1 and 2 naturally imply the 
continued movement of capital across borders 
over that period (as detailed in online annex 3.2). 
In the decades ahead, ﬁ nancial markets in devel-
oping countries will become considerably deeper, 
more sophisticated, and more integrated region-
ally and globally; these countries will tend to face 
better growth prospects than advanced econo-
mies; and the timing of demographic change 
will vary widely across countries. Th ese will be 
the key drivers of changes in the global pattern 
of net capital f lows and net international asset 
positions.11 
Investment may be spurred by lower transac-
tion costs in credit markets—for example, from 
more eﬃ  cient collateralization—and at the same 
time, greater access to credit will tend to reduce 
saving. Taken together, these eﬀ ects mean that 
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FIGURE 3.1 Changes in yields are more muted under the gradual convergence scenario 
than under rapid convergence
Source: World Bank calculations.
Note: This report estimates each country’s yield to suppliers of capital as the marginal product of reproducible capital, after adjusting for the rela-
tive price of capital to consumption goods and depreciation. Yields are reported for 2014 (the ﬁ rst year where the model attains potential GDP) and 
2030 (the end of the projection period). Gradual and rapid convergence refer to the relative pace of projected convergence between developed and 
developing economies in terms of productivity growth and structural changes. 
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Between 1850 and 1929, Great Britain was a net pro-
vider of capital to the rest of the world, on the order 
of about 3.5 percent of its GDP annually and as much 
as 8–9 percent in some years (ﬁ gure B3.2.1, panel a), 
ﬁ rst by running a trade surplus as a major exporter 
of goods such as textiles, and later because repatri-
ated earnings from overseas investments more than 
compensated for a declining trade balance. Following 
World War I, the United States gradually took over 
that mantle, running an annual balance-of-payments 
surplus of 1.9 percent in the interwar period and again 
through most of the post–World War II period until the 
mid-1970s. Japan and Germany became net lenders 
of signiﬁ cance in the 1980s. 
More recently, the global pattern of balances of 
payments has undergone yet another transformation. 
Newly industrialized East Asian economies (particularly 
China since around 2000), together with major oil 
exporters, have become significant net providers of 
capital to the rest of the world, with the United States 
and a diverse group of Latin American, African, and 
peripheral European economies serving as the pri-
mary recipients of that capital (figure B3.2.1, panel 
b). There has been much debate over the causes, 
consequences, and sustainability of large balance-of-
payments positions (see, for example, Blanchard and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2010; Lin and Dailami 2010; Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy 2009; Chinn and Ito 2007; and 
Obstfeld and Rogoff 2007). But to the extent that such 
positions are believed to be destabilizing to the global 
economy, any sustainable long-run rebalancing must 
address underlying cross-country variations in incen-
tives for investment and saving behavior.
BOX 3.2  Historically, the dominant net providers and recipients of capital have 
not been ﬁ xed
FIGURE B3.2.1 Net capital outﬂ ows (current account), the United Kingdom and the United 
States, 1850–1945 (panel a) and evolution of the global pattern of current account balances, 
1980–2010 (panel b)
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in Jones and Obstfeld 2001 and the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
a. Major oil exporting countries, as deﬁ ned by the IMF (International Monetary Fund), are Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela.
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As discussed in chapter 2, under this scenario, 
aging and financial development lead to a fall 
in China’s saving rate of roughly 7 percentage 
points, from 52 percent of GDP in 2010 to 45 
percent in 2030. However, China’s investment 
rate will decline even further, falling from 48 
percent to 37 percent over the same period. Th e 
scenario analysis implicitly accounts for a transi-
tion from heavy state involvement in investment 
decisions to a more market-driven structure of 
investment in China.13 At the same time, steadily 
rising wages will result in a steep decline in its 
rental-wage ratio, rendering returns in China 
relatively less competitive, and this manifests in 
the investment rate falling from its very high his-
torical levels, although it remains high by inter-
national standards. The net result will be that 
China maintains its role as a signiﬁ cant exporter 
of capital to the rest of the world.
Under the rapid convergence scenario, because 
of steady credit growth, saving rates in developing 
countries will be lower in the future. Conversely, 
their investment rates will fall only margin-
ally, sustained by institutional development and 
combination of aging and moderate but steady 
f inancial market development. At the same 
time, investment will slow because of a moder-
ate slowdown in growth. For most developing 
countries, these two effects will roughly can-
cel out and have fairly little impact on current 
accounts. Excluding China, the developing world 
will, on aggregate, maintain a moderate, gradu-
ally attenuating deﬁ cit between 2015 and 2030 
(ﬁ gure 3.2, panel a). For example, India and, on 
aggregate, Sub-Saharan Africa will follow this 
pattern, being fairly early in their demographic 
transitions and having signiﬁ cant scope for ﬁ nan-
cial market development. Brazil will ﬁ t this pat-
tern for most of the projection period as well, but, 
facing more severe aging, its deﬁ cit will level oﬀ  
and then begin to rise slightly in the mid- to late 
2020s. Net capital ﬂ ows from China to advanced 
countries, on the other hand, will increase sub-
stantially, leveling oﬀ  after reaching 6–7 percent 
of China’s GDP (ﬁ gure 3.2, panel b); the ﬂ ows 
will represent a rising share of high-income coun-
tries’ output because these economies will expand 
relatively more slowly than China. 
FIGURE 3.2 In the gradual convergence scenario, there will be sizable net capital ﬂ ows 
from China to high-income countries
Source: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database.
Note: Net capital ﬂ ows are reported as the current account position, with surpluses indicative of capital outﬂ ows. The current account positions for 
the two groups do not exactly offset because they are computed as a share of each respective group’s output. It is also well known that historical 
data on current account balances do not generally sum to zero at the global level, as required by theory, because of measurement problems.
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policy community: how to manage China’s cur-
rent account surplus. Some reduction in China’s 
surplus should be desirable for the country, at 
least to the extent that surpluses are the result of 
domestic distortions such as lack of social protec-
tion and weak corporate governance.16 Beneﬁ ts to 
China include regaining monetary independence 
through reducing reserve accumulation, smooth-
ing international relations, and improving global 
ﬁ nancial stability. At the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that a rapid reduction in China’s 
reserve accumulation has the potential to destabi-
lize the global ﬁ nancial system; thus, the timing 
and speed of adjustment are important.
But this result also highlights a caveat that 
must be made to the approach taken to gener-
ate these two scenarios. The determinants of 
investment and saving in the model were selected 
because they tend to be important across coun-
tries, and the sensitivity of saving and investment 
to these factors is assumed to be the same across 
countries (online annexes 1.6 and 2.6). This 
approach may miss some idiosyncratic factors 
that inﬂ uence saving and investment behavior, 
and thus net capital ﬂ ows, in any particular coun-
try. Given the institutional and policy challenges 
robust productivity growth. The resulting out-
come is a channeling of much of the world’s sav-
ing to the developing world. However, there will 
be a widening imbalance between China and 
other developing countries, with most developing 
countries running gradually increasing deﬁ cits 
(figure 3.3).14 Relative to the gradual scenario, 
China’s current account surplus will evolve more 
gradually, with smaller net ﬂ ows to high-income 
countries due to relatively less attractive invest-
ment opportunities there, in a world in which 
global growth is driven almost entirely by the 
developing world.15
Scenarios of China’s current 
account balance highlight looming 
policy challenges
Under the two scenarios explored in this report, 
China will run large current account surpluses 
over the next two decades. Th is will ﬁ nance invest-
ment mainly in high-income countries in the 
gradual convergence scenario and mainly in devel-
oping countries in the rapid convergence scenario. 
Th ese results highlight a major policy challenge 
faced by China and, indeed, by the international 
FIGURE 3.3 In the r apid convergence scenario, much of the developing world apart from 
China will be net capital importers
Source: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database.
Note: Net capital ﬂ ows are reported as the current account position, with surpluses indicative of net capital outﬂ ows.
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and social safety net measures such as pension 
and public health reforms have the potential to 
signiﬁ cantly reduce Chinese savings and exter-
nal imbalances, and these policy choices are only 
crudely captured by the scenario analysis.17 Of 
course, policy makers in deﬁ cit countries, par-
ticularly the United States, have a role to play in 
resolving global imbalances as well.18
Expanding volumes of gross 
capital ﬂ ows to and from 
developing countries
Although the scenarios for the path of net capital 
ﬂ ows oﬀ er important information on the extent 
of balance-of-payments imbalances in the decades 
ahead, assessing net capital f lows alone over-
looks important monetary and ﬁ nancial stabil-
ity aspects of transferring capital across national 
borders. From the perspective of assessing these 
issues, measuring gross capital ﬂ ows—along with 
the composition of those ﬂ ows—is more informa-
tive than looking at net balances. 
Furthermore, the impact of ﬁ nancial market 
development on developing countries’ volumes of 
gross inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows is quite distinct from 
its impact on the net balance between the two. 
Although greater access to ﬁ nance has the poten-
tial to both stimulate investment and reduce sav-
ing, thus narrowing current account balances, 
development and integration of developing 
countries’ ﬁ nancial markets can be expected to 
expand gross ﬂ ows signiﬁ cantly and to potentially 
alter the composition of capital ﬂ ows as well. An 
expansion of developing countries’ gross capital 
ﬂ ows will also be driven by relatively favorable 
demographic conditions for attracting foreign 
investment as well as by healthy productivity 
improvements and growth. A country’s pace of 
growth and path of ﬁ nancial market development 
and integration depend on institutional change 
and policy choices—a range of possibilities high-
lighted by considering alternative scenarios of 
how these variables may evolve in the future and 
the corresponding paths of gross capital ﬂ ows.
International ﬁ nancial integration is reﬂ ected 
by growth in both inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows of capi-
tal as investors at home and abroad diversify and 
faced by China in the context of its atypical eco-
nomic system, such idiosyncratic factors might be 
especially important there, which deserves special 
mention because of the country’s size and global 
economic inﬂ uence.
In the context of investment rates moderat-
ing to more sustainable levels, current account 
imbalances can only be resolved by implementing 
policies to bring saving down more quickly than 
it would fall from demographic change alone. 
One policy avenue is institutional reform to pro-
mote broad-based ﬁ nancial market development. 
Most developing countries will experience a faster 
decline in saving rates than investment rates in 
the rapid convergence scenario because of credit 
growth, as discussed earlier, but China will sus-
tain its surplus under this scenario. 
This result for China is observed chief ly 
because the country starts out with a high initial 
ratio of credit to GDP and thus has less room for 
convergence. Domestic credit to the private sector 
as a share of GDP, a standard aggregate measure 
of ﬁ nancial sector development, was 130 percent 
of GDP in China in 2010, well above the aver-
age of 73 percent for middle-income countries 
(World Bank World Development Indicators 
database) and implying that China already has a 
highly developed ﬁ nancial sector. In Tunisia and 
Uruguay, also middle-income countries, domes-
tic credit extended to the private sector was 69 
percent and 22 percent of GDP, respectively. Th e 
situation in China is considerably more nuanced 
than this one metric indicates, however. On an 
index of household access to financial services 
developed by Honohan (2008), for example, 
China scored 42 out of a possible 100, the same 
as Tunisia and Uruguay. Financial underdevel-
opment has been identiﬁ ed as one of the factors 
behind increases in China’s saving, as the need 
for credit-constrained households to save for big-
ticket items and precautionary motives increased 
as social safety nets shrank (Chamon and Prasad 
2010). On the corporate saving side, distortions 
such as barriers to competition, corporate gov-
ernance weaknesses, undertaxation, and advan-
tageous access to ﬁ nance for state-owned enter-
prises have led to high retained earnings (Lin 
and Dailami 2010). Institutional reforms of the 
corporate sector, ﬁ nancial market liberalization, 
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capital inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows has vastly exceeded 
the increase in their net counterparts (ﬁ gure 3.4). 
Initially, this was a high-income-country phe-
nomenon, visible in the takeoﬀ  in gross inﬂ ows to 
and outﬂ ows from those countries. Th e upward 
trend continued for two decades, so that from 
1990 to the peak in 2007, the sum of high-income 
countries’ gross capital inf lows and outf lows 
grew tenfold, compared with a less than fourfold 
increase in trade ﬂ ows (imports plus exports) and 
a less than two-and-a-half-fold increase in nomi-
nal GDP over that period.20 
Developing countries’ integration into the 
financial system during the 1990s remained 
quite modest relative to their economic size, per-
ceived investment opportunities, and engage-
ment in global trade. Evidence to this eﬀ ect can 
be observed in patterns of global capital ﬂ ows, in 
the role of developing-country banks and other 
ﬁ nancial institutions in the process of interna-
tional ﬁ nancial intermediation, and in developing 
countries’ capacity to inﬂ uence the rules of global 
finance. It was only during the expansionary 
years just prior to the global ﬁ nancial crisis that 
developing countries came to play a greater role 
in international ﬁ nancial intermediation and that 
gross inf lows to and outf lows from developing 
countries began to take oﬀ .21 By 2007, 11 percent 
their countries share risk. Greater gross f lows 
can mean more access to ﬁ nance for some types 
of investment projects because the composi-
tion of inf lows and outf lows tends to differ.19 
Th us, investment projects can go ahead despite 
residents’ relatively low tolerance for risk and 
without the country necessarily borrowing on 
net. Large amounts of gross ﬂ ows can be desta-
bilizing, though; cross-border banking ﬂ ows, in 
particular, are volatile and highly procyclical, 
potentially magnifying risk instead of spreading 
it (Brunnermeier et al. 2012). Given that volumes 
of gross capital ﬂ ows have been growing much 
more rapidly than net balances globally, and that 
the path of gross ﬂ ows is both an essential under-
pinning of investment and a potentially destabi-
lizing force with important policy implications, 
thinking about how gross ﬂ ows will evolve in the 
future is a valuable exercise.
Developing countries’ inﬂ ows and 
outﬂ ows of capital remain small 
relative to those of high-income 
economies, but they have begun 
to take off
Since the mid-1990s, ﬁ nancial globalization has 
meant that the signiﬁ cant expansion in total gross 
 FIGURE 3.4 Gross capital ﬂ ows have long expanded relatively faster than net ﬂ ows in high-
income economies, and in recent years a similar trend can be observed in developing economies
 Source: World Bank calculations using data in the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
Note: Current account surplus (deﬁ cit) is equal to the sum of current accounts across surplus (deﬁ cit) countries in each group, divided by the 
group’s GDP. Gross capital ﬂ ows are summed across all countries in each group, divided by the group’s GDP.
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provides structural support for cross-border capi-
tal movement in that capital tends to ﬂ ow out of 
countries with high saving rates.
One promising line of research views gross 
capital f lows from the perspective of interna-
tional trade in ﬁ nancial assets; as such, a coun-
try’s engagement in global finance depends on 
its residents’ demand for foreign assets as well as 
its capacity to supply assets with return and risk 
characteristics suﬃ  ciently appealing to foreign 
investors (Broner et al. 2013). Th us, gross capital 
ﬂ ows into and out of a country can be expected to 
be related not only to the country’s generation of 
proﬁ table investment opportunities but also to its 
level of ﬁ nancial market sophistication and global 
integration.23 
It has been a longstanding stylized fact 
that international portfolio diversification has 
occurred much less than implied by models of 
risk sharing unless they incorporate frictions such 
as asymmetric information or other sources of 
transaction costs.24 A reduction in these frictions 
would imply a large increase in gross ﬂ ows into 
and out of a given country, as domestic agents 
diversify by sending capital abroad and foreign 
agents diversify by sending capital in. Advanced 
countries seem to have been following this 
of gross global capital inﬂ ows went to developing 
countries, versus 4 percent in 2000.
Although the ﬁ nancial crisis brought on a dra-
matic downturn in the volume of global capital 
ﬂ ows, capital ﬂ ows to and from developing coun-
tries were much less affected during the crisis 
than f lows in and out of advanced countries.22 
Before the crisis, not only did high-income coun-
tries account for the great majority of both global 
gross inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows, but current account 
balances also constituted a much smaller share 
of gross ﬂ ows in high-income countries than in 
developing countries. Even as high-income coun-
tries’ ﬂ ows have recovered in the immediate post-
crisis years, developing countries’ share of global 
ﬂ ows is signiﬁ cantly greater than a decade ago, 
although still not commensurate with their share 
of global output, growth, and trade. International 
investment positions ref lect a large disparity in 
foreign asset holdings between advanced and 
developing countries as well (ﬁ gure 3.5).
Several ongoing trends will 
support a rapid expansion of 
capital ﬂ ows to developing 
countries in the future 
Rapidly growing economies attract increased 
capital ﬂ ows because that growth implies sizable 
investment opportunities and, often, improv-
ing creditworthiness and more opportunity for 
investment diversiﬁ cation. Stronger, more devel-
oped ﬁ nancial institutions, in particular, tend to 
allow developing countries to attract larger capi-
tal ﬂ ows. In terms of intermediation, although 
stock markets would need to be of some threshold 
size to attract institutional investors, the interna-
tionalization of the banking industry has been an 
important vehicle of information transmission 
for global investors (Portes and Rey 2005), in 
turn allowing a growing amount of capital to be 
directed to developing countries. 
Demographic conditions also matter: coun-
tries with a large share of working-age people 
tend to attract more capital inﬂ ows because of 
their relatively large labor pools and potential 
for high rates of productivity growth (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2002; Domeij and Flodén 2006, 
among others). Th e large diversity in the demo-
graphic conditions across the world, as well, 
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FIG URE 3.5 International investment positions still 
reﬂ ect a large disparity in foreign asset holdings between 
advanced and developing countries
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the IMF International Financial Statistics 
database. 
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lagged behind their shares of global output and 
trade. This line of reasoning is also consistent 
with the prospect that developing countries’ vol-
umes of capital ﬂ ows are set to accelerate.
The expansion of developing 
countries’ gross capital ﬂ ows will 
depend on the pace of growth and 
ﬁ nancial development
The econometric work underlying this report’s 
forecast of gross capital ﬂ ows is supportive of pre-
vious literature in that it ﬁ nds that higher levels 
of capital inﬂ ows—encompassing FDI, portfolio 
f lows, and bank lending—are associated with 
increasing ﬁ nancial development and openness 
(measured by domestic credit to the private sec-
tor as a percentage of GDP and the Chinn and 
Ito [2006] index of capital account openness, 
respectively) as well as with higher GDP growth, 
a lower dependency ratio, and global monetary 
conditions. Th is work provides the basis for two 
scenarios of projected gross inﬂ ows to 2030, cor-
responding to the gradual and rapid convergence 
scenarios presented in the previous two chapters 
(box 3.3 and online annex 3.4).
Under the gradual convergence scenario, 
global gross capital inﬂ ows will reach $13 tril-
lion in 2030 (ﬁ gure 3.7, panel a), with the share 
destined for developing countries rising to 47 
percent ($6.2 trillion). In the rapid convergence 
scenario, developing countries’ comparatively 
stronger growth and convergence with developed 
countries in terms of financial sector develop-
ment and globalization will contribute to a faster 
increase in the growth of capital ﬂ ows than in the 
first scenario. Global gross capital inf lows will 
reach nearly $22.6 trillion by 2030 in the rapid 
convergence scenario, with a larger share of the 
total (60 percent, or $13.5 trillion) expected to go 
to developing countries (ﬁ gure 3.7, panel b). 
One factor behind the increase in develop-
ing countries’ share of global gross ﬂ ows is sim-
ply the change in their relative size. Under the 
gradual scenario, gross inf lows to developing 
countries will change little relative to their output 
(ﬁ gure 3.8), so the increase in their share is due 
largely to their growing relative economic size, 
coupled with a moderate decline in high-income 
pattern at least until the onset of the global ﬁ nan-
cial crisis, as their ﬁ nancial markets integrated 
and gross ﬂ ows expanded rapidly. 
Th e relationship between gross ﬂ ows and over-
all development, proxied by per capita GDP, is 
also evident when the accumulation of gross ﬂ ows 
into stocks of international assets and liabilities 
is examined. As presented in ﬁ gure 3.6, the rela-
tionship between GDP per capita and external 
balances across countries is nonlinear: a 1 per-
cent difference between countries in GDP per 
capita corresponds to an increasingly large diﬀ er-
ence in external assets as a percentage of GDP as 
countries at higher levels of GDP per capita are 
compared.
Were countries to follow a similar curve over 
time (which is admittedly a strong assumption 
but makes for an interesting thought experiment), 
then developing countries would ﬁ rst move along 
the downward-sloping and relatively ﬂ at portions 
of the curve. Th is is consistent with the observa-
tion that these countries’ shares of gross capital 
ﬂ ows and international investment positions have 
FIGU RE 3.6 The relationship between GDP per capita 
and external balances across countries is nonlinear
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in the IMF International Financial Statistics and 
World Bank World Development Indicators databases.
Note: The external balance sheet is measured as total external assets plus total external 
liabilities, divided by two. Countries identiﬁ ed as offshore ﬁ nancial centers are excluded. On 
the horizontal axis, mid-points (of the log) of the 2011 World Bank income classiﬁ cation ranges 
are shown, where LIC denotes low-income, LMC lower-middle income, UMC upper-middle 
income, and HIC high income.
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capital inﬂ ows to developing countries is illus-
trated by the rapid convergence scenario. Here, 
the rise in gross capital inf lows to developing 
countries will outstrip economic growth, so that 
countries’ inﬂ ows as a share of output due to a 
slowdown in growth. 
Th e potential contribution of ﬁ nancial devel-
opment and integration to an expansion in gross 
The construction of gross capital inflow projections 
begins with the estimation of four specifications of 
a model capturing the determinants of gross capital 
inﬂ ows along ﬁ ve broad categories of explanatory vari-
ables. These categories include country-level demo-
graphic factors, country-level macroeconomic factors, 
country-level structural and institutional factors, global 
economic factors, and controls for global shocks over 
time and country and income group effects. The model 
is estimated for a large number of developing and devel-
oped countries using data for the period 1980–2010.
Using the results of the preferred specification 
of the model (column 4 in table 3A.1 of online annex 
3.3), forecasts of gross capital inﬂ ows to 172 countries 
through 2030 are constructed, treating developed and 
developing countries as distinct groups. The paths of 
the key explanatory variables correspond to the paths 
of these variables as assumed, or endogenously gen-
erated by the CGE model, in the two global scenarios 
(gradual convergence and rapid convergence) devel-
oped in chapters 1 and 2. The only exception is the 
measure of capital account openness, which is not a 
variable in the CGE model; scenario paths for capital 
account openness are built speciﬁ cally for the gross 
capital ﬂ ows projections.
Finally, estimates of gross capital outflows are 
inferred from the difference between gross inﬂ ows and 
net ﬂ ows (the current account). A full explanation of the 
variables, the modeling process, and the projection pro-
cess is presented in online annexes 3.3 and 3.4 .
BOX 3.3  Gross capital ﬂ ow scenarios are based on historical evidence on the 
relationship between the ﬂ ows and their determinants
FIGURE 3.7 By 2030, most gross capital ﬂ ows may go to developing countries
Source: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
Note: Inﬂ ows are depicted in nominal U.S. dollars, assuming a constant 3.5 percent world inﬂ ation rate that is based on the 2003–07 ﬁ ve-year aver-
age from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor database. Gradual and rapid convergence refer to projected scenarios concerning the relative 
pace of convergence between developed and developing economies in terms of productivity growth and structural changes. 
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Developing economies’ growing 
importance as sources and 
destinations of capital ﬂ ows will 
not be a BRICs story alone
Disaggregating the scenario results by country 
shows that China will be an important part of 
the story, but by no means will changing future 
patterns of capital ﬂ ows be a China story alone 
(figure 3.9), nor will it be a BRICs (Brazil, the 
Russian Federation, India, and China) story 
alone. Financial development and integration 
have the potential to boost gross capital f lows 
across the developing world. Sub-Saharan Africa, 
for example, can be expected to not only receive 
a growing volume of capital f lows, but also to 
attract an increasing share of total capital ﬂ ows to 
developing countries (box 3.4). Under the gradual 
convergence scenario, developing countries other 
than the BRICs will collectively account for 17 
percent of global gross inf lows in 2030 and 15 
percent of outﬂ ows. In this multipolar world, no 
single country will attract as great a share of global 
inﬂ ows as the Euro Area or the United States do 
today, not even China; small and medium-size 
developing countries will collectively matter much 
more in the global economy than they do today, 
particularly in terms of their role in the global 
ﬁ nancial markets and capital ﬂ ows.
On the other hand, by 2030, China may be 
as important a source of capital ﬂ ows as Europe 
and the United States are today. Under both the 
gradual and rapid convergence scenarios, China is 
expected to account for over 40 percent of global 
outﬂ ows in 2030.25 Th is will be driven mainly by 
its robust growth, greater integration with global 
ﬁ nancial markets, and signiﬁ cant current account 
surpluses stemming from its investment rate (cur-
rently very high) falling somewhat faster than its 
saving rate as wages rise (some details are pro-
vided in chapters 1 and 2).
 The composition of global 
capital ﬂ ows in terms of ﬁ nancial 
instruments may be poised for 
change
Financial market development and integration 
can be expected to affect the composition, as 
inﬂ ows reach 11 percent of their GDP in 2030, 
exceeding the level in 2007 (9 percent) when 
capital ﬂ ows peaked in the lead-up to the global 
financial crisis. This works together with their 
growing relative size to raise their share of global 
capital f lows substantially under this scenario, 
although it is still somewhat conservative relative 
to the growth rate of capital ﬂ ows to developing 
countries between 2000 and 2011 (represented by 
the linear trend line in ﬁ gure 3.8).
The likelihood of one scenario or the other 
playing out depends not only on several factors 
that are out of the hands of developing-country 
policy makers—such as global productivity 
advancements and demand for exports—but also 
on factors that are very much inﬂ uenced by policy 
at the national level. Th ese include (a) education 
reform; (b) eﬀ orts to reduce corruption, barriers 
to competition, and distortions in factor markets 
that limit the adoption of technologies and thus 
constrain economic growth; (c) policies to pro-
mote ﬁ nancial market development, along with 
complementary reform of regulatory institutions 
to limit volatility and risk and enhance corporate 
governance and transparency; and (d) trade and 
ﬁ nancial market integration.
FIGURE 3 .8 Relative to developing countries’ GDP, gross 
inﬂ ows may hold steady or trend upward, depending on 
the pace of growth and ﬁ nancial development
Source: World Bank projections, supplemented with data in the IMF International Financial 
Statistics database.
Note: Gradual and rapid convergence refer to projected scenarios concerning the relative 
pace of convergence between developed and developing economies in terms of productivity 
growth and structural change.
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changes in the composition of inﬂ ows thus may 
affect an economy’s exposure to exchange rate 
risk and monetary policy spillovers.26
There is widespread speculation that a larger 
percentage of the world’s capital f lows will be 
intermediated by capital markets in the future, 
implying that banking and FDI inﬂ ows will repre-
sent relatively less of the total. Th is is an uncertain 
outcome, however, considering that portfolio ﬂ ows 
currently make up a relatively small share of capital 
ﬂ ows into and out of developing countries and that 
these countries’ ﬂ ows can be expected to consti-
tute a growing share of global aggregate ﬂ ows in 
the future. But even if the predicted increase in 
the use of capital markets as a channel of ﬁ nan-
cial intermediation is not borne out globally, capi-
tal markets are likely to be increasingly important 
in developing countries as their ﬁ nancial markets 
mature, with the long-term eﬀ ect of developing-
economy convergence with advanced economies in 
terms of the composition of their capital inﬂ ows. 
Ultimately, the extent to which capital mar-
kets play a greater role in funding investment 
in these countries depends to some degree on 
policy choices. Historically, policies deliberately 
designed to promote FDI, such as tax incentives, 
well as the overall levels, of capital ﬂ ows. A brief 
examination of trends in recent decades shows 
long-standing differences in the composition 
of capital inf lows to developed countries ver-
sus developing countries. Developing countries 
receive mainly equity inf lows, while their out-
ﬂ ows are predominantly into relatively safe secu-
rities, meaning that a disproportionate amount of 
risk is borne abroad (compensated for by higher 
returns on these foreign liabilities than on foreign 
assets). Indeed, most capital inﬂ ows to develop-
ing countries were in the form of FDI during the 
1990s and early 2000s (ﬁ gure 3.10). Inﬂ ows to 
advanced countries were more diverse, with the 
lion’s share in the form of loans and portfolio 
investment. Th e pattern of inﬂ ows to developing 
countries changed somewhat in the 2000s, how-
ever, with loans representing a rising share.
Th e relative shares of FDI, bank lending, and 
portfolio investment in gross inﬂ ows have impor-
tant implications for macroeconomic stability 
and policy making; banking and portfolio ﬂ ows 
tend to be more procyclical and volatile than 
FDI. Currency denomination varies by compo-
nent as well. Because bonds are typically issued 
in only a handful of international currencies, 
FIGURE 3.9 Small and medium developing countries as well as the BRICs will be impor-
tant sources and destinations of capital ﬂ ows
Source: World Bank projections for 2030; World Bank calculations using data in the IMF International Financial Statistics database for 2010. 
Note: Gross capital ﬂ ows include portfolio, foreign direct investment, and banking transactions. Gradual and rapid refer to projected scenarios 
concerning the relative pace of convergence between developed and developing economies in terms of productivity growth and structural change. 
BRICs = Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China.
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Sub-Saharan Africa is poised to receive steadily 
increasing amounts of capital inﬂ ows over the next 
two decades. In the gradual convergence scenario 
presented in this chapter, gross capital inflows to 
the region will reach $254 billion in 2030 (figure 
B3.4.1), compared with $62 billion in 2012. As a 
share of gross inﬂ ows to developing countries, Sub-
Saharan Africa will rise from 5.4 percent in 2012 to 
8.2 percent in 2030 under the gradual convergence 
scenario. Although the share of developing-country 
inﬂ ows going to Sub-Saharan Africa is not expected 
to reach the peaks observed during periods of severe 
economic tension in recent years, it will remain well 
above the level observed during most of the 2000s.
The largest single stream of gross capital inﬂ ows 
to Sub-Saharan Africa is in the form of FDI, and much 
of this is directed to the natural resources sector—oil 
in Angola, Nigeria, and other West and Central African 
countries; copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Zambia; bauxite in Guinea; and natural gas in a 
number of countries. In recent years, the level of FDI 
inﬂ ows has been driven in part by the rapid expansion of 
large developing economies such as Brazil, China, and 
India. Notwithstanding the decline in the level of FDI 
inﬂ ows to Sub-Saharan Africa in the aftermath of the 
global ﬁ nancial crisis, the long-term expansion of the 
global economy and rich natural resource endowments 
of countries in the region are likely to keep Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s FDI inﬂ ows at robust levels in the years ahead. 
Guinea alone contains 26 percent of the world’s known 
bauxite reserves; the Democratic Republic of Congo 
accounts for 45 percent of cobalt reserves; Botswana, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa 
together represent 58 percent of industrial diamond 
reserves; and South Africa accounts for more than 95 
percent of platinum-group metals (USGS 2012). Strong 
global demand for energy indicates that international 
capital will continue to ﬂ ow to oil development projects, 
even in challenging governance environments such as 
that in South Sudan.
Although extractive industries are set to be an 
important target of capital inflows to Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the future, there are also signs of increasing 
investor interest in ﬁ nancing the infrastructure, retail, 
BOX 3.4  Encouraged by the continent’s growth prospects, demographic trends, 
and improved investment climate, global investors and creditors are 
increasingly attracted to Sub-Saharan Africa
FIGURE B3.4.1 Gross capital inﬂ ows to Sub-Saharan Africa will rise as a share of inﬂ ows to 
developing countries
Sources: World Bank projections, supplemented with calculations using data in the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
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and financial services sectors. Infrastructure financ-
ing is especially important because insufﬁ cient power 
generation, lack of basic water and sanitation systems, 
overcrowded urban roads, and inefﬁ cient ports pose 
major constraints to productivity and international trade 
in the region and have a significant impact on liveli-
hoods. Reversing these deﬁ ciencies will require sig-
niﬁ cant amounts of capital from domestic and foreign 
sources, but at the same time infrastructure improve-
ments promise to make doing business in Africa signiﬁ -
cantly easier.
Estimates produced for chapter 1 indicate that 
aggregate water and sanitation sector investment 
needs among Sub-Saharan African countries will rise 
from $2.2 billion in 2012 to $3.8 billion in 2030. This ﬁ g-
ure will be dwarfed by investment needs in the power 
sector, expected to nearly triple, from $4.9 billion to 
$13.8 billion, over the same years. Roads will require an 
estimated $11.2 billion of investment in 2030. Nigeria, 
with the region’s largest (and rapidly growing) popula-
tion, will require power sector investment of almost 
three-and-a-half times its 2012 level in 2030. Relatively 
rapid population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa means 
that infrastructure financing needs will grow faster 
than in other developing regions. At the same time, the 
growing proportion of global economic growth attribut-
able to developing countries suggests that other devel-
oping countries will be a key source of capital ﬂ ows to 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the decades ahead. China and 
India are already active investors in infrastructure proj-
ects and telecommunications projects in the region. 
Another driver behind the growth in capital inﬂ ows 
to Sub-Saharan Africa over the next two decades will 
be the region’s rising per capita incomes. The expec-
tation that Africa’s emerging middle class will support 
a range of consumer goods industries—processed 
food and beverages, ready-to-wear clothing, cosmet-
ics, household appliances, and home improvement—is 
increasingly becoming reality for multinational compa-
nies and retail banks, their conﬁ dence was bolstered 
by the very visible success of the mobile phone indus-
try on the continent. Just as important are key demo-
graphic statistics: 42 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans 
are under the age of 15, versus a range of 17 percent 
(Eastern Europe and Central Asia) to 32 percent (South 
Asia) in other developing regions. The large proportion 
of young people in Africa means that the region is at an 
advantage in terms of accumulating savings over the 
long term and in terms of having a large proportion of 
working-age population for decades to come. 
One clear signal of the world’s growing assurance 
of the power of the African consumer was Walmart’s 
$2.4 billion purchase of the South African retail giant 
Massmart in 2011. Although intraregional investment 
currently accounts for a small proportion of total FDI 
inﬂ ows—only 4 percent (in terms of value) of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions and greenfield FDI 
projects undertaken in Sub-Saharan African countries 
between 2003 and 2010 were funded by other coun-
tries in the region—such projects can help convince 
companies elsewhere in the world considering invest-
ing in Africa to move forward. Good examples include 
high-profile investments such as Mauritius-based 
SEACOM’s $600 million investment in an underwater 
ﬁ ber-optic cable that linked South Africa, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Kenya to Europe and South Asia in 2009. 
Ecobank, for another example, a bank operating in 
some 30 Sub-Saharan Africa countries, was among the 
top FDI investors in the region during 2003–11 (Ernst & 
Young 2012). 
Looking ahead, there may be an adjustment in the 
type of capital going to Sub-Saharan Africa. A long-
standing trend is that most capital inﬂ ows to the region 
have been in the form of FDI. But in recent years, 
access to bank lending and international bond markets 
has improved. Figure B3.4.2 tracks capital inﬂ ows in the 
form of cross-border bank loans, clearly depicting a ris-
ing trend. In 2007, the peak year for cross-border capi-
tal ﬂ ows, nine international syndicated loans of more 
than $1 billion went to borrowers in Angola, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, and South Africa in the retail, telecommuni-
cations, construction, oil, and mining industries. The 
lenders in these transactions are broadly based geo-
graphically. Despite dropping in 2008 in the face of 
the global ﬁ nancial turmoil, the volume of bank lend-
ing has increased in each subsequent year. Here, too, 
there is evidence of growing intraregional involvement: 
Standard Bank group, the largest commercial bank in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, was among the top three arrangers 
of syndicated loans in 2011 (Bloomberg 2012).
BOX 3.4 (continued)
(continued)
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and transaction costs.27 These constraints can 
generally be expected to relax as income levels 
rise, but these changes do involve shifts in policy. 
Policy makers should recognize that initiatives 
designed to deepen and better integrate ﬁ nancial 
have been one factor behind the predominance 
of FDI in inﬂ ows to the developing world, along 
with trade barriers, shallow financial markets, 
barriers to competition in the economy, and, at 
the broadest level, informational asymmetries 
a. For all three of the regions mentioned, the ﬁ gure does not include countries classiﬁ ed as high-income by the World Bank. Thus, for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Equatorial Guinea is excluded.
BOX 3.4 (continued)
Raising capital on international bond markets has 
also become a possibility for some African countries. 
The governments of Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, 
and the Seychelles raised a total of $3.18 billion on 
international bond markets between 2006 and 2011. 
Though few corporations based in the region have 
access to markets outside their home countries, the 
increased ability of sovereigns to issue debt on inter-
national markets is likely to pave the way for enhanced 
corporate access in the future. A similar narrative can 
be found in access to international capital markets: 
only 37 Sub-Saharan African companies are listed on 
equity markets outside the region—17 on European 
exchanges and 11 on U.S. exchanges (Bloomberg data-
base). That said, international investors have demon-
strated increasing interest in African capital markets, 
albeit from a low starting point. 
For all the positivity, Sub-Saharan Africa faces unde-
niable challenges in creating an environment suitable 
for large capital inﬂ ows, not least of which is the rela-
tive underdevelopment of its domestic banking sector. 
Only 24 percent of people age 15 and above have an 
account at a formal ﬁ nancial institution, compared with 
33 percent in South Asia and 55 percent in East Asia 
and the Paciﬁ c (World Bank Global Financial Inclusion 
database).a Domestic credit to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP is less than 30 percent for most 
Sub-Saharan African countries, and in several countries 
that rate is in the single digits. Investors still shy away 
from some countries because of entrenched corruption 
and other risks. In the immediate future, increased con-
sumer spending by the middle class will remain con-
centrated in commodity-exporting and other relatively 
wealthy countries.
Source: World Bank calculations using data in the Dealogic Loan Analytics database.
Note: The ﬁ gure includes intra-African cross-border loans.
FIGURE B3.4.2 Cross-border bank loans to Sub-Saharan Africa are on the rise
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markets may also promote portfolio inﬂ ows, and 
that regulatory institutions should be strength-
ened in tandem with liberalization, given the 
volatility of private capital ﬂ ows (portfolio ﬂ ows 
in particular).
In addition to changes in the composition of 
capital f lows that are likely to accompany the 
increasing share of inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows attribut-
able to developing countries, the two scenarios 
of gross capital f lows in this chapter indicate 
that the coming decades are likely to see much 
greater South-South capital ﬂ ows (as illustrated 
in online annex 3.5). GDH 2011 documented the 
rise of South-South FDI, which is already under 
way and will become an increasingly important 
component of investment in developing countries 
in the future (World Bank 2011). As developing 
countries’ banks grow in size and become more 
internationally active, as their stock and bond 
markets continue to develop, and as their ﬁ nan-
cial markets become more regionally integrated, 
they will have an opportunity to intermediate a 
greater share of South-South ﬂ ows and, broadly, 
to play a much larger role in intermediating 
global capital ﬂ ows than they do today.
At present, more than half of capital outﬂ ows 
from developing countries are in the form of 
government reserve accumulation, while exter-
nal investment activity in advanced countries 
is mainly accounted for by private sector enti-
ties. But reserve accumulation among developing 
countries can be expected to decelerate, perhaps 
dramatically, as more countries move toward ﬂ oat-
ing exchange rate regimes and as capital markets 
are allowed to become more open, meaning that 
developing countries will become more similar to 
advanced countries in terms of the composition 
of their capital outflows. China will be a major 
determinant of the speed and extent of developing 
countries’ changing capital outﬂ ow composition.
Capital ﬂ ows and monetary 
policy spillovers 
As discussed above, in the years ahead the vol-
umes of gross capital ﬂ ows to and from develop-
ing countries are likely to expand dramatically. 
The developing world’s financial markets will 
FIGURE 3.10 Historically, the composition of capital 
inﬂ ows has differed between income groups, with FDI 
providing stability in ﬂ ows to developing countries
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics database.
Note: Each component depicted is the annual net change in liabilities to nonresidents. Loans 
consist mainly of lending by banks and nonbank ﬁ nancial institutions, but also include any 
other type of liabilities to nonresidents not counted as FDI or portfolio investment. Portfolio 
investment includes equity and debt portfolio investment.
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foreign exchange markets. Th e ﬁ rst three of these 
sources, at least, will be in ﬂ ux over the coming 
two decades as developing countries come to 
account for a much greater share of global capital 
ﬂ ows than they do today, as their domestic ﬁ nan-
cial markets mature and become more sophisti-
cated, and as South-South ﬂ ows increase.
As of the end of 2010, the bulk of capital ﬂ ows 
were still conducted in U.S. dollars and euros; 
83 percent of international bonds outstanding 
and 80 percent of international banking assets 
were denominated in one of these two currencies 
(ﬁ gure 3.11). Despite the increasing importance 
of the euro, the U.S. dollar remains the domi-
nant international reserve currency. Th e share of 
reserves held in dollars is more than double the 
share of reserves held in euros.28 
In the current multipolar international mon-
etary system—in which the U.S. dollar and euro 
serve as the principal reserve currencies, most 
emerging economies operate under some vari-
ant of a managed ﬂ oating exchange rate regime, 
and there is high capital mobility across national 
borders—advanced countries with international 
currency status have a disproportionate inf lu-
ence on global monetary conditions.29 Should 
very low interest rates (such as those currently in 
place in key currency countries) be maintained 
over an extended period, they could potentially 
lead to excessive risk-taking behavior on the 
part of ﬁ nancial market participants, including 
banks, and stimulate portfolio and banking ﬂ ows 
to developing countries as investors and ﬁ nan-
cial intermediaries “reach for yield” and seek to 
maintain returns. Under these conditions, policy 
makers in developing countries face a difficult 
challenge in deciphering whether capital inﬂ ows 
are the result of improvements in their domestic 
fundamentals or rather are a transitory eﬀ ect trig-
gered by low yields in advanced countries, subject 
to reversal when world interest rates rise.
One gauge of the extent of the international 
domain of the U.S. dollar and euro in interna-
tional monetary aﬀ airs is the volume of interna-
tional bank claims denominated in those curren-
cies, which is particularly relevant for the large 
number of developing countries where interna-
tional banks account for the bulk of capital ﬂ ows. 
As the international banking industry has grown, 
the U.S. dollar has persistently played a major 
become deeper, more sophisticated, and more 
globalized. These economies’ capital f lows and 
stocks of international assets and liabilities will 
not only grow in size but also change in terms 
of their composition, rates of return, and risk 
proﬁ les. South-South investment will increase. 
Developing countries’ banks and capital markets 
will intermediate a growing share of global capi-
tal ﬂ ows, both between developing countries and 
between developing and advanced economies. 
An implication of these developments is that 
developing countries may become more exposed 
than ever to spillovers of monetary policy shocks 
through their international balance sheets. 
However, the dominant position of today’s global 
ﬁ nancial centers will be eroded to some extent. 
Th us, the conﬁ guration of the sources and chan-
nels of international shocks may become more 
dispersed than today, reducing the exposure of 
the world economy to shocks originating in any 
one economy and offsetting the potential for 
greater instability that developing countries face 
as their ﬁ nancial markets expand and integrate.
The international monetary 
system is anchored to the 
U.S. dollar and the euro
Use of the national currencies of a few major 
advanced countries as the world’s dominant inter-
national currencies has been a prominent feature 
of the post–World War II global ﬁ nancial system. 
Currently, the international monetary system is 
anchored to the U.S. dollar and, to a lesser extent, 
the euro (Dailami and Masson 2011). Th is situ-
ation has long had strong relevance for develop-
ing countries, which rely more than advanced 
countries on credit denominated in foreign cur-
rencies. Monetary policy may be neutral in the 
long run, but at any given time prevailing mon-
etary conditions have real eﬀ ects, and the insta-
bility that can result from an inability to control 
monetary conditions is an important issue facing 
developing-country policy makers. A long-term 
shift in which currencies are most prominent at 
the global level, as well, has policy implications. 
Demand for international currency originates 
from four sources: accumulation of oﬃ  cial for-
eign exchange reserves, international bank credit, 
international securities issues, and turnover in 
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it is likely that some developing countries will 
become major players in international ﬁ nancial 
intermediation. Regarding how monetary policy 
spillovers will evolve, these trends in capital ﬂ ows 
have two main, countervailing implications: First, 
were the present composition of capital ﬂ ows (in 
terms of type and currency denomination) to 
remain roughly the same through 2030, as devel-
oping countries become more deeply integrated in 
global ﬁ nancial markets, the impact of U.S. and 
euro monetary policy on these countries would 
increase. Second, developing countries’ ﬁ nancial 
markets are likely to become deeper and more 
sophisticated in the years ahead, meaning that 
their capital markets and banks have the poten-
tial to intermediate a growing share of the world’s 
capital ﬂ ows, and key developing countries’ mon-
etary policy may become more inﬂ uential on a 
global scale. Monetary spillovers from key devel-
oping countries to other developing countries 
are particularly plausible given that South-South 
capital ﬂ ows are expected to increase in the com-
ing years. Th is change, on its own, would mean 
role as the preferred currency for global banking 
transactions, although there are signs that this 
may change in the future as the dollar gradually 
gives way to other currencies (World Bank 2011). 
It is interesting to note that loans by non-U.S. 
banks, mainly European banks, account for a sig-
niﬁ cant part of dollar-denominated loans.
Global credit denominated in both dollars and 
euros grew rapidly in the decade leading to the 
2007–09 global ﬁ nancial crisis, although it has 
been fairly ﬂ at from 2008 to 2011 (ﬁ gure 3.12). 
U.S. dollar credit stood at $31.4 trillion at the end 
of 2011, up from $12.6 trillion at the end of 1999. 
Global credit in euros was €23.9 trillion ($31.4 
trillion) at the end of 2011, up from €11 trillion 
($11.1 trillion) at the end of 1999. Although the 
amounts of credit outstanding globally that are 
denominated in dollars and euros are roughly 
equal, dollar-denominated credit makes up a 
substantially greater share of credit outside of the 
United States than the euro does outside the Euro 
Area—$11.8 trillion compared with $4.4 trillion. 
One implication is that because the U.S. dollar 
is more internationalized, the global economy is 
more sensitive to U.S. monetary policy than it is 
to Euro Area monetary policy, in part through 
the international banking system.
For emerging-market economies, the ability 
to insulate domestic monetary policy depends on 
their willingness to fully accept the exchange rate 
movements that would result from changes in the 
monetary policy stance of international currency 
countries. Because many countries fear the result-
ing volatility, they intervene to limit the exchange 
rate changes through accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. Th ough countries may be suc-
cessful in the short run in sterilizing the eﬀ ects 
on domestic liquidity, empirical evidence shows 
that there are limits to sterilization. In the cur-
rent environment, for example, this means that 
some of the U.S. monetary expansion is likely to 
appear domestically in emerging-market coun-
tries as well.30 
The international monetary 
system will be in ﬂ ux in the future
Looking forward, developing countries as a whole 
will account for a much greater share of gross cap-
ital inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows than they do today, and 
FIGURE 3.11 International assets and foreign exchange 
trading are mainly denominated in the U.S. dollar and the 
euro
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in the BIS Locational Banking Statistics and IMF 
COFER databases.
Note: Data are for 2010. Denomination of assets is calculated in terms of shares of the global 
stocks of banking assets and bonds for which the denomination was reported to the BIS, 
and shares of reserves for which the denomination was reported to the IMF (in 2010, these 
accounted for 56 percent of total reported reserve holdings). 
a. Because each foreign exchange transaction involves two currencies, the shares of transac-
tion volume in which each currency was involved sum to 200 percent of the total volume.
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is uncertain. One can even imagine a scenario in 
which greater liberalization and integration of 
developing countries’ ﬁ nancial markets proceeds 
hand in hand with a trend toward greater con-
solidation and concentration of global ﬁ nancial 
intermediation, with only a few countries in the 
world specializing in ﬁ nancial services. In such 
that the share of developing countries’ capital 
ﬂ ows denominated in advanced-country curren-
cies would likely shrink as a growing share are 
intermediated by developing country–based capi-
tal markets and banks.
Th us, the evolution of developing countries’ 
exposure to advanced countries’ monetary policy 
FIGURE 3.12 The U.S. dollar is still the main currency in global credit markets
Sources: World Bank calculations using data in the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics and IMF International Financial Statistics databases. 
Note: U.S. (Euro Area) domestic credit by non-U.S. (non-Euro Area) banks is measured as local currency claims on local residents of the United States (Euro Area) using 
BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics data. Domestic credit provided by home banks is estimated by subtracting local currency claims on local residents from total domestic 
credit using IMF International Financial Statistics data. Cross-border claims on residents are from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics. Claims on nonresidents are approxi-
mated by adding cross-border claims on nonresidents and local claims on nonresidents from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics; this underestimates this component 
slightly because it omits credit to nonresidents by their countries’ domestic banks denominated in the currency in question; data on this subcomponent are not readily avail-
able, but it is likely to be quite small relative to foreign banks’ claims in the currency.
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The costly string of banking and sovereign 
debt crises the world has experienced in recent 
years has left policy makers keenly aware of the 
trade-oﬀ  between the instability that can accom-
pany a highly complex and integrated global 
financial system and the benefits of deepen-
ing global integration via capital ﬂ ows. Capital 
inf lows can be key in supporting economic 
growth, and open cross-border ﬁ nancial channels 
are essential in channeling capital from coun-
tries with excess savings to productive projects 
in countries with insuﬃ  cient savings. Over the 
years, the steady integration of developing coun-
tries into the international financial system by 
way of international capital ﬂ ows has provided 
investors with an important means of diversiﬁ -
cation. But it is the risks of an increasingly inte-
grated international financial system featuring 
the movement of capital across countries on a 
massive scale, and how to best manage the system 
to avoid future crises, that continue to dominate 
the minds of ﬁ nancial sector policy makers and 
regulators at the moment. 
Several major concerns lie at the forefront 
of policy discussions related to the stability of 
the international ﬁ nancial system: (a) the long-
standing underpricing of sovereign risk in some 
advanced economies, (b) the global impact of 
unprecedented easy monetary policy in coun-
tries containing major ﬁ nancial centers, and (c) 
the ability of the international ﬁ nancial system to 
fulﬁ ll its primary task of intermediating capital 
across national borders in a manner that promotes 
productive investment and sustained growth 
rather than fueling asset bubbles and instabil-
ity. Regardless of the short-term versus long-term 
nature of each of these issues, the magnitude of 
the expected expansion in the volume of interna-
tional capital ﬂ ows through 2030, in both abso-
lute amounts and as a percentage of GDP, means 
that having an appropriate policy framework in 
place to manage international capital ﬂ ows will 
become even more crucial in the future.
Th ere is broad agreement that central banks 
and other economic planning authorities must be 
well equipped to respond quickly and resolutely 
to mitigate contagion across countries during 
times of ﬁ nancial distress, and must be vigilant 
in monitoring and acting upon conditions that 
a scenario, developing countries might not play 
a significant role in international intermedia-
tion despite becoming increasingly important as 
a source and destination of international capital 
ﬂ ows. Th e 2007–09 global ﬁ nancial crisis appears 
to have interrupted a trend toward greater con-
centration. Whether a reversion to this trend 
occurs depends, in part, on whether policies are 
pursued at the national and regional levels to pro-
mote the deepening and strengthening of local 
ﬁ nancial markets.
It is likely, in any case, that developing coun-
tries will have a more central place in the global 
ﬁ nancial system in the years ahead than they do 
today. China, in particular, has the capacity to 
have a much larger impact on global interest rates 
and other monetary conditions if the renminbi 
follows a path toward becoming an international 
currency.31 And as developing countries account 
for a greater share of global gross capital inﬂ ows 
and outﬂ ows, the composition of those ﬂ ows may 
very well change as well. Reserve accumulation 
will likely diminish relative to private f lows as 
developing countries move toward more ﬂ exible 
exchange rate regimes. Th is will likely mean that 
fewer foreign assets will be denominated in dol-
lars and euros;32 even more important, returns on 
foreign assets will rise as reserves are displaced 
by private investments intermediated by more 
mature ﬁ nancial markets.
Conclusion and policy 
implications
Th e rapid expansion in the volume of global capi-
tal ﬂ ows expected during the next two decades 
in the two scenarios presented in this chapter 
will render the world’s economies more finan-
cially interconnected than at any time in his-
tory. Interpreting how this increased integration 
will aﬀ ect the global economy in the long term, 
or how policy makers should react to it, is by no 
means a straightforward task. History can cer-
tainly provide guidance, but there is also value 
in estimating the scope of international finan-
cial links in the future, and additionally in envi-
sioning potential policy responses that might be 
appropriate.
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around the world set up a large network of liquid-
ity swap lines starting in late 2007 (ﬁ gure 3.13). 
Under these arrangements, the home central 
bank of currencies in short supply globally at the 
time could provide its currency to commercial 
banks operating in other countries, with the cen-
tral banks of the countries in which the commer-
cial banks were located operating as intermediar-
ies (Allen and Moessner 2010). Th e People’s Bank 
of China, for instance, agreed to provide a total 
of RMB 650 billion under swap lines with the 
central banks of Argentina; Belarus; Hong Kong 
SAR, China; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; 
and Malaysia.33 After implementing several prior 
rounds of swap agreements with other major 
central banks, the U.S. Federal Reserve agreed 
to swap lines of unlimited size with the Bank 
of England, Bank of Japan, European Central 
Bank, and Swiss National Bank for a period of 
contribute to instability. Expanding the capacity 
of economic policy makers to act in a coordinated 
manner at the international level in monitoring 
and responding to episodes of instability is, by 
many accounts, also important. Although inter-
national coordination eﬀ orts are complicated by a 
host of political economy and other issues, crises 
oﬀ er strong incentive to overcome such obstacles. 
Financial crises can provide 
strong incentive for international 
monetary policy and ﬁ nancial 
stability coordination
An obvious place to look for evidence on these 
policy matters is the global ﬁ nancial crisis of sev-
eral years ago, which saw unprecedented coor-
dination of monetary policy among national 
monetary authorities. For example, central banks 
FIGURE 3.13 A number of new central bank liquidity swap lines were extended between 
December 2007 and December 2010
Source: Based on Allen and Moessner 2010, with updates. 
Note: Color of the arrows indicates the swap network, generally according to the central bank at the center of the network: blue is Switzerland, 
green is the ECB (European Central Bank), orange is China, red is Japan, and black is the United States; aqua arrows show a multilateral swap net-
work between the central banks of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
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New modes of cross-country 
cooperation may be beneﬁ cial 
as the international ﬁ nancial 
system becomes ever more 
interconnected
Moving forward, a potentially fundamental 
question is whether the current decentralized 
model—in which national (or regional) central 
banks have control over their own monetary pol-
icy and ﬁ nancial regulation is crafted at the coun-
try level—is adequate for the task of managing an 
increasingly globalized ﬁ nancial system. Th e real-
ity is that any model must ﬁ t into the constructs 
of a world made up of sovereign states. In such a 
world, perhaps the best way to arrive at outcomes 
that serve the needs of the most countries possible 
is to encourage cooperation at both the bilateral 
and multilateral levels, while acknowledging that 
a high degree of coordination is not always politi-
cally feasible and that national policies will con-
tinue to be key in shaping the world’s monetary 
and ﬁ nancial policy framework. 
Th e scope for cooperative eﬀ orts is broad and 
could take a number of forms. One form is partic-
ipation in multilateral initiatives—such as those 
on monetary and financial stability and bank-
ing supervision led by the Bank for International 
Settlements—or public commitments to time-
lines for policy objectives within the G-20. One 
potential contribution of the G-20 process would 
be to emphasize the spillover and mutual depen-
dence aspects of key currency countries’ ﬁ nancial 
sector and monetary policy, and to ensure that 
key currency countries move away from a nar-
row policy focus on just their own economies. 
Synthesizing the eﬀ orts of multilateral institu-
tions might also be called for. 
Another form of cooperation is at the bilateral 
level, such as strengthening and institutionalizing 
the swap lines that provide liquidity to non-key 
currency countries during periods of instabil-
ity or sharing knowledge and experience across 
countries. Recent crises in advanced economies 
hold valuable lessons for developing countries 
whose financial markets will become increas-
ingly sophisticated and globally integrated in 
the years ahead. Regulatory institutions must 
be more forward-looking, with systems in place 
six months starting in October 2008 (the height 
of the crisis).
Global and regional organizations responded 
to the crisis by increasing their volume of lend-
ing to client countries. Among multilateral devel-
opment banks, signiﬁ cant capital infusions also 
allowed more resources to be devoted to devel-
opment initiatives in their member countries.34 
International negotiations surrounding postcrisis 
measures to reduce the probability of future ﬁ nan-
cial crises have been led by organizations such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors (G-20). The IMF’s revised Flexible 
Credit Line, for example, together with its newly 
established Precautionary and Liquidity Line, are 
intended to improve the institution’s capacity to 
assist countries heavily aﬀ ected by the crisis and 
to prevent future crises. In 2010, the IMF also 
launched three new concessional ﬁ nancing facili-
ties specifically for low-income countries. The 
IMF’s proposed Global Stabilization Mechanism 
would provide liquidity in conjunction with 
bilateral and regional arrangements with the spe-
ciﬁ c goal of arresting contagion across countries 
during ﬁ nancial crises.
International commitment to preventing epi-
sodes of ﬁ nancial contagion is currently being 
put to the test by the ongoing sovereign debt 
crisis in the Euro Area. In one sense, the world 
is signaling its recognition of the gravity of the 
situation by allocating additional resources to 
safety nets. As of the June 2012 meeting of the 
G-20, 37 IMF member countries had contrib-
uted a total of $456 billion to the institution’s 
ﬁ rewall fund, which the institution intends to 
disburse only as a secondary line of defense after 
resources available via its standard quota arrange-
ments and the New Arrangements to Borrow are 
signiﬁ cantly drawn down. Developing countries 
have been remarkably active in contributing to 
this fund, with the BRICS, along with Mexico 
and Turkey, pledging a combined $95 billion of 
the total. Th is level of involvement by developing 
countries in international crisis prevention and 
resolution mechanisms will become increasingly 
important as developing countries account for a 
growing share of gross global capital ﬂ ows in the 
years to come.
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authorities in emerging economies—facing 
strong capital inﬂ ows as a result of low interest 
rates in major economies—may feel it is neces-
sary to ease interest rates to discourage inﬂ ows 
even if domestic macroeconomic conditions do 
not otherwise call for such a move, although 
the inﬂ ationary pressure of lowering rates must 
also be considered. Macroprudential responses 
might also be considered, perhaps targeting a spe-
ciﬁ c sector, such as real estate, that is subject to 
overheating. 
Faced with strong demand for their assets, 
even economies with f loating exchange rates 
may resort to capital controls, such as Brazil and 
Taiwan, China, did in 2009, or as Switzerland 
implicitly began to do in 2011 when it commit-
ted to maintaining an exchange rate ﬂ oor of the 
Swiss franc against the euro. In the longer term, 
countries reliant on capital inﬂ ows representing 
a large share of their GDP risk ﬁ scal distress and 
recession should there be a sudden turnaround 
in those ﬂ ows, at which point monetary authori-
ties must step in to assist. It could be argued 
that there is potential danger for policy makers 
to err on the side of overly strict capital controls, 
choking oﬀ  access to ﬁ nance, when what is really 
needed is careful reform of regulatory institutions 
and greater international regulatory coordination. 
Understanding the nature of capital inﬂ ows to 
emerging and developing economies—whether 
they are driven by good economic fundamentals 
within the country or by more transitory forces 
such as low yields in advanced economies or 
heavy use of carry trades—can help policy mak-
ers determine the best response. Deciphering 
whether fundamental or transitory forces are 
more powerful in driving capital inf lows to a 
country is no doubt a diﬃ  cult task, but one that 
has clear implications for policy. In the case of the 
former, it has been argued that allowing exchange 
rate appreciation is the most appropriate response; 
in the latter, monetary, ﬁ scal, and ﬁ nancial poli-
cies should be employed (Sidaoui 2011). 
Recognizing the potential impacts of prevail-
ing conditions in advanced economies on the 
rest of the world is no doubt essential to craft-
ing policy responses to those conditions. But 
how might policy responses need to change in 
the long term? The two scenarios presented in 
to monitor new innovations in financial mar-
kets in real time—for example, by making this 
an explicit part of the job description for bank 
supervisors—and to quickly evaluate and adapt 
to innovations before they cause systemic risk. 
Th e bottom line is that cooperation in moni-
toring and managing the international ﬁ nancial 
system cannot be overemphasized. In a highly 
interconnected system, international cooperation 
in managing the system is key for its stability. 
Multilateral institutions will continue to have a 
role in this management in the future, particu-
larly in helping countries establish the conditions 
supporting the development and functioning of 
financial markets and assisting in coping with 
periods of crisis or near-crisis. But initiatives 
within international forums must be considered 
in light of efforts by authorities in individual 
countries. Regarding the response to the global 
ﬁ nancial crisis, the unprecedented provision of 
liquidity by major central banks to help resolve 
the crisis has fueled heated debate about the scale 
and nature of risks being taken in the process 
of unwinding their positions. At the same time, 
there is concern that extremely low interest rates 
in advanced economies could result in an over-
abundance of capital inf lows to emerging and 
developing countries as investors search for yield 
elsewhere, with potentially destabilizing eﬀ ects in 
those countries in the future.
As developing countries come 
to account for half or more of 
the world’s capital outﬂ ows, 
their policies regarding capital 
ﬂ ows are likely to become more 
inﬂ uential at the global level
For a given country, the challenges of managing 
surges of capital inﬂ ows are by now well under-
stood and continue to be relevant in understand-
ing how emerging and developing countries may 
react to accommodative monetary policy con-
ditions that persist in advanced economies. For 
emerging economies with ﬁ xed exchange rates, 
excessive capital inf lows can present a difficult 
choice between allowing currency appreciation 
and intervening in foreign exchange markets to 
hold down the value of the currency. Monetary 
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currencies implies that developing countries will 
become less affected by monetary policy spill-
overs from any one country. Th is could be stabi-
lizing on a global level because liquidity shocks 
will be more diversified, but it could also be 
destabilizing as it becomes more diﬃ  cult to assess 
the timing and extent of monetary policy spill-
overs. Regardless of the currency composition of 
capital ﬂ ows in the future, an increasing share of 
global ﬂ ows going to and from developing coun-
tries indicates that these countries should have a 
larger role in management of capital ﬂ ows at the 
international level, within both bilateral and mul-
tilateral organizations. 
Th ere are also exchange rate regime implica-
tions of a potential shift in the currency composi-
tion of global capital ﬂ ows. With more diversiﬁ -
cation in the currency makeup of capital ﬂ ows, 
countries with ﬁ xed exchange rate regimes may 
ﬁ nd that it is more sustainable to peg to a bas-
ket of currencies (for example, the dollar, the 
euro, and the renminbi) than to any one of those 
currencies. 
Th e rise in the volume of global capital ﬂ ows 
in the decades ahead will increase the inﬂ uence 
of foreign investors on capital accumulation in 
many countries. For some countries, it is conceiv-
able that most of their total investment will be 
determined by overseas investors and creditors in 
the future, thus bringing an even greater inter-
national dimension to ﬁ nancial policy-making 
efforts. The efforts of the G-20, IMF, and BIS 
will be key in developing a ﬁ nancial supervisory 
architecture that enhances global ﬁ nancial mar-
ket stability through, by other measures, avoiding 
excessive volatile speculative capital transactions. 
Policy makers will need to monitor the chan-
nels of capital inf lows (bank loans, portfolio 
investment, and FDI) because these channels 
have diﬀ erent capacities for stabilizing or desta-
bilizing conditions in recipient countries. Th ere 
is wide speculation that capital markets will 
intermediate a growing amount of global capital 
ﬂ ows in the future and that banks will account 
for less. Whether this will be good news for coun-
tries that currently receive most of their inﬂ ows 
in the form of bank loans remains to be seen; 
bank lending tends to be highly procyclical and 
generally less supportive of risk sharing than FDI 
this chapter anticipate sharp transitions in the 
regional patterns of capital ﬂ ows through 2030. 
Under both scenarios, the share of global capital 
inﬂ ows going to Europe and the United States is 
projected to decline substantially, while the share 
going to China will increase considerably. A simi-
lar trend is expected in terms of the share of capi-
tal outﬂ ows. Several future policy implications 
follow from the scenarios. 
Broadly, the course of global monetary and 
ﬁ nancial policy making will need to be adjusted 
at national and international levels to account for 
the implication that developing countries will 
become responsible for an expected half or more 
of the world’s capital outﬂ ows. Th e two scenarios 
presented in this chapter envisage that develop-
ing countries will account for 49–58 percent of 
the world’s global capital outﬂ ows by 2030, rising 
from 28 percent in 2010. Th is shift implies that 
developing countries’ monetary and ﬁ nancial sec-
tor policies could be more inﬂ uential at the global 
level—although, as noted previously, this notion 
must be balanced against the currency composi-
tion of global capital ﬂ ows. 
Among developing countries, China is unique 
in its potential to position its currency as a truly 
global currency during the coming years. Should 
the increase in the share of global capital ﬂ ows 
attributable to China be accompanied by greater 
use of the renminbi as the currency denominat-
ing these ﬂ ows (internationalization of the ren-
minbi is a stated policy goal in China), then 
China’s monetary policy stance can be expected 
to exert considerably stronger inﬂ uence on the 
international financial system than it does at 
present. Under such a scenario, the world would 
also experience a decrease, to some extent, in 
the dominance of U.S. and Euro Area mon-
etary policy on the global stage. One conceivable 
arrangement is that the U.S. dollar, the euro, and 
the renminbi will all be globally signiﬁ cant cur-
rencies by 2030 (World Bank 2011). Of course, 
alternate scenarios consider that either the dollar 
remains preeminent in global ﬁ nance during the 
next two decades, or there is no clearly preemi-
nent currency by 2030.
For small and medium-size developing coun-
tries, a world in which the United States, the 
Euro Area, and China all have key international 
144 Capital Flows in the Third Age of Financial Globalization Global Development Horizons
Estimates for the informal agricultural sector in 
Ghana, for example, place nominal rates there at 
as much as 350 percent (Udry and Anagol 2006), 
and real returns to microenterprises in Sri Lanka 
have been placed at several percentage points 
higher than prevailing market interest rates (De 
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruﬀ  2008).
 4. Some approaches eﬀ ectively lump land and natural 
resources together with capital by estimating the 
income share of capital as one minus the income 
share of labor, in which case the income share of 
capital is overestimated. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) 
estimate that only about half of this amount, on 
average, should actually be attributed to reproduc-
ible capital, but this follows from estimates of the 
contribution of land and natural resources to pro-
duction that may be overly aggressive.
 5. Details are reported in online annex 3.1, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/CapitalForTh eFuture.
 6. Averages for each income group were computed by 
weighting yields for each country by their relative 
share of the group’s capital stock.
 7. Th e notional investment demand equation is cal-
culated across time at the country level, holding 
yields constant at 2014 levels, and this is summed 
across countries to estimate a path of global 
notional investment demand. Th is straightfor-
ward measure of notional demand abstracts from 
the endogeneity of variables such as output on the 
right-hand side of the factor demand equation, 
as these variables follow the path generated by 
the model, which is codetermined with the real-
ized path of investment as opposed to the path of 
notional investment demand. In the special case 
when, globally, yields tend to change little over 
time, the distortion from not accounting for endo-
geneity is quite minor because notional demand 
barely diﬀ ers from realized demand in this case.
 8. More precisely, 2030 global notional investment 
demand is within 0.04 percent of the supply of 
saving. Note that, at the global level, the supply of 
capital will be equal to the pool of saving, and this 
represents the notional global supply of saving for 
investment because—by the assumptions of the 
model—saving is not aﬀ ected by yields.
 9. More precisely, 2030 global notional demand 
exceeds global supply by 2.6 percent; this pressure 
corresponds to a cumulative increase in global 
average yields (weighted by capital stocks) of 
roughly half a percentage point between 2014 and 
2030.
10. It is also important to recognize that a scenario with 
rapid growth alone (unaccompanied by changes in 
or equity portfolio investment (Brunnermeier 
et al. 2012). But, in middle-income countries, 
portfolio investment has historically been even 
more volatile, in relative terms (that is, adjusting 
for the smaller magnitude of this component of 
developing countries’ inﬂ ows), than bank lending 
(Broner et al. 2013).35 Th ough the share of bank 
loans in global capital ﬂ ows may well recede in 
the long term, it must also be acknowledged that 
loans will continue to represent a signiﬁ cant por-
tion of global capital ﬂ ows for years to come. Th e 
many eﬀ orts under way to improve regulation of 
the international banking sector thus will remain 
highly relevant. 
Finally, as growing amounts of capital are 
transferred among developing countries, there 
is even capacity for greater regional monetary 
policy spillover from large emerging economies 
such as Brazil and Russia. Th ese countries are not 
expected to have the global reach that China may, 
but it is conceivable that their inf luence could 
become increasingly apparent at the regional level. 
Certainly, in a multipolar world, South-South 
monetary policy coordination will become more 
critical in promoting stable ﬁ nancial and macro-
economic conditions in developing countries. 
Notes
 1. As in other recent scholarship, gross capital 
inﬂ ows in this report are measured as purchases 
of domestic assets by foreigners net of sales of 
domestic assets by foreigners, and gross outﬂ ows 
are measured as purchases of foreign assets by 
domestic residents net of sales of foreign assets by 
domestic residents. Net capital ﬂ ows are deﬁ ned as 
gross inﬂ ows minus gross outﬂ ows.
 2. Lucas (1990) noted that if positive spillovers from 
human capital accumulation are suﬃ  ciently great 
and suﬃ  ciently local (spilling over more within 
countries than across borders), then diﬀ erences 
in human capital might eliminate diﬀ erences 
between countries in the return to capital entirely. 
However, not enough progress has been made in 
quantifying the scope of external beneﬁ ts from 
knowledge spillovers or the degree to which these 
beneﬁ ts spill across borders to resolve this question 
empirically.
 3. Interest rates can also vary as widely between sec-
tors within countries as they do between countries. 
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is greater, which raises country-speciﬁ c relative 
yields and hence capital inﬂ ows to ﬁ nance realized 
investment; second, realized investment is also 
greater because developing countries can attract 
more investment ﬁ nancing as their ﬁ nancial 
development and institutional quality improve 
substantially.
15. Under the rapid convergence scenario, high-
income countries’ investment falls from 17.3 per-
cent of the group’s GDP in 2010 to 14.9 percent in 
2030, compared with 16.4 percent in 2030 under 
the gradual convergence scenario. Th e group’s 
saving rate in 2030 does not diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly 
between the two scenarios, so the diﬀ erence in the 
group’s aggregate current account balance is due 
mainly to this diﬀ erence in investment rates.
16. Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) distinguish 
between “good imbalances” and “bad imbal-
ances,” and provide a summary of how domestic 
and systemic distortions can give rise to poten-
tially destabilizing imbalances. Th e main role of 
national-level policy makers is to address domestic 
distortions of incentives to save and invest in their 
economies, whereas there is also a role for interna-
tional policy coordination in addressing systemic 
distortions—for example, by improving global 
liquidity provision.
17. In the Linkage  model, national saving does 
depend negatively on the degree of social security 
protection. Details are given in online annexes 1.5 
and 1.6.
18. Advanced economies might reduce current account 
deﬁ cits by increasing public saving and encourag-
ing private saving by avoiding negative real inter-
est rates over extended periods (see, for example, 
Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2010).
19. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007), for exam-
ple, document a transition in the composition of 
emerging markets’ international balance sheets to 
a large FDI and portfolio equity component of 
liabilities, with heavy reserve accumulation on the 
asset side.
20. At the peak in 2007, global gross capital ﬂ ows 
amounted to $11 trillion—an amount equiva-
lent to 19 percent of world GDP—up from $0.4 
trillion in 1980 and approximately $3.7 trillion 
in 2000. At the nadir in 2009, total global gross 
capital ﬂ ows had dropped to $1.8 trillion.
21. In 2010, for example, among majority foreign-
owned banks in developing countries, 34.6 per-
cent (350 banks) had another developing country 
as the main nationality of ownership, up from 
29.3 percent (212 banks) in 2000 (authors’ 
structural factors) does not result in global saving 
and investment deviating signiﬁ cantly from the 
gradual convergence scenario. Th is underscores 
the importance of allowing structural variables 
to experience substantial change—as is consid-
ered in the rapid convergence scenario—to grasp 
the full extent of potential transformations in the 
developing world for global saving and investment 
outcomes. 
11. Higgins (1998) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2002) point to potential eﬀ ects that changes in 
the age structure of populations have on current 
account balances, but the theoretical direction of 
the eﬀ ect is ambiguous because aging can aﬀ ect 
both saving and investment negatively (and poten-
tially nonlinearly). In the scenario analysis in this 
report, the impact of demographic change on net 
capital ﬂ ows is not directly identiﬁ ed, but the 
model generating the scenario results does incor-
porate projected changes in the age structure. Fur-
ther details are given in online annex 1.6.
12. Details of how the two scenarios are constructed 
can be found in online annex 1.6. Details of the 
current account balance projection calculations 
are in online annex 3.2. 
13. In the CGE model, the parameters in the invest-
ment equation are calibrated uniformly across 
countries based on results from a panel regression, 
with an implicit assumption that the future path 
of investment will be determined similarly across 
countries. Details are given in online annexes 
1.5 and 1.6. For China, investment has histori-
cally been higher than would be predicted by the 
model, so its projected path reﬂ ects an adjustment 
down to what would be expected for a typical 
country, given the paths of the right-hand-side 
variables.
14. Th e relatively large diﬀ erential in high-income 
versus developing-country yields described earlier 
raises the Lucas (1990) question of why capital 
can ﬂ ow “uphill” from the South to the North 
in the model. Th e reason for this is that the key 
endogenous variables in the World Bank’s Link-
age model are calibrated to observed 2007 data, 
allowing surpluses (deﬁ cits) to coexist with posi-
tive (negative) yield diﬀ erentials. Consequently, 
only subsequent movements of yields, along with 
the other determinants of investment ﬁ nancing, 
have the potential to alter the path of net capi-
tal ﬂ ows. Th e mitigation of the Lucas paradox 
relative to levels today in the rapid convergence 
scenario thus has two interrelated reasons: ﬁ rst, 
investment demand in many developing countries 
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could lead to more inﬂ ows in the form of bonds 
denominated in domestic currency.
27. Hooper and Kim (2007) estimate the association 
of various measures of transparency with the three 
main components of capital inﬂ ows to devel-
oping countries and ﬁ nd that the relationships 
vary widely, both by dimension of transparency 
and by type of inﬂ ow, so that, broadly speak-
ing, an increase in transparency over time can 
be expected to aﬀ ect the composition of capital 
ﬂ ows. For example, an index of competitiveness 
is found to have a much larger positive association 
with portfolio ﬂ ows than with FDI, and a negative 
association with bank lending; stock market depth 
similarly has a positive association with portfolio 
ﬂ ows and a negative association with bank lending 
(and, in this case, an association with FDI that is 
not statistically signiﬁ cant).
28. Th ese shares are based only on the portion of 
reserves voluntarily identiﬁ ed by central banks to 
the International Monetary Fund to be denomi-
nated in a speciﬁ c currency. In 2010, the currency of 
56 percent of total reserve holdings was identiﬁ ed.
29. Th ese eﬀ ects may not be additive because liquidity 
in each of the currencies may not be easily substi-
tutable, particularly during times of ﬁ nancial dis-
tress, as experienced during the recent crisis when 
acute dollar shortage in international markets 
pushed up the costs of borrowing in foreign cur-
rencies and swapping the proceeds into dollars. In 
particular, the intensive funding pressures expe-
rienced by European banks increased the euro-
dollar implied swap basis spread.
30. A second source of monetary policy spillover is 
that, given the importance of the United States 
in the world economy, spillovers from the United 
States may inﬂ uence economic conditions in other 
countries, such that business cycles become syn-
chronized and corresponding ﬁ scal and monetary 
policy stances become similar across countries. 
For instance, a demand shock in the United States 
may increase both U.S. economic activity and 
U.S. imports, inducing a rise in interest rates in 
the United States and abroad.
31. Th is outcome depends on political commitment in 
China to move toward full currency convertibil-
ity and institutional transparency. An expanded 
discussion of the conditions necessary for the ren-
minbi to become an international currency is in 
World Bank (2011).
32. In the context of the present uncertainty sur-
rounding the institutional arrangement of the 
Euro Area, it should be noted that the extent to 
calculations based on bank shareholder data on 
banks in Bankscope).
22. Didier, Hevia, and Schmukler (2011) show, how-
ever, that the crisis aﬀ ected economic performance 
in high-income and developing countries simi-
larly when diﬀ erences in precrisis growth rates are 
accounted for, and also that there was wide varia-
tion among developing countries, with Eastern 
European countries among the most aﬀ ected and 
low-income countries relatively isolated from the 
global crisis.
23. For example, Martin and Rey (2004) build a 
theoretical model with transaction costs in which 
ﬁ nancial assets are imperfect substitutes and the 
number of assets is endogenous, which gives rise 
to a link between market size and integration, 
and asset returns. Another formal model of how 
greater integration of ﬁ nancial markets can drive 
an expansion of capital ﬂ ows is developed by 
Evans and Hnatkovska (2005); the model implies 
a relationship between integration and changes in 
the composition and volatility of capital ﬂ ows as 
well.
24. Lucas (1990) compares international diversiﬁ ca-
tion to that predicted by a portfolio model and 
reviews a range of possible sources of home bias. 
Kraay et al. (2005) incorporates sovereign risk in 
such a model to reconcile the predictions of the 
model to the data. A growing body of literature 
supports the idea that informational asymmetries 
are important in explaining capital ﬂ ows; see, 
for example, Kang and Stulz (1997); Ahearne, 
Griever, and Warnock (2004); and Leuz, Lins, 
and Warnock (2009).
25. Th e scenarios for outﬂ ows are calculated as a resid-
ual of the gross inﬂ ow and current account pro-
jections, rather than being explicitly modeled (as 
in online annex 3.4), and thus are admittedly less 
theoretically grounded. Some factors that drive 
residents’ capital outﬂ ows from a country are not 
taken into account, and these may diﬀ er signiﬁ -
cantly from the factors that drive foreigners’ capi-
tal ﬂ ows into the country and the determinants 
of current accounts. To the extent that income 
growth and the development and global integra-
tion of ﬁ nancial markets are likely drivers of gross 
outﬂ ows, however, these eﬀ ects are accounted for 
by the modeling strategy via their intermediary 
impact on gross inﬂ ows. 
26. In addition, the currency makeup of the compo-
nents themselves may evolve with ﬁ nancial market 
development. For example, in some larger develop-
ing countries, domestic bond market development 
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310, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, 
Switzerland.
BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.
BIS Locational Banking Statistics, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.
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cussion Paper 7693, Center for Economic and Pol-
icy Research, Washington, DC.
Bloomberg. 2012. “Banks Battling European Debt 
Crisis Lose on African Deals.” May 8. http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-07/banks-battling-
european-debt-crisis-lose-on-african-deals.html.
Bloomberg database, New York. http://www.bloom 
berg.com.
Bordo, Michael D., and Barry J. Eichengreen. 2003. 
“Crises Now and Th en: What Lessons from the Last 
Era of Financial Globalization.” In Monetary His-
tory, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets: Essays in 
Honor of Charles Goodhart, vol. 2, ed. Paul Mizen, 
52–91. London: Edward Elgar.
Broner, Fernando A., Tatiana Didier, Aitor Erce, and 
Sergio Schmukler. 2013. “Gross Capital Flows: 
Dynamics and Crises.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 60 (1): 113–33.
Brunnermeier, Markus, José de Gregorio, Barry 
Eichengreen, Mohamed El-Erian, Arminio Fraga, 
Takatoshi Ito, Philip R. Lane, Jean Pisani-Ferry, 
Eswar Prasad, Raghuram Rajan, Maria Ramos, 
Hélène Rey, Dani Rodrik, Kenneth Rogoﬀ , Hyun 
Song Shin, Andrés Velasco, Beatrice Weder di 
Mauro, and Yongding Yu. 2012. “Banks and Cross-
Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Reg-
ulatory Responses.” Report of the Committee on 
International Economic Policy and Reform, Brook-
ings Institution, Washington, DC.
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 
2009. “Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility.” 
American Economic Review 99 (2): 584–88.
Caselli, Francesco, and James D. Feyrer. 2007. “Th e 
Marginal Product of Capital.” Th e Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 122 (2): 535–68.
Chamon, Marcos D., and Eswar S. Prasad. 2010. “Why 
Are Saving Rates of Urban Households in China 
Rising?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconom-
ics 2 (1): 93–130.
Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. 2006. “What Matters 
for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Insti-
tutions, and Interactions.” Journal of Development 
Economics 81 (1): 163–92. 
which the euro will be used as an international 
currency over the next one or two decades depends 
to some extent on the resolution of inconsisten-
cies between the Euro Area’s monetary and ﬁ scal 
institutions.
33. East Asian countries had a network of swap lines 
already in place, part of the legacy of the 1997–98 
Asian ﬁ nancial crisis, although the People’s Bank 
of China created new swap lines and expanded 
existing ones (Allen and Moessner 2010). 
34. Th e International Monetary Fund, tradition-
ally considered the global lender of last resort for 
countries facing ﬁ nancial crises, tripled its lending 
capacity in response to the crisis. Multilateral devel-
opment banks (MDBs), as well, expanded their vol-
ume of lending to client countries. Th e increase in 
lending by MDBs was possible following signiﬁ cant 
capital increases within many of the institutions. In 
March 2011, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development’s board of governors 
approved an $86.2 billion (31 percent) increase in 
subscribed capital, including $5.1 billion over the 
next ﬁ ve years. Shareholders of the Asian Devel-
opment Bank agreed in April 2009 to triple the 
institution’s capital base, from $55 billion to $165 
billion, the largest general capital increase among 
the major MDBs, including a 4 percent increase of 
paid-in capital over the next ﬁ ve years. In 2010, the 
Inter-American Development Bank approved a $70 
billion (70 percent) increase in general capital, and 
the African Development Bank approved a $63 bil-
lion (200 percent) increase.
35. At the same time, rapid adjustment of asset prices 
means that foreign holders of equity absorb much 
of a negative shock before they can exit, and thus 
may be less likely to exit in response to the shock. 
However, investors face high costs of monitoring a 
fund manager’s medium- to long-run performance, 
and this can tend to induce a focus on short-term 
returns and herding behavior (De la Torre, Ize, and 
Schmukler 2011; World Bank 2012).
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